The apparitions rose from the fen so
coated with mud they appeared to be the earth itself. It was a few
minutes before 9:00 a.m. on Sunday, 17 May, 1863, and the night chill
was just melding into the heat of the day. The demoralized, exhausted
rebels, crouching behind the cotton bales, had endured an hour of
heavy cannons methodically dismantling their textile fortifications
from almost point blank range. And then, abruptly, while the
bombardment continued, a great host of shouting banshees
materialized out of the clinging mire, teeth and steel blazing in the
sunlight, almost on top of them. Reason evaporated. Logic dissolved.
The outnumbered rebels ran for their lives.
The Big Black River should have made a
strong defensive position. The west bank was 60 feet above the
meandering river and the swampy east shore. The railroad was carried 150 feet above the marshes and an oxbow lake on great stone supports, a bridge 1,250 feet long. Normally wagons and travelers on foot had to use a browbeaten ford, and then clamber up the steep
slope. The 5 divisions of Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton's army of Mississippi could have
easily held the west bank against Grant, at least for awhile. With a
little stupidity on Grant's part, even the 3 divisions which had
crossed Baker's Creek 2 days earlier might have resisted. But the
broken parts of the army which had escaped the debacle at Champion
Hill, stood no chance of stopping the
victorious Yankee army less than 18 hours later. And then, General Pemberton made
made this bad situation even worse.
Instead
of defending the west bank, Pemberton had posted a third of the
battered remnants of his army with their backs to the river – just
a day after the same sin had led to disaster. Sent ahead late on the
afternoon of Saturday,16 May the seemingly tireless Chief Engineer,
Major Samuel Lockett, had conjured a defense across the boggy neck of
the east bank of the Big Black river bend.
Cotton bales awaiting shipment at Bovina Station were brought by locomotive to the west bank and rolled down the shoulder of the railroad levee. Stacked several deep in a line across most the open face of the river bend they formed an instant fortification. With dirt thrown against them to dampen any sparks, it was the same defense which had worked so well at Fort Pemberton, in February.
Then, in front of the main battle line, Lockett added a trick developed by the Roman Army 2,000 years earlier – abatis. These were tree branches driven into ground with their brittle arms facing the advancing Yankees. Like barbed wire a generation later, these abatis were intended to break up attacking formations.
Crossties
were also brought forward from Bovina Station and dropped between the rails on the
railroad bridge. Then dirt was scattered down, making it usable for horse drawn wagons.
But vividly
aware of the disaster the day before, Lockett was determined to
provide a second line of retreat. Close at hand was a small fleet of
steamboats – the Dot, the Charm, the Paul Jones and the Bufort -
which had plied the Big Black until the Yankees had captured Grand
Gulf, at the river's mouth. Lockett had one of these, the Dot,
brought south of the railroad bridge. Her engine was stripped and
sent north on the river, and everything above her bottom deck was
stripped off. Anchored to both shores, she formed a second bridge,
for the men, if not their equipment.
Major
General John Steve's Bowen's battered division filed into the new
“fortifications” after midnight. Although
they had suffered heavily at Champion Hill, they were confident with
the defenses they found awaiting them.
Brigadier General Francis
Marion Cockrell brigade was south of the road, and 47 year old
Brigadier General Martin Edwin Green's brigade at the northern end of
the line. Sandwiched between them were the 3 regiments of impressed
draftees from east Tennessee, under General John Crawford Vaughn.
Most of the rebels to the southern rebellion had already drifted away
from their units by this time. But Pemberton had little faith in
those who remained. And the weary Tennesseans who collapsed behind
the cotton walls in the dark morning hours of Sunday, 17 May, knew
their bodies were being offered as a sacrifice in the forlorn hope
that Major General Loring's wayward division would soon arrive to
rejoin the army.
As
usual, Lieutenant General Ulysses Simpson Grant was prepared for the next step. His army was just as
tired as the rebels. The only difference was that his men had won.
The Saturday night of 16 May, Grant let his men sleep where they
were, atop the bloody hill.Alvin Hovey's 12th division was
too damaged by the day's butchery to move the next morning. Better
to allow them a day of rest, to recover those separated in the chaos,
those confused or wounded or frightened, to find their way back to
their units. Better to let them bury their own dead. They would
follow the next day. But the rest of the army would not wait a moment
longer than was necessary.
In
the pitch black of 3:30 A.M., Major General Alexander McClernand (above) pushed his
XIII corps west out of Edward's Depot. Brigadier General Eugene
Carr's 14th division lead the way, with a skirmish line
Colonel Charles Lippicot's 33rd Illinois regiment
sweeping both sides of the road ahead, collecting rebels who had
collapsed and fallen asleep. Brigadier General Peter Joseph
Osterhaus' 9th division was next in line, with Andrew
Jackson Smith's 10th division bringing up the rear. James
McPherson's entire XVII Corps would follow up the same road, but
would not be required to form up until well after dawn.
William
Tecumseh Sherman's (above) XV Corps – consisting of Frederick Steele's 1st
division and James Tuttle's 3rd divison - was just
catching up with the army after occupying Jackson.
They had turned
north at the town of Bolton, crossed Baker's Creek and were already
marching west to reach the Big Black River 11 miles upstream at
Bridgeport. Here Sherman expected to be rejoined by General Francis
Blair's 2nd division, before crossing the river on a
pontoon bridge he had been dragging along since Raymond. This
crossing would outflank the entire Big Black River line, should
Pemberton have decided to defend the west bank. Luckily for Grant,
Pemberton had made it easy for him.
The
Yankees were confident and careful. Examining the cotton bale
defenses, General Carr spread his men out south of the Bovina Road.
The Prussian immigrant Osterhause formed his division into a battle
line north of the road and into the woods on his right. And like a
carpenter choosing his his tools, Peter reached out the perfect
weapon for the situation – the 10 pound Parrott rifle.
They
were the largest field artillery piece used in the war. Being formed
from brittle cast iron they were relatively inexpensive. Once drilled
and rifled, water was poured down the barrel while a red hot cast
iron band was clamped around the breech (above, rear). This reinforcement increased
the muzzle velocity to over 1,100 feet per second, giving them an
effective range of 3,500 yards – over a mile.
But
the 20 pound Parrott had 2 disadvantages. First the gun and carriage
weighed over 2 and ½ tons, requiring 8 horses to pull and 10 crew
members to manhandle. And secondly, 22 of the big Parrotts were
engaged during the Battle of Antietam the previous September, and 3
of them had blown out their breeches, killing many of their crews.
This tendency of the brittle metal to fail caused more than a little
unease among the crew of the 1st Battery of the
Wisconsin Light Artillery, who had 6 of the behemoths in their care.
But it was these guns that General Osterhause reached for on that
Sunday morning, telling their commander, 25 year old Lieutenant Oscar
F. Nutting, in his broken English, “I shows you a place where you gets a good chance at
'em”.
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