GETTYSBURG Chapter Four

 

I know the few men of Company A, 6^th Virginia cavalry, were shocked when,  at about 4:30 that Tuesday morning, 9 June, 1863, Federal cavalry appeared without warning out of a pea soup fog. In the shrouded anonymity there was no mercy except that provided by sheer chance. 

Some of the rebel pickets were paralyzed with fear when the madmen in blue came bursting toward their dugouts in the tree line, sabers slashing. Others panicked and went scampering to the rear on foot. 

Behind the blue attackers Federal cavalry formations galloped through the muddy water of Bevery's Ford  (above), crossing the Rappahannock, the infamous “Dare You Yankees to Attack Line”,  intending to clear a path 10 miles south to Culpeper, where they expected to find J.E.B. Stuart's 7,000 man rebel cavalry corps gathered for a raid. But Stuart was far closer than that. And soon it would the Yankees turn to be surprised.

The Federals at Beverly's Ford - named for early landowner Robert Beverly – were the 5,000 man division under 37 year old General John Buford (above), a West Pointer, who had been superseded as over all commander of the cavalry corps assigned to the  Federal Army of the Potomac.  

But Buford was a cautious commander before a battle.  He had scouted the approaches to the river days earlier, and the enemy picket positions. According to General Pleasanton's plan, Buford's troopers were right on time and expected to reach Culpeper by 9:00 a.m. that morning.

What the plan had not allowed for was the determination of Captain Bruce Gibson's company, camped in the wooded hillocks above the river (above).  

Despite having left their horses loose to graze overnight, about 100 of Gibson's men managed to get mounted – a few bareback – and delay the 2 regiments of federal cavalry under Colonel Benjamin “Grimes” Davis. And as the Beverly's Ford Road gained altitude above the Rappahannock,  the fog thinned - along with Confederate confusion.

Within half an hour, the entire 6^th Virginia regiment was throwing itself against the Union troopers, and dozens of fierce battles involving half a dozen men at a time sparked along both sides of the road. It was, to borrow the title of a favored Army of the Potomac march, “Hell Along the Rappahannock”. 

But when the Federal cavalry broke out of the woods, they found themselves facing a low hill,  atop which was line of cannons around Saint James' Church (above). As was his nature, Colonel Davis immediately lead a charge straight up the slope against the rebel cannon. The grapeshot cut down horses and men of the 6^th Pennsylvania and 6^th Regular Army Cavalry, as well as Colonel Davis. But the rebel guns were overrun.

However, without a commander, the Federals could not organize a defense, and a new rebel cavalry regiment charged to retake the guns and drive the Federals back. By now Buford had joined his spearhead, and rather then launch another frontal assault, he moved his troopers around the rebel left at Yew ridge, only to find dismounted rebel cavalry behind a stone wall. Removing them would take some time.

Meanwhile, 4 miles to the southeast, General David Gregg (above) was 90 minutes late crossing the Rappahannock at the little 19^th century industrial park called Kellysville. 

Two regiments of Federal cavalry and a brigade of infantry crossed Kelly's Ford (above), also looking to reach Culpeper by 9:00 a.m..  But they found their chosen road already blocked by alerted rebel cavalry. Rather than fighting his way through, General Gregg decided to look for another route.

By the time Buford's men finally carried the stone wall – well after 9:00 a.m. - and pried the rebels out of their position around St. James' Church, Buford had realized Stuart's cavalry corps was not 8 miles to the south, but right in front of him, and gathering. Buford was smart enough to still wonder about the location of the rebel infantry. 

He supposed A.P. Hill's corps of 21,000 rebels were still 35 miles to the east at Fredricks Crossing. But that left 2/3rds of the rebel army missing - where were Longstreet and “Old Baldy” Ewell's 42,000 men?  About 11:00 a.m. Buford decided to push 2 regiments ahead, hoping to uncover rebel infantry. 

Waiting across the field, General J.E.B.  Stuart (above) was prepared to crush the charging Federals between his 6^th and 12^th Virginia regiments, and White's 35^th Virginian cavalry battalion.

Buford’s men were spared this fate because General Gregg had finally reached the rear of the rebel line at Brandy Station -  on the Orange and Alexandria railroad line -   and then turned west to the northern foot of Fleetwood Hill (above).  

