At
about 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 3 July, 1863, a pair of rebel officers
walked 100 yards to the Yankee trenches. Once inside they were
introduced to the short and feisty commander of the 10th
division, XIII Corps, 48 year old regular army General Andrew
Jackson Smith. (above).
The junior Confederate, Colonel L.M. Montgomery, carried a letter from Lieutenant General John Crawford Pemberton, which read, “I
have the honor to propose an armistice...with the view to arranging
terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to
you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be
named by yourself, at such place and hour today as you may find
convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of
blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite
period....”
The
letter went from General Smith to Major General James McPherson, and
was read by those officers and discussed with their staffs. By the
time it had reached Grant, the contents were common knowledge among
staff officers, as was the identity of the second rebel officer, 32
year old Major General John Stevens Bowen (above). He had been promoted to
Major General after the Federal noose had cut Vicksburg off from the
outside world, so the Confederate Congress was unaware of Pemberton's
largess toward the man who had forced the court martial of General
Van Dorn – Pemberton's predecessor. Bad feelings in Richmond might
delay approval of Bowen's promotion. Still, few would have questioned
his qualifications as displayed at Shiloh and Cornith and Champion's
Hill.
Like
Grant, John Bowen (above, antebellum) had graduated West Point. And like Grant, he had
been posted to the Jefferson barracks in St. Louis. Both men had
married into prominent Missouri families. Transferred to duty in the
west, both men were so miserable they resigned from the army. But
Grant had then been forced to try his hand at farming, while Bowen
could fall back on a family fortune. Bowen became an architect, and
returned to St. Louis in the 1850's to open a successful firm with
Charles Miller. When Grant was reduced to selling firewood on the
street, the firm of Bowen and Miller bought their firewood from
Grant. It was not a relationship designed to encourage camaraderie.
Grant's (above) reply to Pemberton reversed the path of the appeal, and was just as
widely known. “Your note of this date is just received, proposing
an armistice...The useless effusion of blood you propose...can be
ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of
the city and garrison...I have no terms other than those...”
In
retrospect Pemberton's note seemed to invite the repetition of
Grant's terms from 16 February, 1862, at Fort Donaldson (above), “No terms
except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I
propose to move immediately upon your works”. Once again Ulysses S.
Grant would become
“Unconditional Surrender Grant" in the press. But Bowen, reading
the response while still in the Yankee trenches decided he could not
wait for gentlemanly formalities.
Bowen
appealed directly to General Smith, requesting that he ask
Grant if he would not at least meet with Pemberton in person, today.
After a few moments wait a runner returned with Grant's agreement to
meet between the lines in front of General McPherson's Corps, at a
time of Pemberton's choosing. And then the pair of Confederates
carried their rejected truce flag back to the Confederate lines.
Grant's
harsh terms set off an animated discussion in Pemberton's
headquarters (above) . Honor insisted the rebels chose to fight rather than
humiliation. It was insane, of course. There were already 10,000 men
on rebel sick lists - 1/3rd of the army too disabled by diarrhea, disease and
wounds to participate in a march let alone an attack to reach
Johnston's Army of Relief. Then Bowen announced, “General Grant
would like to negotiate this afternoon with General Pemberton.”
Grant,
of course, had suggested no such thing. Bowen had suggested the
meeting. But other than a momentary wonder that Bowen had waited to
mention this, the Confederates were greatly relieved. What else
could they think except that Grant's written demand was a mere
publicity stunt and there was to be the very negotiations which
Pemberton had offered in his note. Pemberton (above) quickly sent word
through the Yankee lines that he and his negotiators would meet with
Grant and his, at 3:00 p.m.
But
why had Bowen waited to announce Grant's acceptance of a meeting? And why had he created
the impression that Grant sought negotiations? Bowen knew that with
Johnston's army at the Big Black River, Grant was motivated to drop his demand for unconditional surrender - as he
had at Fort Donaldson. Bowen also knew that most rebels paroled
from Vicksburg could re-enter the fight – as they would do at
Atlanta in 1864. But in trying to manipulate Grant and Pemberton into a
quicker resolution, the risk was that when Bowen's ruse was
discovered, as it must be, both men would feel cheated, and their
anger could result in a slaughter. Why was Bowen running such a risk?
Like
every one inside Vicksburg, Bowen was exhausted and near a physical
and emotional collapse. Suffering already from the malady which would
soon kill him, Bowen may have felt he had not the strength to wait
for the slow witted Pemberton to face reality, or for Grant to accept
the victory he was being offered, instead of the one he wanted. Bowen
may have felt the situation had to be forced. Or he may just been a
tired sick man, slowly losing control of his mind and body.
They
met at 3:00 p.m near a tree near the rebel trenches (above). Pemberton, ever
the gentleman, began by seeking to make Grant's come-down as easy as
possible. He said he understood the Yankee had asked for this
personal interview. Surprised, Grant honestly answered that he had
not. Shaken, but determined, Pemberton then asked what other terms
might Grant be willing to offer. Grant replied there were none. And
for a moment Pemberton stood silent, feeling as if he had
been slapped on the face. Ever the gentleman, he now said stiffly,
“Then, sir, it is unnecessary that you and I should hold any
further conversation; we will go to fighting again at once.”
And
it was now, according to Grant, that John Bowen stepped forward. He
began by saying he was anxious that the surrender be consummated
right here, and now. He suggested that he and Yankee General Andrew
Smith negotiate between themselves. In Pemberton's version, he was
the one who made the suggestion. But it is unlikely anybody sat and talked.
In any case, while Grant (above) and
Pemberton small talked about the Mexican War, Smith and Bowen agreed
to a cease fire until final terms were decided. Then Bowen suggested
Vicksburg would surrender while the Army of Mississippi would simply
leave. Presumably Grant would believe they presented no threat
because of their physical condition. Grant killed that idea out
right. The General from Galena was now so frustrated he ended the
meeting. He accepted the cease fire, and said he would counter
Bowen's offer by 10:00 p.m. that night.
It
must have been an interesting evening meal in Pemberton's
headquarters. The food, what there was of it, was at least warm. Maybe John Pemberton was too ill to accuse Bowen of duplicity. But
the emotional roller coaster day of that had left them all exhausted. The Gentlemen
from the south must have known, no matter what terms Grant offered,
they had little choice but to accept them.
Grant
must have been struggling with his temper. He'd been lied to. But
once he got over that anger, as usual, he saw the situation with clarity. At 10:00 p.m. a white flag appeared over the Smith's trench
line, heralding a letter addressed to Pemberton – not Bowen. It was
a not a negotiation, but a statement of intent.
“ I will march in
one division as a guard and take possession at 8 A.M. tomorrow. As
soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men,
you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking
with them their regimental clothing, and Staff, Field and cavalry
officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their
clothing, but no other property...any amount of rations you may deem
necessary can be taken from the stores you now have...You will be
allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The
same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and
privates as fast as they become able to travel...”
At
dawn on Saturday, 4 July, 1863, Pemberton sent his reply. He sought 2
small face saving addendum. First, his men would stack their own arms and
colors in front of their current positions, and second they would evacuate their trenches at 10:00 a.m. without turning them over to the Yankees. Since Grant voiced no objections, that was the way it would be done.
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