At
7:40 am the first wave of 183 warplanes spotted the white water
breakers at Kahuka Point (above). As they banked south at 6,000 feet, 39
year old Commander Mitsuo Fuchida slid back the center canopy of his
torpedo bomber. And as they passed seaward of Waimea Bay, he raised
his binoculars.
Twenty miles up the central valley of Oahu he could
see the Army air base at Wheeler airfield. Thirty-five miles beyond
were the three lobes of the naval base at Pearl Harbor. No American
planes moved in the sky. The Pacific Fleet remained chained to its
anchors.
Ten minutes later the long anticipated war between the
United States and Japan, began. But what screwed up 40 years of
careful planning on both sides was a bunch of irrational human
beings. And you can't plan for that.
In
1901 the rational Rear
Admiral Raymond Perry Rodgers (above) drew up plans for an American war with
Japan. Labeled War Plan Orange, it called for the American Pacific
Fleet to sail west to relieve the U.S. colony in the Philippines, and
then turn north to fight a decisive battle with the dreadnoughts of
the Imperial Japanese Navy. With minor modifications that remained
the basic war plan until 1941, and was mirrored by Japanese planning.
Entering
the 20th century, the Japanese elite were desperate to keep the
Americans from scavenging their nation as the Europeans had devoured
China. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea, so it's rice fields could feed
the growing Japanese population.
They
conquered Manchuria in 1931, to gain coal, iron, zinc and copper for
Japanese industry.
And they invaded China in 1937, seeking even
more resources to stabilize their own Imperial system. The one
natural resource which kept Japan from total independence was oil,
90% of which they had to buy from the United States. As a hedge, the
Imperial government had carefully amassed a 2 year stockpile.
By
April of 1940, Prime Minster, 50 year old Prince Fumimaro Konoye (above, front), started looking for an escape hatch from the morass of the China war he
had sought. He opened talks with the American government. But
from within his own cabinet a war hawk emerged, 52 year old General
Hideki Tojo (second row, second from the left)
The General (above) argued that, “... If we yield to America's
demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China incident. Manchukuo
(Japanese Manchuria) will be endangered and our control of Korea
undermined.” As the most elite of the elite, Emperor Hirohito was
sympathetic to Tojo.
Then,
early in July of 1941 the Japanese occupied the rubber plantations in
French Indochina. Outraged, President Franklin Roosevelt froze all
Japanese funds in American banks. The President and his senior
advisers then secretly slipped off to Newfoundland to meet with
Winston Churchill to talk about the war raging in Europe.
So
everybody above Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson (above), was
abruptly out of the loop. Because of this brief and sudden power
vacuum, the 38 year old antifascist autocratic who headed the little
known Foreign Funds Control Committee, found his hand wrapped around
the Japanese throat.
Late
in July Acheson squeezed. His committee ruled that Japan could not
use frozen funds to pay for the $50 million of petroleum they had
contracted to buy, enough oil to keep them independent into 1943.
The American oil companies screamed at the lost revenue, but after
returning from the Atlantic Conference the Roosevelt administration
feared rescinding the order would “send the wrong message” to
Japan.
Acheson himself had no concerns about backing Japan into a
corner because, as he wrote later, “...no rational Japanese could
believe that an attack on us could result in anything but disaster
for his country."
The power Acheson had such faith in was the
American Pacific fleet, 9 battleships (above the USS Arizona) , 3 aircraft carriers, 20
cruisers, 50 destroyers and 33 submarines. In May of 1940, this
powerful force had been transferred to Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, to
send a message.
The
lagoon's original name was “Wai Momi”, meaning Waters of Pearl.
Over the previous half century the U.S. Navy had dredged it to an
average depth of 30 feet, built piers, dry docks, maintenance yards,
barracks, warehouses and air fields.
In 1924 construction began on
what would become 60 large above ground oil tanks (above), which could hold
4.5 million barrels of fuel for the Pacific Fleet.
In addition there
were some 30,000 U.S. Army troops stationed at Henderson Barracks,
and Army fighters and bombers at Hickham Field in the center of
Oahu.
