VICKSBURG Chapter Fifty-Five

It was 2 regiments from Indiana, the 11^th and the 48^th and the Wisconsin 28^th , which did the final damage to the Rebel center. General Hovey's 12^th division, 1^st brigade, commanded by 37 year old Brigadier General George Francis McGinness, went once again up the bloodied face of Champion Hill, to re-capture the cross roads. 

But this time, after brushing aside the rebel infantry, the Hoosiers and Badgers found the line held only by a single battery of 4 bronze six pound cannon. In the face of withering blasts of grape shot, the mid-westerners let loose killing volley after volley of musket fire, that butchered the gunners and their horses.

The story is told that when the white smoke cleared, only the 6 foot 3 inch dark haired, 41 year old Captain Samuel Jones Ridley (above) was still standing by a gun of Company A, of the 1^st Mississippi Light Artillery. The horses were all down, dead or screaming in agony, so the cannon were not going anywhere. And the human gunners had either been killed or wounded, or run to escape the same fate. But Captain Ridley continued to service the last gun by himself.

The Yankees saw him load double canister into the barrel and pull the lanyard. A century later a devotee of the Lost Cause would imagine the Yankee reaction. “For a moment perhaps, their eyes filled with admiration, but then the cannon roared its defiance ... they answered with a storm of lead. And in the next instant the lone figure vanished in the smoke.” Under that smoke the Captain had been hit by 6 musket balls. The batteries' second in command, Lieutenant Frank Johnston had a more prosaic vision. He wrote, “We went in there with 82 men and came out with 8”.

The shocked Yankees paid for the captured canon with their futures. There was little romance in such a grisly bargains. Before he had left Vicksburg, marching to his temporary grave on this hilltop, Sam Ridley, successful planter and slave owner, had predicted the Yankees would only capture Vicksburg through the “...bad management of the general in command.” 

Most of the Confederate soldiers knew who was responsible for the disaster on Champion Hill. Young surgeon John A. Leavy, of Missouri, wrote, “ "Today proved...General Pemberton is either a traitor or the most incompetent officer in the Confederacy. Indecision, indecision, indecision ... Our soldiers and officers are determined not to be sold (meaning sacrificed) if they can possibly help it." 

Referring to Pemberton's Pennsylvania birth, school teacher Sargent William Pitt Chambers was convinced, "...our Commanding General had been false to the flag under which he fought." Said one of Pemberton's officers, “He undoubtedly displayed bad generalship, and the day’s work may cost us Vicksburg.”

Pemberton had crossed Bakers Creek with some 17,000 men. Of the 38 guns which Pemberton had brought to the battle, some 11 cannon were captured.  He left 380 dead on the battlefield, and another 66 who would die within 48 hours. 

Over 1,000 were wounded, and almost 2,500 surrendered to the victorious Federals.  More importantly, the soul of the Army of Mississippi had been destroyed on that Hill of Death. Unit discipline, which had survived the day long slugging match, disintegrated while searching for an escape route.

What saved Pemberton's army from complete destruction was ingenuity, none of it from Pemberton. Arriving at Edward's Depot early on the morning of 16 May, 1863, 25 year old Major Samuel Henry Lockett, Chief Engineer for the army, was ordered by the Lieutenant General to concentrate on providing entrenchments for the battle line across Champion Hill. Almost as an after thought Lockett dispatched a Sergeant Vernon to use fifty men from Brigadier General Alfred Cumming's 3^rd Brigade, to replace the washed out Raymond Road bridge over Baker's Creek.

By 2:00 p.m. the water level had fallen enough that they had built a smaller replacement and were cutting away the 10 foot natural levees on either bank, to provide access. Without that bridge, inadequate as it was, the entire army would have been lost.  Excluding the 7,000 men who marched under General Lorring's division, Pemberton recrossed Baker's Creek with perhaps 9,000 men.

