When Captain William Yeger's company of cavalry slipped back into Jackson, Mississippi, late in the afternoon of 16 May, 1863, the town had been occupied by Yankees for less than 48 hours. Still, Yeger discovered the Federal troops had destroyed the state arsenal and foundry, burned down a gun carriage factory and associated shops, including a tent maker, and – most importantly - burned the trestles of the long Vicksburg and Alabama railroad bridge over the Pearl River. It was Yankee General Sherman's opinion that as a military asset the city of Jackson would be out of business for 6 months.
General Joseph (“Old Joe”) Johnston (above), the Confederate commander for Tennessee and Mississippi, knew the Pearl River bridge must be his top priority, more important than even support of Pemberton's army in Vicksburg. Without that bridge, he could not even comfortably supply his reoccupation of Jackson.
One hundred miles north of Jackson (above), beyond Yankee reach for the moment, in the town of Grenada, Johnston had ordered 400 locomotives and rail cars to be safely parked. All that rolling stock was now trapped west of the Pearl River. The longer those locomotives sat in Grenada the greater the chance Yankee cavalry would destroy them all. It was the core of Jefferson Davis' fallacy that Vicksburg was a nail, a point to be defended. Or to put it another way, Vicksburg may have been Lincoln's key, but the Pearl River bridge was the lock. With the lock smashed, the key was meaningless.
So while in the Mississippi capital Governor John Jones Pettus fretted over stolen draperies, Johnston huddled with his Chief Quartermaster, 30 year old Major Livingston Mims, on how to replace the Pearl River bridge. While that was happening, Johnston struggled to assemble an army. He had less than 4,000 men, mostly Gregg's brigade. But within 48 hours, as expected, more troops arrived. First came the South Carolina brigade of General State's Rights Gist.
With them came General William Henry Talbot Walker's (above) Georgia brigade. Johnston quickly recognized Walker's experience in the “old army” made him “the only officer in my command competent to lead a division” and on 23 May he promoted Walker to Major General and folded his and Gregg's and Gists brigades into a division.
Evander McNair's brigade of Tennessee regiments arrived soon after, along with 4 Texas regiments under 41 year old lawyer, General Mathew Duncan Ector. On 19 May, Brigadier General Samuel B. Maxey marched into Jackson with his troops, the last of the Port Hudson defenders to escape before the Yankees surrounded that place. None of these men had wagons, and they brought little artillery with them, but they were present and accounted for.
These 6, 498 men formed a division under 44 year old Mississippi planter, Major General Samuel Gibbs French (above). Johnston's newly named Army of Relief now numbered about 11,000 men. And that afternoon the division of Major General William Wing Loring came stumbling in as well.
Separated - intentionally or not - from Pemberton's main force during the battle of Champion Hill on 16 May - - Loring (above)'s men had 'force marched' 40 miles in 24 hours to escape. His artillerymen spiked 12 of their own cannon and freed their horses. Many of the infantry dropped their muskets and ammunition to lighten their load while crossing rivers. At 3:00 am on 17 May they had reached Dillon, where both Loring and Pemberton had expected to find Grant's supply trains.
There were no Yankees in Dillon, but scouts soon found 500 Federal troops at Utica. Not looking for a fight, Loring forced marched his exhausted 6,000 men around the town. That evening they reached Crystal Springs, where they finally felt safe enough to collapse and sleep.
Taking a day to recover, Loring's division reached Jackson on the evening of 19 May. He had lost “...our artillery, wagons, knapsacks, blankets, and everything we had.” They had also lost 3,000 stragglers. Most of those men would stumble in over the next week. But Loring's division of 6,049 men would not be an offensive force for weeks to come.
Three days later a brigade from North Carolina arrived in Jackson, having been on the move since early May. It's commander was the brilliant tactician, foul mouthed and argumentative and often drunk General Nathan George “Shanks” Evens. This brigade was folded into French's division. Johnston's Army of relief now numbered about 23,000 men.
Adam's troopers gave Johnston a good idea of what he faced in trying to relieve Vicksburg. As early as 10 June, Grant had assigned General John Parke's IX Corps to defend his supply base at Snyder's Bluff. And he had pushed a division from Sherman's Corps eastward to defend the crossing at the Big Black River Bridge, and pushed a second division toward Sataritia, about half way to Yazoo City. As reinforcements continued to arrive in Jackson, Johnston countered by sending General Walker's division to Yazoo City, and Loring's division 6 miles behind at Benton, along the Southern Railroad to Vicksburg.
