FIRST BLOOD Part Five

 

I would have thought the bubble for the flamboyant General Gustave Toutant Beauregard would have popped just after five, on Sunday morning, 21 July, 1861, when a federal artillery shell smashed into his headquarters, It had been hit 3 days before, by federal guns covering the union retreat from Blackburn's ford, ruining Beauregard's dinner. And now another 12 pound ball crashed his breakfast, almost killing his Spanish valet. This second shot ought to have proved two things to Beauregard – first, that it was past time to move his headquarters, and second, that federal troops were no longer passively waiting for Beauregard's coup de main. But in spite of this second rude warning, the little general retained his surplus of self confidence.

It had been a very busy year for Beauregard. In January, “The Little Napoleon” had been named superintendent of West Point. Five days later,when the appointment was withdrawn, Beauregard took offense, even tho there was never a chance he would stay in the job. He spent the next two years trying to get the government he had just betrayed to reimburse him for the train ticket to New York he had never used. Beauregard was again offended when he was not named commander of his native Louisiana's new Confederate army. In a snit he enlisted as private in “The Orleans Guards”, an aristocratic militia unit. Confederate President Jefferson Davis rescued Beauregard from his own ego, by making him Confederate commander of Charleston, South Carolina.

His many admirers said the 42 year old Beauregard worked so tirelessly to strengthen the harbor defenses that his hair turned white. Others, who knew him well, suggested the hostilities had cut off his supply of hair dye. But in April it was Beauregard who accepted the surrender of Fort Sumter, and he became a hero to the entire Confederacy. July found “Old Borey”, as the 21,000 men under his command called him, doing his very best to live up to his growing reputation for arrogance and to give his savior an ulcer.

Amazingly, after scaring the entire Confederate chain of command with a mere twitch on  18 July, Irwin McDowell's 35,000 man federal army at Centerville went somnambulant for 48 hours, oblivious while trains carrying the lead units of Joe Johnston's 10,000 man army staggered into Manassas Junction. By the morning of Sunday,21 July, 1861, the numerical odds in northeastern Virginia were just about equal. Despite this, Jeff Davis thought Beauregard's planned offensive, little short of insane.

The Little Napoleon intended on throwing half his army (12,000 men) across Bull Run at Union Mill, to drive past McDowell's left, and fall upon Centerville, isolating the federal army, and dictating peace terms from Arlington Heights, overlooking Washington, D.C.. President Davis did not know that McDowell had already dealt with that threat, on 19 July, sending 5.500 men back to Fairfax Court House, where they could easily out flank Beauregard 's out flanking maneuver. But Davis did know the Confederates had just enough ammunition for one big fight, and no logistics to support an advance. Davis tried to discourage Beauregard without offending the famously easily offended creole.  Unfortunately, Beauregard already despised Davis. "The curse of God must have been on our people when we chose him...” Beauregard wrote of his superior and savior. Despite his breakfast clue of a cannon ball, Beauregard still insisted upon launching his assault.

General Richard Ewell got the first of his 5 Virginia regiments across Union ford on the rebel right, as the federal artillery was opening fire. General David Jones was ready to follow with 3 more regiments, and behind him was General Longstreet with 4 more. The Virginians shoved aside the cavalry skirmishers, and pushed north on the empty road. McDowell was duly informed of the assault, and glad to hear of it. By the time Ewell got to the west bound road leading to Centerville, the federal army would be in Manassas Junction. Luckily for Beauregard, orders for Ewell to halt and withdraw arrived within half an hour of his crossing Bull Run. .The only problem was, no correction arrived for General Jones, who kept going and found himself on the north side of Bull Run, advancing all by himself.

The new orders had been issued by Joe Johnston (above), who was junior to Beauregard, but twice as smart and half as arrogant. And when he saw reports from Longstreet saying that Federal General Daniel Tyler's division seemed to be getting ready to attack the north side of the stone bridge that carried the Warrenton Turnpike over Bull Run, Johnston had ordered Ewell to get back south of Bull Run, fast. General Beauregard was suspicious at first, but held off countermanding the order until he received an appraisal of Tyler's intentions from the observation post 358 feet up Signal Hill knob. And that delay gave Beauregard enough time to become a military genius.

At about 8:45 that Sunday morning, to the west of Manassas Junction on the rebel right, Captain Edward Porter Alexander (above)  was watching through a spy class Tyler's movements 8 miles to the north, on the rebel left. It was obvious to him that Tyler had no real intention of launching an assault. But before he could tell Beaurgard that,  out the corner of his eye,  Alexander saw a glint of a brass cannon in the sunlight, and the sparkle of thousands of muskets moving toward Sudley Springs, further beyond the rebel left. Alexander sent a flag message to his operator at the Stone Bridge, “Look out for your left, your position is turned." He then followed that up with a note alerting Beauregard: “I see a body of troops crossing Bull Run about two miles above the Stone Bridge...I can see both infantry and artillery.”