The view from this low ridge was so dominate that just days before General Stuart had used it as a viewing stand for a grand review of his entire cavalry corps. Had Gregg gained the crest of that hill, J.E.B. Stuart's entire command would have been crushed between the Federal wings. Stuart was saved that fate because of one odd little Confederate cannon.

Almost all of the guns lined up to defend St. James' Church were standard cannons that fired 12 pound shot. 

But there was also at least one 1841 howitzer that fired a 6 pound shell (above). It's bronze barrel was less than 5 feet long,  the top of it's large wheels stood no more than 3 feet high and it weighed less than 800 pounds and could be pulled by a single mule. But it required a crew of 6, like a standard 12 pound Napoleon. The Federals had only 6, and the rebels only 23. This particular little gun was under the charge of Lieutenant John Carter. When his irregular ammunition had run low, Carter had been forced to withdraw his little howitzer and its crew to the rear. He wrote later, "As we came near Fleetwood Hill...the whole plateau east of the hill and beyond...was covered with Federal cavalry.”

There were no rebel troops on the hill except Major George Brinton McClellan – first cousin to the hesitant Federal General, and his staff. McClellan had already dispatched one warning to Stuart of the federal division a mile and a half in his rear. But Stuart had not responded. So McClellan now ordered Lieutenant Carter to drag his howitzer up the hill, and open fire. Without explaining that he had only one round of high explosive left, Carter's 6 man gun crew did just that.

And that one shot caused the advancing Federals to pause. They suspected there must be more rebel howitzers on the reverse slope, ready to lob explosives into their crowded ranks. So they waited while their own artillery could be brought forward. And that was just enough time for a second warning from McClellan to reach Stuart, punctuated by Carter's desperate single shot.

Without pausing a moment, Stuart wheeled around the force he had intended to crush Buford, and sent them galloping back to Fleetwood Hill to stop Gregg. The weary rebel troopers reached the summit just as the Federal troopers did. 

In the clash of colliding regiments rebel numbers drove the union cavalry back down the slope. But they quickly returned. In the words of one of the rebel gunners, over the next 4 hours, “The two forces met with a crash that could have been heard miles away...Back and forth they swayed across the slope of Fleetwood Hill."   It was a form of warfare that had more in common with WWII era fighter plane dog fights than Napoleonic cavalry charges. The battle devolved into individual combats, in which casualties were surprisingly low, and unit cohesion difficult to maintain.  About 5:00 p.m., General Pleasanton decided to pull his men back north of the Rappahannock, and the battle faded into the twilight and the river..

Some 17,000 troopers had fought over 70 square miles of Virginia countryside, in the largest single cavalry engagement on north American soil. The Federals had suffered causalities of just under 900, while Stuart reported under 600 dead, wounded and captured. General Stuart held the field of battle, a traditional talisman of victory.

But as one of his subordinates put it, “Brandy Station made the Federal Cavalry.” The Yankee professionalism and skills could no longer be doubted.  But the ultimate measure of the success in this particular battle went to Stuart. The Federal cavalry had detected no rebel infantry, anywhere.

The next morning Wednesday 10 June, 1863 the lead regiments of Richard “Baldy” Ewell's Corps began marching toward Chester Gap, gateway to the Shenandoah Valley. They were unimpeded, and Army of the Potomac commander, General Hooker, was totally unaware they were on the march..  

Five days later “Old Pete” Longstreet's Corp would cross the upstream fords of the Rappahannock, screened by Stuart's cavalrymen. The first day of the battle of Gettysburg was now less than 3 weeks away.

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GETTYSBURG Chapter Three

 

I imagine the Florida and Mississippi boys – they called each other “boys” - regretted mocking the New York engineers that Tuesday afternoon, The stronger voiced had bellowed the 350 yards across the Rappahannock River, urging the brawny union men to come rest in the shade of the trees on the southern side of the river.  

But about 1:00 p.m., when 4 batteries of Federal artillery finally arrived and begun to blast away, the laughter ceased. While rebel sharpshooters killed 6 sons of New York and wounded 18 more, the engineers persisted in unloading 10 pontoon boats at the river's edge. 

Then 2 companies of Vermont boys rushed to the river, and in broad daylight the engineers paddled them across the open water to the Confederate shore.

