VICKSBURG Chapter Forty - Nine

 

As noon on Saturday, 16 May, 1863 approached, the 1^st brigade of General Hovey's 12^th Division,  had captured the low ridge overlooking the key cross roads atop Champion Hill. Immediately Brigadier General George Francis McGinnis ordered artillery up the hill to support the tenacious toe hold. As the path up the slope was narrow, only two guns were sent. It was a moment of high drama, captured by the official history of the 16^th Ohio Light Artillery battery.

“...Lieutenant (George) Murdoch was ordered up to the top of the Hill. Captain (James A.) Mitchell asking...to be permitted to go with it to place the guns. We galloped up the Hill. Cannoneers dismounted...Lieutenant Murdoch's horse was wounded, so that during the fight he was dismounted. A little distance beyond the summit of the Hill there was an open field to the left of the road, into which one of the guns, with Corporal Belmer as gunner, was pulled...

...while the other, with Corporal (Pomeroy) Mitchell (above)  as gunner,  went forward about fifty yards and found a good place just to the right of the road, near a log cabin and smoke house. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Murdoch were with this gun.... the ground sloping down hill in front of them...by using solid shot (they) could fire over our own men...”

“...The gun by the cabin found our men, in front of it, in the way. The rebels were advancing, the bullets were coming fast. Then it was that the captain showed his bravery. He dashed down on his horse, right in the face of that leaden storm, and cried to our men: "Out of the way. boys, get out of the way and give the artillery a chancel" Our men rushed back and around the cabins, and as the Johnnies came on they got charge after charge of canister, all the 13 rounds of canister the gun carried.” 

This counter attack had been hastily thrown together by Brigadier General Stephen Dill Lee (above), whose 2^nd brigade was facing an attack by troops from Logan's division, coming up the wooded and ravine which into cut northern slope of Champion Hill.  But Lee knew the vital point was, in fact behind him. 

So around 1:00pm, Lee collected about 400 survivors of the 34^th Georgia regiment who had been thrown back by the first Yankee thrust, bolstered them with his own reserve, the 31^st Alabama regiment, and launched an immediate assault. 

This first counter-attack was quickly cut down by deadly accurate fire of the 45^th Illinois and 23^rd Indiana regiments, and flanking fire from the 24^th Indiana, but mostly because of the two cannon from the 16^th Ohio. As his troops fell back. Lee ordered a second assault, this time adding the 23^rd Alabama regiment drawn from his own front line, directed specifically to silence those Yankee guns.

The history of the 16^th Ohio notes the bravery of the rebel assault. “... though the slaughter was appalling, still on they came.....as fast as one line was shattered another took its place.” 

But the account also records the cost. “The brave Captain (James Mitchel) remained on his horse... A whole volley was fired at him by the enemy concealed in the ravine...near the house. As the horse was hit he sprang forward, throwing the Captain off backward...(James) rose from the ground, pressing his hand to his chest, the blood flowing freely from his wound. Lieutenant Murdock sent back for surgical aid, but the Captain insisted on sitting down with his back to a tree at the roadside near the command...”  In such a way the second assault was thrown back.

About 1:30pm, Lee's division commander, General Stevenson, sent word to Pemberton, asking for help. Not waiting for a reply, Lee launched troops on yet another attempt to retake the vital road junction, adding the 46^th Alabama regiment to his punch. Some of these troops were making their third charge that afternoon against the Yankee line. 

Out of canister shot, Corporal Belmer's gun was hitched to its horse team and sent racing back down the hill. The gun manned by Pomeroy Mitchel however, kept firing until Lieutenant Murdoch saw the rebels closing in. He waved his pistol and yelled, “Quick, boys, out of here!”

The 16^th not only saved both their own guns, they captured 2 cannon from The Botetourt battery, and spiked several of the guns abandoned by Waddell's battery. Meanwhile, the third rebel counterattack was thrown back, leaving the 46^th Alabama regiment embedded in the Yankee line. Exhausted and bloodied, the brave Alabamian fighters suddenly found themselves surrounded. When demanded, the Confederate regiment was forced to surrender.