Federal muskets were glinting in the sun only because McDowell's army had not yet learned how to march on a battle field. At 2:30 that morning a battalion each under Generals David Hunter and Samuel Heintzelman, 12,000 men in all,  marched south on the Warrenton Pike from Centerville. In the predawn blackness, just after crossing a bridge over Cub Run, they ran into the rear of General Tyler's 8,000 man division, which was stumbling forward to threaten the stone bridge over Bull Run. What followed was an exhausting two hours of standing, marching and counter marching before the flanking battalions could reach the Sudley Springs cross roads, and get clear of the mess. The delay meant Tyler's men were demonstrating for 3 ½ hours in front of the Warrenton Pike stone bridge, before Hunter's division even began crossing Bull Run at Sudley Springs at about 9:30. Which left them out in the open to be seen from Signal Hill by Captain Alexander.

The left flank of the rebel army rested on the stone bridge carrying the Warrenton Turnpike over Bull Run. It consisted of 1,000 men and a battery of artillery, commanded by the hard drinking, knock-kneed General Nathan “Shanks” Evans (above). And after reading Alexander's message, and matching it with his own assessment, Evans acted boldly. 

He left 4 companies to guard the Stone Bridge (above), and led the rest of his brigade on a forced march to the north, first over Henry House Hill and then to Mathew's House hill. As always, Evens was accompanied by an aide, who carried on his back a small barrel of Even's favorite whiskey.

Even also sent word six miles back to Manassas Junction, demanding immediate reinforcement, where it found the rebel brigades from the Shenandoah Valley - the newly arrived 800 South Carolinans under General Bernard Bee, and the 1,000 Georgians under Colonel Francis Bartow. These two brigades began an immediate force march toward the Henry House Hill,  followed by Colonel Thomas Jackson's brigade of Virginians.

It was not yet 10 a.m., Sunday, 21 July, 1861, and the first great battle of the American Civil was about to begin in earnest. And having shown himself to be a delusional commander, Gustave Toutant Beauregard was about to prove to be a great leader.

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FIRST BLOOD Part Two

I suppose you could say one of the places the American Civil War began was Harper's Ferry (above), where the falling waters of the Shenandoah and the Potomac rivers powered the machines at the Federal Armory, mass producing muskets and ammunition. But after rebel Colonel Thomas Jackson seized the town and armory in April of 1861, stripping it of muskets and powder stores, and shipping 300 gun making machines to Richmond, the place lost its military significance. Still, it was federal property, and the man 74 year old Winfield Scott picked to restore it was his old rival and subordinate, 68 year old Robert Patterson.

The fickle President James Polk had chosen Patterson (above)  to lead the 1847 invasion of Vera Cruz, Mexico. But then he changed his mind. Winfield Scott collected the glory and Patterson did the paper work. Now, Scott charged his “friendemy” with retaking Harper's Ferry, and keeping the 11,000 rebels in the Shenandoah Valley, now commanded by General Joe Johnston, from reinforcing Beauregard's 22,000 men at Manassas Junction. It wouldn't be easy, of course. But it was made worse by Patterson's lingering resentment over Vera Cruz. He never disobeyed a direct order from Scott, but always parsed those orders carefully, rarely sharing his own thoughts with his “superior”. And while urging Patterson to move on the rebels, General Scott had also reminded his old rival that any reversal could be catastrophic. Patterson put that warning in his pocket, to use later.

By the middle of June, Patterson had assembled 18,000 troops,  mostly 90 day militia,   to retake Harper's Ferry.  In response Joe Johnston (who regarded the place as as “untenable”) ordered Jackson to evacuate the town, blowing up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridge and the armory buildings as he did. The next day, Monday, 17 June, seeing the place abandoned, Patterson took.”formal possession of Harper's Ferry.”

Informed of the bloodless victory, Scott now urged Patterson to at once move against Johnston, who had concentrated his forces on the other side of the Blue Ridge mountains, around Winchester, Virginia.. Patterson did not reply, and neither did he cross the Potomac for another two weeks, in part because because he believed Johnson had 20,000 men at Winchester, making the rebels stronger than himself, and in part because he had to shift his men from around Harper's Ferry, to the west. And that latter point illustrated a truth about the coming war in western Virginia.

The Shenandoah valley, was important for the south because of its food and horses, and because the Blue Ridge Mountains shielded any rebel army heading north (“down” the valley) into Pennsylvania or Maryland. But an invading federal army advancing “up ” the valley, heading south, would be moving away from Richmond and the industrial centers of the Confederacy.  So the Federal government could never win the war in the valley.  But as General Robert Patterson was about to prove, the government could lose the war there.

At about four in the morning, on Monday, 1 July, 1861, a company of ex-firemen from Philadelphia , McMullin's Independent Rangers, wadded across the chest high Potomac River at Watkins Ferry, under the watchful eyes of rebel troopers under Colonel J.E.B. Stuart.  It was quickly evident, as heavy supply trains followed, that Patterson was moving cautiously. Fifteen miles to the south, in Martinsburg, Virginia, Colonel Jackson was awakened with the news about 7:30 that morning.  He immediately aroused his 5^th Virginia Regiment of 380 men,   and notified Johnson, 30 miles further south in Winchester. Jackson's standing orders were to slow the federal advance, but avoid any serious engagement. He sent three cannon back to Winchester, and just one forward with his Virginians, certain he need not worry about being overrun by Patterson's slow advance.