By 31 May, Major Mims had gathered “large numbers” of slaves and enough iron rails and cross ties, to begin replacing the tracks and short bridges immediately around Jackson. But the Pearl River bridge was a greater challenge.
The river itself was only about 50 feet wide. But the the approach from Jackson first dropped 5 to 8 feet off the lip of of an escarpment – part of the Jackson Hills. Wooden trestles were the obvious solution there. However, a hundred yards or so on, the roadbed abruptly dropped over a 20 foot cliff, to the river itself. A pair of surviving stone towers could again carry rails across that muddy stream.
But on the eastern shore, the construction engineers had to deal with a quarter mile wide flood plain, with a water table inches below the surface. Trestles here had been mounted on broad stone bases until higher and firmer ground was reached (above, right center). But the Yankees had burned all those trestles. The charred wood and bent rails had to be cleared and the heat cracked stones replaced. It would not be until mid June before Major Mims could even begin rebuilding the long bridge.
On Friday, 29 May, Johnston (above) sent a dispatch rider to Lieutenant General Pemberton, 50 miles to the west. As usual it was a less than cheerful note. It began, “I am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate you, unless you co-operate, and we make mutually supporting movements. Communicate your plans and suggestions, if possible.”
That same day, 50 miles away in Vicksburg, Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton (above) sent his own message to Johnston. “I have 18,000 men to man the lines and river front; no reserves. I do not think you should move with less than 30,000 or 35,000, and then, if possible, toward Snyder's Mill, (Chickasaw Bayou, after) giving me notice...My men are in good spirits, awaiting your arrival...You may depend on my holding the place as long as possible...”.
On Monday, 1 June, 43 year old Kentucky politician, General John Cabell Breckinridge (above) arrived in Jackson from Chattanooga, with his 5,200 man division. Breckenridge was a friend of Johnston's, who had suffered in Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg. And, finally, on Wednesday, 3 June, the 3,000 man cavalry division of 27 year old William Hicks “Red” Jackson rode in from Tennessee. All told, Johnston now had about 27,000 men. It was unlikely he would ever be stronger, as Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon (below), continually reminded Johnston.
Seddon (above) offered to send him even more of Bragg's army, if Johnston would just attack. But Johnston cautioned, “To take from Bragg what is required to deal effectively with Grant will involve yielding Tennessee.” Johnston could almost hear Confederate President Jefferson Davis screaming in the background when Sedden replied on Tuesday, 16 June. “I rely on you” said Seddon/Davis, “to avert the loss. If better resources do not offer, you must attack.”
Davis (above) was arguing that it would be better to lose Tennessee, so the south could concentrate its full strength to save Vicksburg, after which Tennessee could be retaken. But he never said that explicitly. As a politician, he couldn't. But Johnston never understood that subtly. The two men had argued this point for 3 years now, without either one understanding the other. They had now been reduced to using Seddon as a cut out, to avoid Johnston resigning or Davis firing him.
Still, Johnston tried one more time on Tuesday, 19 June. “You do not appreciate the difficulties in the course you direct,” - “that” being an all out attack on Grant - “nor the probability and consequence of failure. Grant's position, naturally strong, is entrenched...His reinforcements have been at least equal to my whole force. The Big Black covers him from attack, and would cut off our retreat if defeated. We cannot combine operations with Pemberton, from uncertain and slow communication. The defeat of this little army would at once open Mississippi and Alabama to Grant.”
Seddon/Davis' reply showed clearly that Davis was again on the verge of firing Johnston. And that would have done no one any good. “Consequences realized,” Seddon/Davis bluntly responded. “I take the responsibility, and leave you free to follow the most desperate course the occasion may demand. Rely upon it, the eyes and hopes of the whole Confederacy are upon you, with the full confidence that you will act, and with the sentiment that it is better to fail nobly daring, than, through prudence even, to be inactive. I rely upon you to save Vicksburg.'"
To Save Vicksburg. This was Johnston's new mission. How he was to achieve this Davis offered no advice. Maybe there was no way to do what Davis insisted upon. But Davis insisted it be tried. Whatever the cost.
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