It was now almost 2:00pm. The isolated battle for the crest of Champion Hill -  now called The Hill of Death - had been going on for almost 2 hours. The first brigade of General McGinnis, comprising the 11^th, 24^th, 34^th and 46^th Indiana Regiments and the 29^th Wisconsin regiment had suffered almost 90 dead – including Captain Mitchel - almost 500 wounded and 23 missing or captured. On the opposing line, Cummings shattered Georgia brigade had suffered 121 dead, 269 wounded and 605 captured, and Lee's Alabama battalion had sacrificed over 40 men killed, 140 wounded and 600 captured. The other causality was Grant's patience

At noon Grant had ordered an assault all along his line, but neither Osterhaus's 9^th division, nor Carr's 14^th division in the center had yet to move. It would later be determined that the messenger carrying the order to attack had gotten lost, and had just reached General McClernand's headquarters. Grant might have expected McClernand to have launched his assault on his own initiative, upon seeing Hovey's 12^th division desperately battling on the crest. But the midst of a battle was not the time to deal with McClernand. Grant was was assured the entire line would be advancing soon, along with more support for Hovey's brave men.

Meanwhile Pemberton was having his own command problems. His first choice to support Steven's hard pressed men was to call for one of Loring's 4 brigades. “Old Bizzards” was still trading long range skirmishing fire with Smith's approaching 12^th Division and Blair's 2^nd. But in response to Pemberton's orders, Loring pleaded that he was about to be attacked and could not spare even one of his brigades.  And no matter how many orders Pemberton issued, Loring simply ignored them.

That left only General John Stevens Bowen's smaller division, stretched out along the north/south Ratcliff Road, in between Steven's and Loring's divisions. They, at least, had the advantage of being closer.

The closest unit was Bowen's 1^st brigade under long dour faced 32 year old Brigadier General Seth Maxwell Barton (above).  Shortly after 2:00pm he sent 3 regiments against the flank of the weary federal troops, charging with the 40^th, 41^st and 43^rd Georgia Regiments, supported by the 4 guns of the Cherokee Georgia Artillery, under Captain Max van den Corput. 

Falling on the Yankee flank, they broke the line and pushed it off the vital crossroads, 300 yards back to the crest. But there the Yankees reformed. So Barton threw in his reserve, the 52^nd Georgia regiment against the vulnerable right flank of the new Federal line, crumpling it and at last sending the blue coats streaming for the rear.

And at that moment, after almost 3 hours of violence and bloodshed, the weary men of Barton's brigade were within 5 or 6 hundred yards of complete and total victory. Because at the bottom of that hill, gathered around the Champion home, were almost 200 Yankee wagons loaded with ammunition. It was the last supplies to come through from Port Gibson. And if those wagons and the ammunition they  carried, were captured Grant's campaign would come to an immediate collapse. 

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VICKSBURG Chapter Forty - Eight

 

It was men from Madison who drew the first shots from the rebel cavalry at about 6:45am on that Saturday, 16 May, 1863, about 10 miles northwest of Raymond on the Edward's Depot Road. Under the able direction of 22 year old lawyer, Lieutenant Colonel William Freeman Vilas, Companies “A”, “D” and “I” of the Wisconsin 23^rd Infantry (above) were deployed as skirmishers, and they slowly drove the rebel cavalry northwestward up the road.

The 23^rd was the leading regiment of 31 year old Brigadier General Stephen Gano Burbridge's 1^st Battalion, within the 10^th Division, under the irascible professional, 47 year old Brigadier General Alexander Jackson Smith. Behind Smith's division on this same road was the 2^nd Division of 42 year old politically connected Major General Francis Preston Blair, junior. His division, under Sherman's XVIIth Corps, had just escorted 200 wagons of ammunition to Grant's army. But now they were marching under General McClernand's orders, expecting battle with the Army of Mississippi sometime today.  

Confederate Major General William Wing Loring's division was just up that road, alerted now and preparing a reception for the Yankee's. But shortly after 7:30am, the sound of cannon fire from the north made obvious the central flaw in Loring's plan, which Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton (above) had adopted. 

The only bridge over Baker's Creek was behind the rebel army's left flank. And with the ford on the Raymond road still flooded, that bridge was Pemberton's only connection to Edward's Depot and his supply line back to Vicksburg. So while trying to cut Grant's supply line, Pemberton had uncovered his own. In a near panic, Pemberton ordered Loring to pull his men back 2 miles to Champion Hill, dig in and hold his ground.