Oddly,
the individual who objected the most to basing the fleet at Pearl
Harbor was the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, 64 year old
Admiral James Otto Richardson (above, center).
What worried Richardson was the
vulnerability of the fleet, in particular those above ground oil
tanks. A single strafing run, firing incendiary shells, could set
afire the entire 4 million barrels, leaving the fleet stranded and
easy prey to Japanese battleships and submarines.
Richardson (above) had spent most of 1940 convincing Congress to put the fleet's
vulnerable Oahu oil stockpile 100 feet safely below the volcanic
rocks of the Red Hills, 3 1/2 miles east of the harbor. But the crews did
not start drilling into the basalt until late December of 1940. Even
working around the clock the 250 million gallons of oil would not
start filling the 20 steel lined underground tanks for another three
years. Until then, Richardson wanted the fleet to return to San
Diego. The Roosevelt Administration felt that would be an open
invitation to Japanese aggression, and decided to fire Richardson.
About
the same time Richardson's head hit the chopping block, 57 year old
commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (above),
began planning a preemptive attack on Pearl Harbor. He did this own
his own, and the first time he presented his proposal to the Naval
General Staff , they rejected it.
Typical was the opposition of 57
year old arthritic Vice Admiral Chūichi
Nagumo. Even though he had no experience in aviation, he had just
been just been promoted to command Japan's Kido Butai (mobile strike
force), their aircraft carriers. Nagumo insisted he had the “utmost
respect” for Yamamoto,
but cautioned, “...the most brilliant man can occasionally make a
mistake.”
On
1 February, 1941, 58 year old Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel was named
the new Chief in Command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He shared many of
Richardson's concerns about the fleet's new base. But remembering the fate of his predecessor, Kimmel subdued his warnings, and 2 weeks
after assuming command, he assured his bosses, “I feel that a
surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a
possibility, and we are taking immediate practical steps to minimize
the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will
pay.”
But
Kimmel's only effective warning of such an attack would come from
Consolidated PBY Catalina patrol planes, which could search up to 800
miles out of Pearl. However the strain of long flights on aircraft
and crews, and the limited number of planes at hand meant Kimmel
could only search the most probable approaches.
U.S. Army Air Force
had been promised B-17 heavy bombers (above), which could match the Catalina
for search range. However, on the eve of every delivery, the numbers were reduced or completely diverted to other
demands. As of May, there were only 17 B-17's in Hawaii. Several of
those were soon transferred to Manila, in the Philippines, and none
were assigned search duties.
In
August of 1941, after the American embargo had begun, Yamamoto (above) submitted a revised plan, using almost 500
planes on six aircraft carriers – almost half of the 15 carriers
Japan had built. The General Staff rejected it again. To be clear, Yamamoto did not expect a surprise attack to yield direct victory. as he warned a friend and political ally. He wrote, "Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House."
But because of
the embargo and the China war, the Japanese navy was down to a six
months supply of oil. Yamamoto argued that Nagumo had to either use
his carriers or lose them, So on 25 September the nervous Nagumo
began training his pilots for the attack. The naval critics were
pacified that at least the precious carriers were under the direct
command of the cautious Nagomo. Surely he would prevent the Yamamoto
from unduly risking them. On 16 October, 1941, the Emperor asked
General Hideki Tojo to serve as Prime Minister, and he formed a war
cabinet.
On
Saturday, 1 November, the Japanese Combined Fleet changed their
radio codes. At the same time all ships in the Kido Butai - 6
aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 Cruisers, 11 destroyers, one
fleet oiler and 7 supply ships - went silent, and were replaced by
simulated broadcasts, which convinced the listening Americans the
Japanese carriers remained at anchor in Hiroshima and Saeki bays.
Then at dawn on Sunday, 16 November, and under strict radio silence,
the Kido Butai set sail for the Kuriles Islands, 1,000 miles to the
north. On that same day 20 full sized and 6 midget submarines left
Kwajalein atoll, also bound for Hawaiian waters.