By now the Florida and Mississippi skirmishers had been reinforced, but the granite state boys charged with the the bullets whistling over their heads. As the engineers returned for more men, the 2 companies of Union troops captured the Confederate rifle pits, and 6 officers and 84 men. Surprisingly, the Vermont boys suffered just 7 wounded in the head-on assault. 

The Army of the Potomac may have suffered humiliating defeat in its last 2 major encounters with the Army of Northern Virginia, but on this day, 5 June, 1863, it displayed audacity and a pugnacious spirit. 

By evening there was a full brigade of Vermont boys on the southern side of the river, and the New York engineers were stringing the pontoon boats together to assemble  2 bridges at Fredrick's Crossing (above) above where  Deep Run Creek (above, far left)  joined the Rappannock River, just below Fredricksburg, Virginia.

Six months earlier, at the end of January 1863, President Abraham Lincoln, had sent a very curious letter to the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General Joseph “Fighting Joe” Hooker. Usually such notes after promotions were designed to inspire confidence, but having suffered through two rounds of the arrogant George McCellan – both ending in failures -  the foolishness of General John Pope - culminating in the Second Battle of Mananasas – and the blundering of Ambrose Burnside – ending in the blood soaked disaster at Fredricksburg – Lincoln was more sanguine about the Massachusetts General's abilities.

After reminding Hooker he was responsible for guarding Washington, D.C. as well as Harpers Ferry, Virginia, the President warned Hooker (above),  “...I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and a skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right...You have confidence in yourself ..You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm." But, added the President ". ..I have heard...of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes, can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship...” 

Hooker had rewarded the president during the first week of May with the debacle of Chancellorsville, 18,000 Federal casualties, and a retreat back behind the Rappannock. Lincoln describe Hooker as acting like a "...duck hit on the head".  “Fighting Joe” had not been relieved of his command at once because he still displayed a talent for taking care of his men. It was Hooker who had rebuilt the army after the bloody failure at Fredricksburg, by improving the supply lines, and sanitary conditions in the camps. 

And he formalized the system of  24 and 48 hour passes in all units, even those in Washington, D.C. - where the workers in the legal houses of prostitution became known as “Hooker's Division”  The new army was so improved that within a month of Chancellorsville, it could display both e'lan and competency at Fredrick's Crossing. And it was Joe Hooker himself who had dreamed up that cross river punch  And now he wanted to go further.

General Hooker (above) had not informed his superiors of his intention to cross the river until two hours before launching the attack.  He justified his aggressiveness by balloon observations that several rebel camps on the west bank had disappeared. If, as Hooker suspected, Lee was moving north, Fighting Joe saw an opening.  "I am of the opinion,” he telegraphed his bosses, “that it is my duty to pitch into his rear...” Hooker suggested a “rapid advance on Richmond”, adding that the capture of the rebel capital would be “the most speedy and certain mode of giving the rebellion a mortal blow.”

Appalled, Lincoln replied at 4:00 p.m. that same Tuesday. The Illinois lawyer tried desperately to explain military reality to the West Point graduate. “If he (Lee) should leave a rear force,” telegraphed Lincoln, “it would fight in entrenchments and have you at (a) disadvantage”. Lincoln then Americanized Napoleon's principles of warfare, explaining an army fighting with the Rappahannock at its back was “...like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side, and fight him...” 

Forty minutes later a telegram from Hooker's military superior, General Halleck, asked “Would it not be more advantageous to fight his movable column first, instead of first attacking his entrenchments, with your own forces separated by the Rappahannock?” Latter Hooker asked by telegraph if Halleck  agreed with the President's military assessment. Halleck quickly assured Hooker, “I do.”

And that was the end of any talk about an assault on the rebel capital. Still, Hooker remained reluctant to lose the dream, and insisting on holding onto his new bridgehead “for a few days”. Then something else arose which drew the attention of the Massachusetts native.

 Commander of a Federal cavalry division, Brigadier General John Buford, reported evidence that J.E.B. Stuart and his entire Rebel cavalry corps, about  6,000 troopers (above),  had concentrated near Brandy Station in Culpeper County, Virginia.. Given the strain such a concentration of horses and men would place on the rebel supply train, it seemed obvious General Stuart must be preparing another large cavalry raid, probably into Maryland.