But once across the creek the rebels discovered the Yankees had pushed Captain Samuel De Golyer's battery “H” of the 1^st Michigan Light Artillery across the Bolton Road bridge. After advancing as far as 2 miles west, the batteries' two 12 pound howitzers and three 6 pound rifles, began shelling the retreating Confederates, preventing them from reforming. 

Later General Pemberton (above) would share his self pity with Major Lockett. Watching the disaster he had engineered engulf the army, he said, “Just 30 years ago I began my military career...and today...that career ended in disaster and disgrace.”

By 5:00pm, the only division with any coherence belonged to the one armed firebrand. Major General William Wing Loring (above).  “Give Em Blizzards” had saved his men by stubbornly refusing to feed them into Pemberton's meat grinder at the cross roads. But ultimately, what saved Loring's division was that Grant did not pursue them. Ulysses Simpson Grant was focused on the Yazoo Heights. If he could have been assured that Pemberton would march his entire army to Raymond, Grant would have gladly let them go unmolested.

Grant had about 32,000 men in action at Champion Hill, of whom over 400 were left dead on the field, another 100 or so would die of their wounds within days. Almost 2,000 were wounded, and nearly 200 were missing. The battle had reduced Grant's effectives by about 3,000 men. But the reappearance of Sherman's 2 divisions the next day, would make the Army of the Tennessee 10,000 men stronger.

Even as he easily fending off a cautious single brigade attack up the Raymond Road by Yankee Major General Andrew Jackson Smith's division, Loring chose to slide his men south, to avoid the near panic at the temporary bridge. 

Loring's only unit engaged holding off Smith's attack was the 1,500 men of his 1^st brigade, under the popular, dashing Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman. And it seemed the one time Railroad Engineer viewed the engagement as a summer's outing.  

About 5:30 p.m., a relaxed Tilghman paused in a casual discussion with some of his non-commissioned officers, to adjust the aim of a nearby 12 pound Napoleon cannon. Stepping back to observe the fall of his shot, the 47 year old was cut in half by Federal artillery shell. Stung by this personal loss,  Loring led his men south, away from the Yankee artillery, and away from the Yankee infantry. 

After fighting all day, Major General Carter Stevenson's division trudged 12 miles into the night, crossing the Big Black River before finally resting about 1:00 a.m. on the high ground south of the village of Bovina.  Major General John Bowen's division staggered closely behind, leaving troops on the east side of the Big Black, in the hope of welcoming Major General Loring's men.

But Loring's men were not coming.

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VICKSBURG Chapter Fifty-Three

In the center of the Federal line, General Alvin Hovey's 12^th division was in trouble. By about 2:30pm on Saturday, 16 May, 1863, his 1^st brigade had been badly mauled during their three hour fight atop Champion Hill.  With them now driven off the crest, Hovey threw his 2nd^rd brigade, under the nearsighted 30 year old Colonel George Boardman Boomer, back up the hill, to breakup the enemy assault he was certain would follow. 

Pomeroy Martin remembered how , “Gallantly they went up the Hill.” And behind them Hovey lined up the bloodied 1^st brigade survivors and every cannon he had - the 16th Ohio light, the 2nd Ohio and Battery A of the 1st Missouri Light – 18 guns in total. At the moment, they held their fire, fearful of injuring Boardman's troops. But for a few long minutes those guns and the exhausted 1^st battalion were the only back up for the vital federal wagon train around the Champion house.

Years later the 2nd brigade's second in command, 36 year old dentist Colonel Benjamin Devor Dean, of the 26^th Missouri, recalled, “...the 10th Iowa and 93rd Illinois immediately engaged the enemy... Colonel Boomer...seeing the enemy approaching on our right flank, ordered the 26th Missouri to meet them, which it did on the double quick... getting possession of a deep ravine which the enemy was trying to secure.” For ten minutes or so the 26^th stood up against a larger 52^nd Georgia regiment. But the engagement cost the 26^th Missouri 2 officers and 16 enlisted killed, and 3 officers and 66 enlisted men wounded.