On
Friday, 21 November, , the strike force dropped anchor in the lonely
volcano lined Hitokappu Bay, Iturup Island. That same day Emperor
Hirohito gave his final approval for the attack. Only if the
Americans lifted the oil embargo and gave Japan a free hand in
Asia, could a war now be averted. The Americans still expected Japan to
react to their economic pressure short of war. As one historian has
put it, they had underestimated “...the incredibly high risks...”
the Japanese elite would take to dominate Asia. “It was a matter of
life and death for them.”
On
Sunday, 23 November, Vice Admiral Nagumo was ordered to “....proceed
to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outset of the
war...launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to
the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area...the Task Force will (then)
immediately withdraw...”
As the Fleet steamed east toward war through stormy seas at 14
knots, Vice Admiral Nagumo mused to his Chief of Staff, “ If I had
only been more firm and refused. Now we've left home waters...” But
it was too late for second thoughts.
On
Saturday, 6 December, 1941, Nagumo ordered the attack fleet to
changed course to 180 degrees and increase speed to 20 knots. After a
voyage of almost 2,500 miles, dawn on Sunday, 7 December, 1941, found
the Kido Butai just 230 miles northwest of Oahu Island.
At 6:10 am
local time, they launched the first wave of attack aircraft.
The
first bombs and torpedoes fell on Pearl Harbor, Wheeler Field and
Schofield barracks at 7:55 am, local time.
At 9:45 am the second wave
of Japanese planes turned for home.
In those 110 minutes 2,043 U.S.
military personnel were killed – half when the USS Arizona's
magazine exploded – and 1,143 were wounded.
Five battleships were
sunk or run aground. Another 13 cruisers, destroyers and service
ships were damaged to varying degrees.
Out of 402 American aircraft
on Oahu,188 were destroyed and 159 damaged.
The cost to the Japanese
attack force of 414 planes was 29 aircraft shot down, 9 in the first
wave and 20 in the second, or 8% of the attacking force.
Another 111
planes were damage but returned to their carrier. A total of 20 of those
planes never flew again.
Commander
Mitsuo Fuchida returned to the Kido Butai flagship, the aircraft
carrier Akagi, just before noon, local time. He was one of the last
to land, having circled over Pearl Harbor to observe the entire
assault. Immediately upon landing, presumably after relieving his
bladder in the head, he reported to Vice Admiral Nagumo on the
bridge. He detailed the damage he had seen to the American ships, and
then began to suggest further attacks for a third wave, including the
vulnerable oil storage tanks and the dry dock repair facilities.
Despite some accounts which suggest a confrontation, there is no
persuasive evidence such a discussion took place. Even before Fuchida had
landed, Nagumo and his staff had decided to turn the carriers back
north and "....immediately withdraw...”.
There
were good reasons for Nagumo's decision, None of the Kido Butai were
equipped with radar, meaning at any moment American aircraft might
appear without warning. Intercepted radio traffic hinted that perhaps
50 American land based bombers were still operational. Also, the
ocean might be filled with American submarines.
Did the carriers
even have the weaponry capable of damaging the concrete dry docks? The fuel
tanks were easy targets, but the Kido Butai could only put 150
aircraft into a third strike. And losses had doubled between the
first and second wave attacks. If they doubled again a third wave
could expect to lose between 30 and 40 aircraft. And a third wave
would have to land on the carriers after dark, something Japanese
pilots were not trained for.
And
finally there was also this - Nagumo had never believed in the
attack. Having avoided his greatest fears, and turning back before
achieving Yamamoto's greatest hopes, Nagumo had at least preserved
six of Japan's fragile aircraft carriers. But it would prove to be
a Pyrrhic victory.
Expanding a war because of oil, the Japanese had
left 4 ½ million barrels on Oahu. That fuel would power the U.S.
Navy through the launching of Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, and the
battle at Midway, where 4 Japanese carriers would be sunk. Refusal
to knock out those vulnerable above ground tanks proved that although
the Japanese had started the war because of oil, they never
recognized its strategic role in the war.