Brigadier
General John Stevens Bowen (above) knew what was coming, even as the tattered
remnants of the 23rd Alabama fell back to their former positions
around the Foster Farm. They had bought with their lives and souls
nothing more than a few precious minutes. And now it was up to the 32
year old Georgian to give their sacrifice meaning. He grabbed a fresh
horse and raced back down the Rodney Road, looking for more men.
John
Bowen knew what was coming up that road because he knew 41 year old
Lieutenant General Ulysses Simpson Grant, personally. They had
graduated West Point a decade apart, (Lt. Grant, above) but had briefly bonded in 1858
when Lieutenant Bowen and his new wife, Mary Kennerly had been
assigned to Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis.
Grant (above) was then working
for his Missouri in-laws, having just resigned from the army because
it separated him from Julia. The couples' time together was brief,
but long enough for John to witness Grant's stubbornness and his
pathological inability to retrace his steps. which contributed to his
failure in business.
Later, when transferred to Texas, John Bowen
also resigned from the Army because he missed his wife. Afterward, he returned to St. Louis, as Grant had done. And in 1861 Bowen had been part of the failed effort to carry Missouri firmly into the Confederacy. But at Shiloh
in April of 1862, the Confederate General Bowen had seen how that same streak of
stubbornness now contributed to General Grant's (above) growing success.
Bowen
had no doubt that the Illinois native would throw every soldier and
gun he could lay his hands on at the Confederate line blocking his
way to Port Gibson and across the south fork of Bayou Pierre. Port Gibson was the cork
in the bottle. If the rebels could hold that cork in place, the
Yankees would be trapped against the Mississippi flood plain. But to
do that, Bowen needed more men, and he needed them right now.
Almost
the instant after Bowen galloped off in search of reinforcements, at about 10:00am, Friday morning, 1
May, 1863, 10,000 men of the 10th Division under 48 year old
Brigadier General of Volunteers Andrew Jackson Smith, and the 12th
Division, Hovey's Babies, under 41 year old
Indiana pro-union democratic lawyer Brigadier General Alvin Peterson
Hovey. slammed into General Green's exhausted brigade. The
Federal assault (above), with about 7 men per yard, simply swamped the rebel
defenders of one man every 2 yards, sending them running for the
rear. They Yankees captured 200 prisoners, 2 cannon, 3 caissons and 3
ammunition wagons. It took them less than 30 minutes.
Political
glory hound, 50 year old Union Major General John Alexander
McClernand (above) called a halt after sweeping the rebels from the Foster
House ridge, ostensibly to reorganize. But like a bad actor
genuflecting for his audience's approval - and with an impressionable
visitor in 48 year old Illinois Governor Richard Yates standing next
to him - McClernand could nor resist launching an extended bandiloquent
blovoiation. Luckily for the Federal cause Lieutenant General
Ulysses Grant, also a Yates favorite, was keeping a close eye and ear
on McClernand. After listening to the smug supercilious sycophancy
spewing from his subaltern, Grant pointedly suggested the rebels
were not beaten but merely retreating to stronger lines. He then
pointedly ordered McClernand push his men forward, toward Port Gibson
and the vital bridge over the south fork of Bayou Pierre.
But
after advancing less then 2 miles, at about noon, the Yankees ran
into the 1,000 man brigade of 35 year old Columbus Mississippi
bookstore owner, Brigadier General William Edwin Baldwin.
Having learned from the demoralizing Federal cannon fire the mistake of fighting on the ridge tops, Bowen sheltered Baldwin's men in the maze of the 8 foot tall canebrake (above) along the
bottoms of Willow Creek. On their right were the 1,500 men of Colonel
Francis Marion Cockrell's Missouri brigade, having forced marched
from Grand Gulf. Bowen was stronger at this moment than he had been
at any time before - with more than 6,500 men and 16 cannon in line
of battle. But they were still facing more than 24,000 Federal
troops, with more still arriving every hour.
The
Yankee's advance would be slowed by the canebrake, but General Bowen
had no doubt Grant would keep pushing. He sent a telegraph to
General Pemberton, expected to arrive shortly in Vicksburg. It read
in part, "We have been engaged in a furious battle ever since
daylight; losses very heavy...the odds are overpowering."
And
as if to confirm this, at about 2:00pm, on the Brunisburg road, 3
divisions of Grant's XVII corps under the popular 34 year old of
Union Major General James Birdseye McPherson begin pounding the
Alabama brigade, now commanded after Colonel Edward Tracy's death, by
46 year old Colonel Isham Warren Garott, The new commander asked
General Martin Edwin Green for instructions, but received a confusing
mish-mash of language in return. Garott had no choice but to begin a
grudging slow retreat, forcing Green's entire command to follow his
lead. The Rebel left collapsed.