Watching from the the bottom around the Champion house, gunner Pomeroy Martin saw that “...the whole line... was pressed back slowly, as the rebels were massing all their forces to crush us here. But now...batteries reached further around to the right, poured in an enfilading fire, which was so terrific as to check effectually the rebel advance, and they gave way and fled in confusion.” The cannon to the right, were from General Logan's division.

At the same time, rebel General Seth Barton (above), in command of the 1^st brigade, on the extreme right flank of the rebel line atop Champion Hill, perceived a need for action. He could see Logan's division stumbling up the slope toward him, and decided it would be better to strike the Yankees while they were discombobulated than to passively wait for them to slam into his men. 

Barton posted the 52^nd Georgia regiment with the 4 Parrott rifled cannon of Corputs battery to defend the only bridge over Baker's Creek (above). Certain these men could hold the vital position, Barton drove the 40th, 41st, and 43rd Georgia regiments down the slope, hoping to fall unexpectedly on the Yankee's.

The initial wave, masked by the forested slopes until they were almost on top of the Yankees, drove in the first line, but “...enforced by (the Yankee) second and third lines”, wrote Barton later, “my farther advance was checked..” The troops Barton was hitting were part of Logan's 3^rd Brigade, under 42 year old Brigadier General John Dunlap Stevens - the 8^th and 81st Illinois, and the 20^th and 32nd Ohio regiments. The Federals outnumbered Barton's Georgia soldiers, and were able to bring flanking fire on their attack, forcing the Georgians to to pull back. Under fire, Barton adjusted his line and threw his troops forward again.

Sergeant Osborn Oldroyd, in the 20^th Ohio, remembered the rebels ““succeeded in driving us a short distance” But then the Buckeyes made their own adjustments, stopped the Georgians a second time and forced them to pull back a few yards into the trees for safety.

When first ordered to advance up the heavily wooded slopes of Champion Hill, Grant had asked Logan if he needed more men. The 37 year old “Black Jack” John Alexander Logan (above) assured his commander, “There are not rebels enough outside of hell to drive back the 3^rd division!” In later generations the epithet “Black Jack” would be a demeaning title, indicating the bearer had “stooped” to command African-American troops. But this “Black Jack” - perhaps the original – was a term of familiarity and fondness, which described Logan's jet black hair and blazing black eyes as well as his dark fury in battle. It was a term of respect. He was that rarity in this most political of all America's wars, one of President Lincoln's political generals who was also one of his most respected combat commanders.

Shortly after Logan's division began moving up the northern face of Champion hill, General Hovey, having committed his 2^nd brigade in the bitter fight on the same hill, asked for regiments to stabilize his position. But although Logan directed artillery to lay fire on the rebel's attacking Hovey's men, he sent no troops. Logan's reason for being parsimonious with his support was that he could read a map, and his map indicated that his 3^rd division was being offered the opportunity to destroy the entire rebel army.

It has been an axiomatic that you should not fight with a river at your back since 12 August 490 B.C. E, when Athenian hoplites butchered the larger Persian army in the surf at Marathon beach. A decade even earlier, the Chinese general Sun Tzu had warned “After crossing a river, you should get far away from it”. 

But on Friday, 15 May, 1863, when faced with the rain swollen ford of Baker's Creek, Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton (above) had persevered and counter marched his army to the only bridge over that same creek. A day later, this determination was about to be revealed as a deadly mistake, and there was some irony in that the revelation would be made by the 1^st brigade of General Logan's division.

They were the 20^th, 31^st 45^th and 124^th Illinois regiments along with the 23^rd Indiana. Most were men from the Cairo region of the Prairie state, the district called Little Egypt. The Hoosiers were from the adjoining sympathetic section of Indiana. Hoosier 1^st Lieutenant Shadrach Hooper, could have been speaking for the entire brigade when he said, “...it was a case of brother contending against brother, father against son and chum against schoolmate.” The region was strongly pro-slavery with Confederate sympathies. But these regiments had been answered the call to duty because of loyalty and faith in Black Jack Logan, who had been their congressman before the war. And now they were going to deliver Vicksburg over the the abolitionist north.

