Eleven River miles above Vicksburg , at Milliken's Bend,
were Grant's primary supply depots. With the capture of Haine's Buff
these could now to be bypassed, and a new depot established just behind his the front lines - , up the
Yazoo River at the Johnson plantation on Chickasaw Bayou.
The
regiments protecting those warehouses were transferred as well. But
that left Grant with the same problem he had in December at Holly
Springs. There were still depots at The Bend, and 5 miles closer to
Vicksburg, new hospitals (above) which had sprung up at the scene of that previous winter's pestilence and disease, at Young's Point - opposite the mouth of the Yazoo River.
The
only combat unit at hand to prevent the rebels from cutting
the Mississippi river to Grant's rear was the heavily abused 23rd
Iowa Infantry regiment. After sacrificing themselves at the battles
of Port Gibson, Champion Hill and the Big Black River Bridge, there
were only 160 Iowa boys left - barely enough to guard Confederate
prisoners captured at the Big Black. The need for more soldiers was
so desperate that Grant had been forced to bolster the weary corn
huskers were 1,410 black volunteers.
A
few short weeks before they had been plantations slaves. Touching a
gun would have gotten them shot dead or lynched. Now they wore blue
coats with brass buttons stamped “U.S.” And they carried muskets,
produced so quickly some of them would not fire. They were still
largely untrained, but their white officers were mostly veterans and volunteers. These green soldiers had been roughly formed into the 9th
and 11th
Louisiana and 1st
Mississippi regiments, referred to as the African Brigade. In no way
could they yet be considered an effective combat force , but they
were determined to fight rather than become slaves again.
But
that was a drop in the bucket to what Grant needed. He begged
General Hallack and the War Department to send new
units to free up the XVI Corps, under 45 year old Minnesota businessman, Brigadier General Cadwallader Colden Washburn. These divisions under
William Sooy Smith, Greenville Dodge, Nathan Kimball and Jacob
Lauman, and been garrisoning Memphis and LaGrange Tennessee and
Corinth, Mississippi. It would take a week, but by the first of June
the amazing northern railroad network and the United States Military Rail Road had these green soldiers moving to
occupy central Tennessee, freeing those 15,000 men to fill the
southern trenches of McClernand's lines, closing the ring around
Vicksburg.
With
those men, Grant's strength would top 55,000. But if Joe Johnson's
army, gathering around Jackson, Mississippi, could advance quickly
enough, he might force an escape route for Pemberton's trapped 20,000
soldiers in Vicksburg. Grant (above) needed more men. And, amazingly, he
found them, thanks to the worst disaster suffered by the Union Army
in the entire war.
Said
a Yankee participant in the bloody fiasco of Saturday, 13 December
1862, “If ever men in this war were slaughtered blindly, it was
there.” A federal General observing the battle recalled that rank
after rank of blue clad soldiers melted “...like snow coming down
on warm ground”. Still, they came on, 47 brigades, one brigade at
a time, one after the other, thrown against entrenched rebels.
John L. Smith, of the 118th
Pennsylvania volunteers described the attacks as “...simply
murder.” The returning wounded warned the fresh brigades they were
“marching into an abattoir.” And still they marched on.
Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin told Lincoln to his face, “It
was not a battle, it was a butchery.”
In
this single disaster 1,284 union soldiers were killed, twice as many
as were wounded. Almost another thousand were captured or walked away
from the war in horror and disgust. Federal losses were 8 times those of the
rebel defenders. Lincoln said later that another battle like this
might destroy the army. And the sole man responsible for this
catastrophe was the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major
General Ambrose Everett Burnside, for ever after known as the
“Butcher of Fredricksburg”.
Like
a Shakespearean character, command of the Army of the Potomac would
be offered Ambrose Burnside (above) three times. Twice he had shown the good sense to
reject it, assuring Lincoln, “I am not competent to command such a
large army as this." But every time another of his peers
failed, his political masters came back to Burnside.
He was a
graduate of West Point. He had invented his own carbine, 55,000 of
which were in use. He was a solid Republican, and a popular Rhode
Island politician. He was a successful businessman. In 1861 his IX
Corps had cleared 80% of the North Carolina coast, and at South
Mountain in mid 1862 by itself it had pinned down the rebel army, forcing it to
fight for its life at Antietam. So Lincoln offered him the crown for
a third time. And as ultimate proof of his incompetence, Burnside
accepted.
In
many armies, after a disaster like Fredricksburg, Burnside would have
been tried for incompetence, and shot by a firing squad. In the
American Army he was exiled to headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio. He
requested his old IX corp to join him there. And as a sop to his
battered ego, in March of 1863, stripped of one division, the 8,000
men were returned to Burnside and took over occupation duties in
Kentucky.
And
that is why, in late May of 1863, a frantic War Department found two
full divisions of damn good soldiers sitting on their behinds in
Kentucky. The 1st Division of 39 year old Pennsylvania
canal boat operator Brigadier General Thomas Welsh, and the 2nd
Division of 33 year old Schenectady lawyer Brigadier General Robert
Brown Potter, were transferred to Grant's command and told to
quickly move south. Needless to say, General Burnside was ordered not
to accompany them.
The
IX Brigade was transported to Haine's Bluff, to defend the new supply
depot. With their arrival Grant's army numbered about 75,000 men.
More troops would follow, with time. The rule of reinforcing success
was now working for Grant.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Please share your reaction.