I
gott'a admit, there was one lesson in military science that General
George Washington never learned – Keep It Simple, Stupid.
Consider George's plan for his greatest victory: First, 3,000 men
under Lieutenant Colonel John Cadwalader would slip across the icy
Delaware river near Bristol, Pennsylvania, and threaten the redcoats
and their hired mercenaries (the Hessians) billeted around
Bordentown, New Jersey. Once the British were distracted, Washington
himself would lead 2, 500 men across McKonkey's Ferry, 15 miles to
the north, and march 7 miles south to attack the 1,500 Hessian
troops camped at Trenton, while 700 militiamen under General James
Ewing would cross just south of Trenton, and block the Hessian's retreat. If all
these moving parts managed to work, Washington plan would be judge
brilliant. Luckily for Washington, it did not work.
There
was no reason why it should. The Continental Army, which had numbered
20,000 men outside New York in August, by Friday, 20 December, 1776, were reduced to less than 6,000 exhausted starving, freezing,
dispirited and nearly naked men, huddled on the south bank of the
Delaware River, . Washington admitted most of his men were “so
thinly clad as to be unfit for service.” Desertions were melting
the army into slush, and half of the enlistments were up on New
Year's Day, “I rather think the design of General. Howe is to
possess himself of Philadelphia this winter,” Washington warned
Congress, “and in truth I do not see what is to hinder him...”.
In February the Delaware River would likely freeze over, and Howe's
30,000 men could march across the ice into the American capital.
Knowing this, the bickering Continental Congress had already
retreated to Baltimore. It all made Washington's grandiose plan seem
a pipe dream. But Washington did have a few advantages.
First,
there was the Delaware River (above) , named after Thomas West, the Third
Baron De la Ware. Iron ore and grains were carried by 40 foot long
flat bottom Durham boats on the upper river as it cut a gap
southeastwards through the last ridges of the Appalachian mountains
to the 8 foot falls at Trenton. The river turned southward 20 miles
later at Bordentown, before the last 30 mile reach to the
Philadelphia docks. When Washington retreated across the mile wide
river he had gathered every Durham boat capable of carrying artillery
or cavalry onto the south bank, his side of the river, for seventy
miles up stream. And with American defenses dug in at every ford, it
left General Howe the choice of either building a new fleet, or
waiting for the freeze.
The
second item in Washington's favor was the well known and well hated
Tory, John Honeyman, a butcher and weaver from Griggstown, New Jersey. In
mid-December Honeyman was captured and dragged before General
Washington for a personal interrogation The truth was, Honeyman was
a double agent, a spy for Washington. In private the butcher
informed his spymaster that General Howe was not waiting for the
river to freeze. On Saturday, 14 December Howe had ordered his 20,000
regulars to disperse into winter quarters in northern New Jersey,
where the accommodations and accommodating companionship were
plentiful. That left 10,000 Hessian's in a string of outposts within
mutually supporting distance across southern New Jersey.
Then
on Saturday, 21 December 1776, the amazing John Honeyman somehow
managed to escape Washington's clutches and cross the Delaware,
where he sought refuge with Colonel Johann Gottlieb
Rall,
commanding the three regiments of Hessians at Trenton. While being
congratulated for his escape, Honeyman assured Rall the Americans
could not possibly mount any operations until spring. This confirmed
Rall's personal appraisal of the undisciplined Americans, and
convinced him he needed no trenches to defend Trenton. “Let them
come!”, he boasted, “We'll at them with the bayonet!” But
also on that Saturday, 400 Philadelphia militia surprised a Scottish
redcoat picket company at the tiny Petticoat Bridge, north of Mount
Holly, New Jersey.
The
Scotsmen fell back on their regiment, billeted a mile north in a
village called Blackhorse, and they alerted the man Howe had left in
charge of most of southern New Jersey, General Count Carl Emil Ulrich
von Donop (above). The Count was a competent soldier, and ambitious enough
to despise Colonel Rall, who had been left out of his
chain-of-command. Disturbed by the rebels growing boldness, von
Donop roused his two Hessian regiments at Bordentown and put them
onto the road, south to Blackhorse. Normally, faced with such an
active response, the American militia would have scattered, but their
commander, a Virginian Colonel named Samuel Griffin, got a visit from
General Washington's aid, Joseph Reed, who urged the militia to hang
on for a little while. But, Washington also warned Reed, not to share why he was asking Griffin's men to make this effort, ..as the discovery of it may
prove fatal to us".
Although
ill, Griffin was willing. So on 22 December, when von Dunop's 2,000
men crossed over the Petticoat Bridge and pushed toward Mount Holly (center, right),
the militia stayed in contact, even trading some long range artillery
fire. But they avoided a full fight. The dilatory shooting continued
into the short day of 23 December. The Hessian planned a full assault
for the morning of 24 December, but Griffin sensed the blow and
retreated during the night. Frustrated, von Donop would decide to
tempt the Americans and remain in Mount Holly another day. He was
also, charged one of his disgruntled subordinates, enjoying the
company of an attractive local widow, who might even have been
seamstress Betsy Ross. Whatever the truth, the skirmish had drawn von
Dunop a full day's march south of Bordentown, even farther away from
Trenton then Washington's diversion was intended to draw him.
That
same Monday, 23 December, General Washington (above) was at his modest
headquarters about 10 miles north of Trenton, in William Keith's
Pennsylvania farm house. In the afternoon he was visited by the
handsome, urban and catty Doctor Benjamin Rush, signer of the
Declaration of Independence, and distinguished member of the
Continental Congress. Dr. Rush found Washington moody. “While I
was talking to him”, Rush wrote later, “I observed him to play
with his pen and ink upon several small pieces of paper. One of them
by accident fell upon the floor near my feet. I was struck with the
inscription upon it. “Victory or Death.” Rush decided the general
was depressed, and probably would have prescribed his favorite
treatment, a bleeding. Luckily for the United States, Washington
could not spare the time to open a vein.
The
spirits of Washington's men was improving. It had snowed, the cloud
cover moderating the overnight temperatures, and a supply of long
promised blankets from Virginia had finally reached the army. The colonists were
getting a first painful lesson, a lesson half of them would have to
relearn in 70 years - that a nation of 50 independent sovereign states,
is not a nation. A year earlier, the Continental Congress had
established a daily ration as one pound each of meat and bread, a
pint of milk and a quart of beer or cider per man. But the rations were almost never met. Without an
internal system of roads, or a navy, the colonies occupied by the
army, were really the only ones that could supply the army. And they
would always lack the resources. Washington's little army was in such
terrible condition, that a few blankets could raise the spirits of
the men. Change was on the wind.
Around
noon, on Christmas Eve, 1776, Washington called his commanders to a
meeting in his headquarters, and it was only now that he informed
them of his plan. The next evening the army would cross the river at
McKonkey’s Ferry, at the mouth of Knowles' creek. The Delaware
River was only 300 yards wide here, and Washington calculated it
would take about six hours to carry 2,500 men to the New Jersey
shore.
Once
reformed, the army would march 7 miles south to Trenton, surprising
Rall's Hessians before dawn and trapping them against General James
Ewing 700 militia, which would cross after midnight at the Trenton
ferry. The Hessians at Bordentown would be prevented from reinforcing
by Colonel John Cadwalader's force. After Trenton was captured,
joined by General Ewing's 700 militia, the victorious army would
march the 13 miles north to Princeton, and attack the British force
there under Major General James Grant.
It
was a bold plan. It took account of Colonel Rall's unprepared
position at Trenton and General Howe's dispersed forces. But it could
not allow for the huge storm winding up off the coast of the
Carolinas, and about to slam into the American army.
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