The
whistle on the approaching locomotive shrieked in desperation. Angry
hands grabbed the big iron “harp switch”, and forcefully slammed
the flagged handle aside. With a ringing thud the lever shoved the
twin iron rails 3 inches, opening the point.
A cheer rose from the
men watching round the station. The 4 large drive wheels on the
locomotive abruptly stopped turning, and white yellow sparks danced
where the iron wheels now slid along the iron rails. One of the thin
men shouted, “We are done walking, General!” The rabble cheered
again. One of the rebel officers drew his Navy Colt revolver from his
belt.
The
trouble began after the Army of Mississippi reached the Southern
Railroad 12 miles east of Jackson. They had been marching for a week,
from Vicksburg to Edwards Depot, to Raymond, 3 more days to the
Pearl River, 2 more days to be ferried across and to march north to
Brandon. They had been promised they would board cars of the Southern
Railroad for the 40 mile ride to Enterprise, and then a one day march
south to new camps where they would wait to be exchanged for Yankee
prisoners.
These 30,000 sick, exhausted Confederate soldiers watched
train after train disappear toward Enterprise, including the Governor escaping with many of the state records. Then, on Wednesday, 15 May the men
were told there would be no trains for them. Discipline collapsed.
Private
Epram McDowell Anderson, a 21 year old from the First Missouri
Brigade, witnessed the riot of weary men. “Efforts were made,” he
wrote a year after the war, “by moving the switch, to throw the
trains...from the track...officers had to draw and threaten to use
their side-arms before the mob could be subdued. (Later) One man got
up in the plaza of Brandon and offered to...go and hang (General)
Pemberton, the traitor.” And the dispirited remnants of the Army
of Mississippi had to complete their journey via “shank's mare”
to the Chickasawhay River and Enterprise, 12 miles from the Alabama
border.
General
“Old Joe” Johnston (above) had to stop the trains, to protect the
locomotives. West of the still damaged Pearl River bridge some 90
steam engines had been or soon would be lost. None of these could be
replaced.
And while the Confederacy did everything it could to keep
the Yankees from learning of the Brandon riot, 32 year old William
Nugent, one time lawyer and now Mississippi Inspector General
admitted in a 28 July letter to his wife Eleanor that, “...after
the fall of Vicksburg I entertained the most gloomy forebodings...The
great demoralization produced in our army...was enough to make one
dispirited.” He hoped, he said, that with time the officers could,
“...reorganize and re-discipline our army...”. It was a
desperate hope. But with the fall of Vicksburg, the Confederacy had
little left but desperation.
Disaster
followed upon disaster. On Thursday, 9 July the outpost of Port
Hudson surrendered 6,500 men to General Nathaniel Banks. On Friday,
10 July Joseph 'Old Joe' Johnston and his Army of Relief retreated
back inside the defenses of Jackson.
But with the Pearl River Bridge
still not fully repaired, his 28,000 men had no hope of defending the
town against the 40,000 Yankees gathering outside its trenches. The
weather was hot, General Sherman noted, adding that “...on the
morning of July 17th the place was found evacuated. General Steele's
division was sent in pursuit as far as Brandon..but General Johnston
had carried his army safely off, and pursuit in that hot weather
would have been fatal to my command.”
And
with that anticlimax, the Vicksburg campaign came to an end.
Confederate President Jefferson Davis (above) had no doubt who and what was
to blame for the outcome. Vicksburg was lost, he insisted, because of
a “want of provisions inside and a general outside who would not
fight.” The latter being the cranky and
passive-aggressive Joe Johnston - whom Davis had appointed.
But what about the general inside,
the uninspired and uninspiring Lieutenant General John Clifford
Pemberton (above)? He was also Davis' choice. And Davis had advised him not to
follow Johnston's' orders. It seemed to b3e of a piece, Davis' refusal to admit
any personal culpability in the disaster, Davis had also appointed Pemberton, and advising him to ignore Johnston's orders.
The
Vicksburg Campaign began in December of 1862 and lasted 7 months
through July of 1863. It cost the Yankees 10,000 dead, wounded and
missing, while the Confederacy suffered over 45,000 causalities.
In
just 6 months, Jefferson Davis' insistence on holding Vicksburg and
Port Hudson, even after Grant had destroyed the Pearl River Bridge,
had cost the Confederate government an entire field army, as well as
all but a 12 mile eastern sliver of Mississippi, some 48,500 square
miles of sovereignty lost.
Jefferson Davis' culpability in this
disastrous campaign proved a damning indictment of his military
skills. The President of the Confederacy had no business telling any
general where to place his men.
David
Dixon Porter (above), the 53 year old Admiral of the Yankee brown water navy,
had been accused of never praising a superior. And he was never a
close friend of Grant's. But he had nothing but praise for the Major
General.
“No ordinary general could have taken Vicksburg” said
Porter. “Some men would have given it up....some would have
demanded half the resources of the Union; but Grant never wavered in
his determination, or in his hopes of success."
Most
important of all to Midwest farmers, a war which had seemed a
stalemate 7 months earlier, was now clearly on the path to victory.
As Lincoln put it, “The father of waters now ran unvexed to the
sea.” And that was the achievement of Ulysses S. Grant.
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