At
the same time McClernand was extending his line eastward. Just 1,200
yards through the woods was the rough road of the old Natchez Trace,
leading around the rebel left. Colonel Cockrell threw the 3rd and 5th
Missouri regiments at the Yankees, trying to force them to
consolidate. But there were too many Yankees, and about 5:30pm
General Bowen was forced to send a final message from the Port Gibson
telegraph office. "I am falling back across Bayou Pierre. I
will endeavor to hold that position until reinforcements arrive.…" He then sent the bitter message to the gunners still defending Grand Gulf
to prepare to spike their guns and destroy the ammunition magazines before withdrawing to Warrenton.
It
was at just this moment that General Bowen was superseded by the
arrival of the disruptive argumentative and profane one armed
Floridian, the 5 foot 9 inch tall Brigadier
General William Wing "Old Blizzards" Loring (above). Dispatched from Edward's Station, the one armed argumentative general arrived as the troops were retreating back across the Bayou, and quickly
came to the conclusion that this time he was too late.
Port Gibson
could not be defended. Loss of Port Gibson meant the line of the south fork of Bayou
Pierre could not be held. Loring knew from personal observation, that the north fork of the stream would be easily breached. After that Grand Gulf would be taken in the rear. The only militarily rational
choice was to abandon Grand Gulf and Port Gibson and the entire Bayou Pierre line, and pull back
through Willow Springs 30 miles to Harkinson's Ferry over the Big
Black River. And that is what Loring ordered the bloodied troops
under General Bowen to do, burning the bridge over the south fork of Bayou Pierre
behind them. There they would meet his overstrength division, marching south.
The day delaying the Yankees at Port Gibson had cost Bowen's little army about 70 killed, more than 350
wounded and 384 captured - or almost 17% of his original force engaged. Yankee losses
were about the same, but suffered by a much larger force. Grant
did not press the rebels too hard. He was just pleased to
have escaped the malaria and mud of the Mississippi floodplain. As McClernand's men worked
overnight, dismantling buildings in Port Gibson, to rebuild the burned bridge,
McPherson prepared his men to ford the \south fork of Bayou Pierre upstream of the town.
Come
the dawn, Saturday 2 May, 1863, two thirds of Grant's army would be
across the south fork of Bayou Pierre, and when Sherman's Corps - the remaining third - arrived, they would be able to transfer directly across the Mississippi to Port
Gibson, saving them a 2 day march.
The
only positive for the Confederacy on that Friday evening, 1 May,
1863, was that the Commander of the Army of Mississippi, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton (above), had finally transferred his headquarters to Vicksburg (below). But that change of perspective, which once
might have salvaged the campaign for the rebels, had been converted
by time and events into a recipe for disaster.
The nature of that disaster threw its first shadow across the strong point of Port Hudson, 200 river miles south of Vicksburg. This narrow choke point in the Mississippi, had been bypassed by Grant's capture of Grand Gulf and Port Hudson. So General Pemberton wired the commander of that post, 41 year old New Yorker, Major General Franklin Kitchell Gardner, to bring his 2,000 man garrison to Vicksburg, as quickly as possible. It was the militarily sensible choice. With Vicksburg directly threatened, every man and gun would be needed to defend that vital point.
But a thousand miles away in Richmond, Virginia, 64 year old Confederate President, Jefferson Finis Davis (above), countermanded that order. He reminded Pemberton, "To hold both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is
necessary to a connection with the Trans-Mississippi." Gardner and his 2,000 men would remain right where they were. Davis was right, of course. The South needed both points to stitch the Confederacy together.
But it was also insanity. The 2,000 man garrison was not strong enough to hold Port Hudson. But 2,000 more men might have made the difference at the upcoming battle of Champion's Hill (above). Over the next 2 weeks President Davis would frantically jam another 5,000 men into the trenches around Port Hudson. If those 7,000 men had gone to Vicksburg, they might have held the place, freeing the rest of Pemberton's army to remain mobile, and block a siege. The conundrum has given birth to an endless game of what if's, which would keep armchair generals busy for the next 200 years.
But the core of the issue is that Port Hudson (above) could not stand on its own. If Port Hudson fell, a fortified Vicksburg, with a mobile field army to ward off a siege, might remain standing, even if isolated. But if Vicksburg fell, Port Hudson was doomed. Pemberton knew that. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston, knew it. But by the time anyone had time to do anything about Port Hudson in May of 1863, it was too damn late.
- 30 -