Up north, where the the Ratliff Road met the Clinton road, atop the 75 foot high Champion Hill, the “slender dark-bearded” 29 year old Brigadier General Stephen Dill Lee (above) was methodically getting his Alabama battalion organized for the day's march. He was not expecting trouble, but then, about 7:30am, a company of the 20^th Alabama regiment on the Clinton Road began exchanging gunfire with an advancing Yankee regiment. The shooting got hot for a time, and when the Yankees kept showing up in disturbing numbers Lee had to react quickly. He formed his men into an angle, facing Yankees to the north and to the east.

In one regard the South Carolinian was responsible for this war. As an 1856 graduate of West Point, Captain Stephen Lee had delivered the ultimatum to Fort Sumter in April of 1860. When the fort's commander, Major Anderson, pointed out he had rations for only 3 days, making any shooting or loss of life unnecessary, Lee had rejected the peace offer out of hand. He replied, “(General) Beauregard will open fire on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time." Would the north have reacted with such unity, if the rebellion had begun with a quiet surrender and not a bombardment? Thanks to Stephen Lee, we will never know. 

As a cavalryman in 1862 Stephen had fought at Seven Pines, where General Johnston was wounded. As a Colonel of artillery, he had commanded Confederate guns at Antietam Creek that September, and maybe saved the Army of Northern Virginia. At Chickasaw Bluffs, in January of 1863, at the head of a full division, he had repulsed Sherman's corps, maybe saving Vicksburg. And now atop Champion Hill, reduced again to a brigade commander, Lee recognized the key to his position as the almost imperceptible narrow crest that formed an angle along the hilltop.

Grant's hammer was about to fall on Pemberton's army at the most crucial spot at the precise moment it could destroy the rebel army. In addition to the 11,000 blue coats approaching on the Raymond Road, 2 more Yankee divisions were heading toward Champion Hill on the Clinton Road – the 9^th Division , under 40 year old Prussian born revolutionary Brigadier General Peter J. Osterhaus, followed by the 14^th Division of 33 year old New Yorker, Brigadier General Eugene Asa Carr – both members of 51 year old Major General John Alexander McClernand's XIII Corps.

And to the north, on the Bolton road, were 3 divisions - the 12^th of 42 year old Brigadier General Alvin Peterson Hovey, - XIII Corps - the 3^rd Division of 37 year old John Alexander Logan, and the 7^th Division of 33 year old Hoosier Marcelles Monroe Crocker, both from the XVII Corps under 34 year old Major General Birdseye McPherson. But McClernand was the senior officer present, and about 9:00am when General Hovey asked for permission to launch an assault, McClernand postponed the decision until General Grant had arrived. Meanwhile he ordered Logan's division to extend Hovey's bent line line toward Baker's Creek.

As Hovey's infantry twisted to face Champion Hill, the 168 men of the 16^th Ohio Volunteer Light Battery pulled up north of the the Champion farm house, From here they had a clear view of the Confederates atop the hill.

These Buckeyes had been organized by 37 year old Springfield, Ohio lawyer, Captain James Anderson Mitchel. Its six 6 pound brass rifled cannon were serviced by, among others, the captain's brothers and cousins– 36 year old Lieutenant Isaac Newton Mitchel, 31 year old Sergeant “Jim” H. Mitchel, 25 year old Sergeant William Mitchel, 22 year old Corporal Isaa Mitchel, 21 year old Corporal Pomeroy Mitchel, and 32 year old Private Milton Mitchel.

Corporal Pomeroy Mitchel (above) would write years later, “A skirmish line was thrown out to feel (the rebel) position. Logan's Division marched past and filed to the right....while the enemy was in the woods facing them....” Hovey's men were facing west and south.

Up on the bare hilltop, division commander, Major General Carter Stevenson (above), edged Lee's Alabama brigade to the left - replacing it on the Clinton/Ratcliff crossroads with the larger 1^st Brigade of Brigadier General Seth Barton – the 34^th, 31^st and 39^th Georgia regiments. The defense of this vital position at the new center of the line was also supported by the sole 2 remaining cannon of the Botetourt Artillery – the Virginians badly mangled at Port Gibson back on 1 May – and the 8 guns crewed by Alabamians, under 36 year old Captain James Flemming Waddell.