The brigade general was a 46 year old jeweler named John Eugene Smith (above). His father, John Banler Smith, of Bern, Switzerland, had served in Napoleon's 1812 Russian campaign. After the defeat at Waterloo, the Smith family had emigrated to Philadelphia along with their 1 year old son. In 1834, that son, John Eugene, had moved to St. Louis, Missouri to apprentice in a jewelry store. There he met is wife, Aimee A. Massot, and they were married in 1836. 

In the 1840's, the growing family had moved to the northern Illinois, Mississippi river town of Gelena (above),  

There John operated a Main Street jewelry and watch shop, and had become a friend to the half owner of a leather shop, Orvil Grant  (above,center) - younger brother of Ulysses S. Grant.

These were the men, like most humans, of divided loyalties, struggling in a divided nation,  But in a brief spasm of horrible violence, these men would seal the fate of Vicksburg, Mississippi, and the entire Confederacy.

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VICKSBURG Chapter Fifty-Two

As noon on Saturday, 16 May, 1863 was approaching, the 1^st brigade of General Hovey's 12^th Division,  had captured the low ridge overlooking the key cross roads atop Champion Hill. Immediately Brigadier General George Francis McGinnis ordered artillery up the hill to support the tenacious toe hold. As the path up the slope was narrow, only two guns were sent. It was a moment of high drama, captured by the official history of the 16^th Ohio Light Artillery battery.

“...Lieutenant (George) Murdoch was ordered up to the top of the Hill. Captain (James A.) Mitchell asking...to be permitted to go with it to place the guns. We galloped up the Hill. Cannoneers dismounted and all out...Lieutenant Murdoch's horse was wounded, so that during the fight he was dismounted. A little distance beyond the summit of the Hill there was an open held to the left of the road, into which one of the guns, with Corporal Belmer as gunner, was pulled...

...while the other with Corporal (Pomeroy) Mitchell (above)  as gunner,  went forward about fifty yards and found a good place just to the right of the road, near a log cabin and smoke house. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Murdoch were with this gun.... the ground sloping down hill in front of them...by using solid shot (they) could fire over our own men...”

“...The gun by the cabin found our men in front of it in the way. The rebels were advancing, the bullets were coming fast. Then it was that the captain showed his bravery. He dashed down on his horse, right in the face of that leaden storm, and cried to our men: "Out of the way. boys, get out of the way and give the artillery a chancel" Our men rushed back and around the cabins, and as the Johnnies came on they got charge after charge of canister, all the 13 rounds of canister the gun carried.” 

This counter attack had been hastily thrown together by Brigadier General Stephen Dill Lee (above), whose 2^nd brigade was facing an attack by troops from Logan's division, coming up the wooded and ravine cut northern slope of Champion Hill.  But Lee knew the vital point was, in fact behind him. 

So around 1:00pm, Lee collected about 400 survivors of the 34^th Georgia regiment thrown back by the first Yankee thrust, bolstered them with his own reserve, the 31^st Alabama regiment, and launched an immediate assault. 

This first counter-attack was quickly cut down by deadly accurate fire of the 45^th Illinois and 23^rd Indiana regiments, and flanking fire from the 24^th Indiana, but mostly because of the two cannon from the 16^th Ohio. As his troops fell back. Lee ordered a second assault, this time adding the 23^rd Alabama regiment drawn from his own front line, directed specifically to silence those Yankee guns.

The history of the 16^th Ohio notes the bravery of the rebel assault. “... though the slaughter was appalling, still on they came.....as fast as one line was shattered another took its place.” 