The next morning, Tuesday, 2 July, a brigade of federal regulars and militia under 63 year old Colonel John Joseph Abercrombie (above, the oldest line officer in either army ) and a second brigade under 45 year old Colonel George H. Thomas, began the march south on the Martinsburg and Potomac Turnpike. Both federal commanders were West Point graduates, and both were from slave states. Abercrombie's choice to fight for the union was made easier because his home state, Maryland, and not seceded, and because he was the son-in-law of his commander, General Patterson.  

George Thomas (above) was from Virginia, and when his slave owning family learned he was leading troops against Virginia, they literally turned his picture to the wall, and never spoke his name again.  J.E.B. Stuart, whose cavalry which was snipping at Thomas' brigade this day, wrote bitterly, “I would like to hang, hang him as a traitor to his native state.”

Shortly after noon, as the 3,500 federals were passing though the village of Hainsville, they began receiving fire. This was the 300 Virginians of the 5^th regiment, thrown out in a skirmish line near the 10 mile marker, where the pike crossed a stream called Hoke's Run and climbed a low hill splitting William Porterfield's farm in two. Both federal brigades drew up in a battle line, and advanced slowly. Jackson's rebels held them up for about 45 minutes, until a federal battery of artillery began throwing explosive shells into Mr.Porterfield's barn. Jackson then skillfully withdrew his men.

The federals called it “The Battle of Hoke's Run”, or “The Battle Falling Waters” after two nearby streams. The rebels called it the “Battle of Hainsville”. It left 2 federals dead, 30 wounded and 35 captured when a company of unsuspecting Pennsylvania militia were caught by Stuart's cavalry, who were  dressed in blue. The Confederate dead and wounded were about the same numbers as the federals. By later standards it would be called a skirmish, but both sides were still learning how to fight this war.

The next morning, Wednesday, 3 July, Patterson's invasion showed its clumsy side. As most of the two brigades advanced on Martinsburg,  Private Charles Leonard and his regiment of Maryland militia, “The Park Grays”, were ordered back to Watkins Ferry, to escort supply wagons forward. “We started about 8 a.m., double quick...and slept on the banks of the old Potomac....The next day (4 July) (we) convoyed the supply train to Martinsburg”. Patterson now dug in, and began to build up his supplies.

On Friday, 12 July General Winfield Scott (above)  telegraphed Patterson that McDowell would begin his advance on the 16^th,   and ordered Patterson to also move on that date. The next day Scott repeated the order and added, “If not strong enough to beat the enemy...make a demonstration so as to detain him in the valley or at Winchester.” Patterson responded that his intelligence suggested Johnson could quickly double his strength, bringing him to 40,000 men. If so, should Patterson attack anyway? General Scott did not bother to reply to this fantasy.

In fact, Patterson moved a day early, on Monday, 15 July.  But he got only 5 miles. As the Winchester Road crossed Mill Creek, in the shadow of a rise called Bunker Hill, the federal advance again came under long range musket fire from 600 of J.E.B.Stuart's troopers. Not a single federal soldier was hit, while one rebel was killed and five captured, before the rest withdrew. But it was enough to spark a rebellion in the federal ranks. Several regiments simply refused to march any further. They were two weeks from the end of their service, and they refused to move further from their muster points. General Patterson was forced to call a “council of war”, and the consensus among his officers was the mutiny might infect the entire force. The federal force of 20,000 marched straight back to Martinsburg..

Robert Patterson did his best to put a good light on things. He telegraphed Washington about his problems, and asked permission to sidestep to the east, to Charles Town. It was better than nothing, and Scott approved the move, which Patterson completed on 17 July.  But most of the soldiers on both sides, knew it was a retreat.  A member of the 4th Alabama regiment noted,  "The best generals of the age say it requires more tact and military learning to conduct a good retreat than to fight and win a battle. Therefore I assert that Patterson is the best general they have."  The members of Patterson's own army, even those who had refused to advance, were even more cruel. As he rode past a unit, waiting beside the road to Charles Town, he was greeted with cries of, “Go home, you old coward!, ”” “He's an old secessionist. Shoot him.” Patterson said nothing, but he was steaming with indignation. On Thursday Patterson telegraphed his mea culpa to Scott:. “The enemy has stolen no march on me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissance in force caused him to be reinforced.” 

It was a fantasy, again. Not only was Joe Johnson (above) not begin reinforced. On, Friday evening, 18 July, he began marching his 18,000 men, beginning with Jackson's  Brigade,  south to the Mananas Gap Railroad, and then transferring them by train to reinforce General Beauregard’s 22,000 men at Mananas Junction. The north had lost its advantage on the field of Mananas,  by its ineptitude in the Shenandoah valley.

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