Stevenson's 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier General Alfred Cumming, extended Lee's line west along the crest, facing north. Stevenson held his 4^th brigade under Colonel Alexander Reynolds in reserve, and sent the supply wagons scrambling back across the Baker's Creek bridge to safety. All this took time to establish, but luckily the Yankees seemed in no hurry.

It was not until 10:00am that Grant  (above) and McPherson finally arrived on the field. Grant took over the Champion house as his headquarters. Angry at the delay, Grant reluctantly waited until Logan's men were deployed out on his left flank, and then, about 10:30am, ordered the assault against the entire rebel line.

Wrote the witness Corporal Pomeroy Mitchel, “The infantry of our brigade went forward on both sides of the road. At the brow of the hill there was a battery which was to be taken first of all. (37 year old hat maker Brigadier General George Francis) McGinnis ordered one section of our battery (2 guns) to advance and prepare for action. After advancing to the (base) of the Hill we halted, while the 49th Indiana and 29th Wisconsin were creeping up the hill to capture the battery...For the last rush, they waited till all the (enemy) guns had fired.” 

The charge, when it came , was short - about 75 yards -  and bloody.  Recalled 23 year old Lieutenant Thomas Wise Durham, of the 11^th Indiana, “We were stabbing with bayonets, clubbing with guns, officers shooting with revolvers and slashing and thrusting with swords.” After several long violent  minutes the rebel line broke, and the Confederates fell back, seeking shelter in a ravine on the southern slope, cut by Austin Creek,  But other Federal regiments flanked the ravine, and fired volley after volley into it, until,  said Durham,, “They were really piled on top of each other,” Austin Creek, he said, ran red. By 11:00am, the Yankees had captured half a dozen rebel cannon and controlled the vital road junction. Grant had just cut off two thirds of the Pemberton's small army.

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VICKSBURG Chapter Forty - Seven

 

Late on the evening of Thursday, 14 May, 1863, General Joe Johnston (above) paused 6 miles north of Jackson, Mississippi, along the New Orleans and Memphis rail line. There he composed another missive – to call it an order stretches that definition to the breaking point - to Lieutenant General Pemberton, somewhere near Bovina Station. He wondered if Pemberton might be able to cut Grant's supply line. And he urged, again, that if Pemberton's units could not do that, then their forces should unite. And that was the passive aggressive "order" he sent to Pemberton, near midnight on Friday, 15, May.

Later that morning another 4,000 man brigade joined his forces, bringing Johnston's strength to about 10,000 men. But the new arrivals were exhausted, and needed at least a day to recover.  Within a week Johnston would have perhaps 30,000 men. But ominously, forty miles to the west on that morning, Lieutenant General Pemberton and his army was moving not toward a junction, as Johnston had urged and ordered earlier, but were still waiting.

Pemberton's original plan had been a compromise between his conflicting orders from Confederate President Jefferson Davis to hold Vicksburg (above), and his “orders” from Joe Johnston, to abandon the city and march his army east to Jackson. Pemberton's compromise to this conflict was the worst of both worlds. 

Pemberton left 2 divisions of infantry and the battalion of artillery – about 13,000 men in total – to hold Vicksburg and the heights above the Yazoo River. With his remaining 3 divisions of infantry and Wade Adam's Cavalry -about 17,000 men in total - he advanced eastward along the Southern Railroad to Edward's Depot (above). By staying along the railroad he was protecting his own supply line back to Vicksburg, and, he could argue, thus Vicksburg as well.

However last night, at a council of war, Pemberton had accepted Major General Loring's suggestion, that the army should strike toward Raymond – 20 miles to the southeast. The goal was to cut Grant's supply line, and allow Johnston's smaller force to safely advance and link up with Pemberton.  But, leaving the railroad required finding more horses and wagons.

It took time to seize the transport – until now Pemberton had refused to simply take what he needed – and to load the wagons and organize them into a column. And so Pemberton's entire army spent the morning on their asses while this wagon train was created. The rebel army was not ready to move until the morning was almost gone. And then, before the great advance had made much more than a single mile, it was forced to halt again.