But the account also records the cost. “The brave Captain (James Mitchel) remained on his horse... A whole volley was fired at him by the enemy concealed in the ravine...near the house. As the horse was hit he sprang forward, throwing the Captain off backward...(James) rose from the ground, pressing his hand to his chest, the blood flowing freely from his wound. Lieutenant Murdock sent back for surgical aid, but the Captain insisted on sitting down with his back to a tree at the roadside near the command...” In such a way the second assault was thrown back.

About 1:30pm, Lee's division commander, General Stevenson, sent word to Pemberton, asking for help. Not waiting for a reply, Lee launched troops on yet another attack to retake the vital road junction, adding the 46^th Alabama regiment to his punch. Some of these troops were making their third charge against the Yankee line. 

Out of canister shot, Corporal Belmer's gun was hitched to its horse team and sent racing back down the hill. The gun manned by Pomeroy Mitchel however, kept firing until Lieutenant Murdoch saw the rebels closing in. He waved his pistol and yelled, “Quick, boys, out of here!”

The 16^th not only saved both their own guns, they captured 2 cannon from The Botetourt battery, and spiked several of the guns abandoned by Waddell's battery. Meanwhile, the third rebel counterattack was thrown back, leaving the 46^th Alabama regiment embedded in the Yankee line. Exhausted and bloodied, the brave Alabamian fighters suddenly found themselves surrounded. When demanded, the Confederate regiment was forced to surrender.

It was now almost 2:00pm. The isolated battle for the crest of Champion Hill -  now called The Hill of Death - had been going on for almost 2 hours. The first brigade of General McGinnis, comprising the 11^th, 24^th, 34^th and 46^th Indiana Regiments and the 29^th Wisconsin regiment had suffered almost 90 dead – including Captain Mitchel - almost 500 wounded and 23 missing or captured. On the opposing line, Cummings shattered Georgia brigade had suffered 121 dead, 269 wounded and 605 captured, and Lee's Alabama battalion had sacrificed over 40 men killed, 140 wounded and 600 captured. The other causality was Grant's patience

At noon Grant had ordered an assault all along his line, but neither Osterhaus's 9^th division, nor Carr's 14^th division in the center had yet to move. It would later be determined that the messenger carrying the order to attack had gotten lost, and had just reached General McClernand's headquarters. Grant might have expected McClernand to have launched his assault on his own initiative, upon seeing Hovey's 12^th division desperately battling on the crest. But the midst of a battle was not the time to deal with McClernand. Grant was was assured the entire line would be advancing soon, along with more support for Hovey's brave men.

Meanwhile Pemberton was having his own command problems. His first choice to support Steven's hard pressed men was to call for one of Loring's 4 brigades. “Old Bizzards” was still trading long range skirmishing fire with Smith's approaching 12^th Division and Blair's 2^nd. But in response to Pemberton's orders, Loring pleaded that he was about to be attacked and could not spare even one of his brigades.  And no matter how many orders Pemberton issued, Loring simply ignored them.

That left only General John Stevens Bowen's smaller division, stretched out along the north/south Ratcliff Road, in between Steven's and Loring's divisions. They, at least, had the advantage of being closer.

The closest unit was Bowen's 1^st brigade under long dour faced 32 year old Brigadier General Seth Maxwell Barton (above).  Shortly after 2:00pm he sent 3 regiments against the flank of the weary federal troops, charging with the 40^th, 41^st and 43^rd Georgia Regiments, supported by the 4 guns of the Cherokee Georgia Artillery, under Captain Max van den Corput. 

Falling on the Yankee flank, they broke the line and pushed it off the vital crossroads, 300 yards back to the crest. But there the Yankees reformed. So Barton threw in his reserve, the 52^nd Georgia regiment against the vulnerable right flank of the new Federal line, crumpling it and sending the blue coats streaming for the rear.

And at that moment, after almost 3 hours of violence and bloodshed, the weary men of Barton's brigade was within 5 or 6 hundred yards of complete and total victory. Because at the bottom of that hill, gathered around the Champion home, were almost 200 Yankee wagons loaded with ammunition. And without those wagons, Grant's campaign would be a disaster. 

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