You see, there were three routes which could be taken from Edward's Depot to Raymond. The most direct route crossed Baker's Creek (above, blue line) on a bridge and then turned toward Raymond.  Or, the army might first march east on the Bolton Road, where eventually a road net would allow the troops to turn south/east. The central route followed The Jackson road, climbing a 75 foot tall hill. On its broad flat top the Jackson road crossed a narrow north/south lane called the Ratcliff Road, before descending to level ground where it passed the farmhouse of Sid and Matilda Champion, who had given their name to the entire hill.

The hill top farm had been a wedding gift from the father of the bride, and in the 7 years since their nuptials, Sid and Matilda  (above) had built a 2 story home, and introduced 4 children into the world. Sid had joined the 28^th Mississippi cavalry in '62. And a year later, with soldiers from both sides gathering around her home, Matilda escaped with her children to her father's home in Madison County, Mississippi. The property was left to be guarded by the slaves who toiled the soil against their will. 

After crossing the small Jackson Creek, this central route, headed toward Clinton and beyond to the state capital of Jackson. But before doing that it also crossed another road which turned south toward Raymond.

General Pemberton had chosen the most direct route. But this proved to be a most unfortunate choice, because, as the head of Pemberton's column approached Baker's Creek ford the rebels found the stream swollen with Friday's downpour. The flood had washed out the bridge. 

A little scouting would have warned Pemberton of this problem But no one had checked the route in daylight, even with the hours of delay in getting started....

...not even though the vanguard of this sad sack march was being led by the man who had suggested it - the one armed General Loring (above).   So now, Pemberton's little army had to turn about and slowly counter march a mile back to Edward's Depot.  It took another hour or more. The inability to execute a simple march sapped the energy and spirit of the troops. But the man most offended was Major General Loring., and guess who old Give 'Em Blizzards" blamed for this screwup; not himself certainly, but his boss, General Pemberton.

Then Pemberton made things even worse by deciding to take the Jackson Road. After climbing Champion Hill, Pemberton, now  decided to leave the Jackson Road and follow the narrow and badly maintained “Ratcliff Plantation Road”, which ran a mile south across the top of Champion's Hill before dropping and reconnecting with the road he had originally intended upon using. This final choice slowed their progress even more, and the effect of all this waiting, marching and counter-marching was exemplified by Private Wesley Connor, a member of the Cherokee Artillery near the rear of the column. His unit had set out promptly at 7:00am, and then “... marched two hundred yards, halted an hour or two, and then marched back...” They had then then waited another 11 hours, until 6:00pm,  when they “...marched eastward several miles and then southward", before they, "...bivouacked five or six miles..." from their starting point.

Lorings men pitched their tents around the widow Champion's house, while Lieutenant General Pemberton slept comfortably inside. Two miles up the road, centered around the junction of the Raymond and Ratcliff roads was the division of Major General Bowen. And behind them, the troops commanded by Major General Stevenson,  camped along the northern crest of the hill.  And behind them was the supply train, which had delayed the army for half a day, and then advanced less than four miles.  It seemed to the participants as a disastrous day's march. In fact, the wreckage of Pemberton's first bold decision would save his army, because it failed.

Awakening before 5:00 the next morning, Saturday, 16 May, 1863, Pemberton learned that the cavalry scouts sent ahead to locate Grant's supply trains had found the roads between Port Gibson and Raymond, completely empty. Suddenly Pemberton was adrift. Where were Grant's supply trains? Where was Grant's army? Then about 6:30 the commander of his cavalry brigade, Colonel Wirt Adams (above) came galloping up to report that his men were already skirmishing with Yankee infantry on the Bolton Road, at the very rear of Pemberton's army.  And behind those skirmishers there appeared to be a lot of Yankee soldiers on the road to Edward's Depot, in the perfect position to cut Pemberton's men off from their supply line back to Vicksburg.

Almost immediately a new rider appeared, bearing a message from General Johnston, dated the afternoon of Thursday, 14 May. It informed Pemberton that Johnston was surrendering Jackson, and added, this “,,,makes your plan (to attack Grant's supply line) impractical. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton...".

But the problem with that suggestion was that the road to Clinton was filled with Yankee soldiers heading right at the rear of Pemberton's disjointed army. 

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