Reading the same reports overall Federal cavalry commander, Major General Alfred Pleasonton  (above) suggested he take his 7,000 blue coated cavalry along with 4,000 infantry south of the Rappahannock to break up the rebel raid before it started. On 7 June, 1863, General Hooker approved the operation, to “disperse and destroy" the rebel cavalry.

What neither Hooker nor Pleasanton,  nor even John Buford,  knew was that not only were the rebel cavalry gathering in Culpeper county, but so were the infantry corps of Generals Richard Ewell and "Old Pete" Longstreet -  54,000 men still in northern Virginia,  preparing for an invasion of Pennsylvania. The Federal cavalry was about to poke their nose right into that hornet's nest. 

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GETTYSBURG Chapter Two

 

In early March of 1863 the great humanitarian and amateur general Abraham Lincoln could look past the 13,000 federal dead and wounded on the frozen slopes outside of Fredricksburg, Virginia (above) and still observe that, “If the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to its last man, while the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host.” Lincoln was right, and Confederate General Robert Edward Lee knew it.

The tactical genius Robert E. Lee. would admit that after his victory at Fredricksburg “I was much depressed. We had really accomplished nothing...we had not gained a foot of ground, and I knew the enemy could easily replace the men he had lost..” Lee's right hand man, the brilliant and eccentric General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, had told Lee before Fredricksburg, “I am opposed to fighting here. We will whip the enemy, but gain no fruits of victory.”  And the battle had proved Stonewall correct.

And after Lee's “masterpiece” at Chancellorsville in early May of 1863, dealing 18,000 casualties to the Federals, Lee would admit he was even , “... was more depressed...” - because Chancellorsville had cost Lee 13,000 of his own men dead and wounded (above) - and cost him Jackson, shot by his own men in confusion. And that was why, after these two successive frustrations, Lee was so determined to invade the north.

The situation facing Lee  (above) has been explained by Ethan S. Rafuse, of the United States Army Staff College. “ At the heart of the matter,” wrote Rafuse, “was Northern superiority in men and material.” It left Lee with just two choices, according to Rafuse, “Take the initiative by leading his army north or remain on the defensive....” And the latter choice, Lee knew, could end in only one way - a siege of Richmond followed by surrender. But, Lee told his civilian masters, “An invasion of the enemy’s country breaks up all of his preconceived plans...” And his casualties in Pennsylvania, said Lee, would be “no greater than...from the series of battles I would have been compelled to fight...in Virginia.” In short, Lee's invasion of 1863 was not a search for victory.  It was a way of continuing to avoid defeat.

But the core of Robert E. Lee's generalship was always aggression. Within days of throwing the Federals back from Fredricksburg, he had ordered 35 year old Major Jedediah Hotchkiss (above), the chief topographical engineer for the Army of Northern Virginia....

...to secretly prepare a new map of the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys, from Virginia (above),  extending as far north as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 

Hotchkiss' magnificent work measured in full 7 ½ feet long by 3 feet wide, with roads in red and streams in blue, and would prove accurate through out the coming campaign.  In mid-March Lee wrote to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, “I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive by the first of May, when we may expect General Hooker’s army to be weakened by the expiration of the term of service of many of his regiments...”

In May of 1863, 5,000 Federal veterans were discharged, their 2 year enlistments at an end. Another 10,000 were to be discharged at the beginning of June.  Replacements could not keep up with those losses, so by mid-June, the Army of the Potomac numbered somewhere between 83,000 and 95,000 effective soldiers. This reduction would be transitory, as Lee well knew. But for the first time since the start of the war, the Federal numerical advantage was just 10 to 20,000 men. Lee knew he would never face better odds.

Confederate Secretary of War, James Seddon, and President Jefferson Davis, wanted to capitalize on the success at Chancellorsville by sending a third of Lee's Army to either the Carolina or the Georgia coasts (above), where the Federal capture of ports threatened to cut the Confederacy off from Europe....

...or to the middle of the Mississippi Valley, where Union troops  threatened to capture Vicksburg sundering the Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas from the Confederacy. 

For Lee, this made it a case of use his men or lose his men.  By invading Pennsylvania, Lee argued,  "I believe greater relief would in this way be afforded to the armies in middle Tennessee and on the Carolina coast than by any other method.”  Faced with his opposition to dismembering the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's civilian masters were forced to back down.

On 10 May, 1863, in preparation for the invasion, Lee ordered the two corps of the ANV to became three corps, of approximately 22.000 men each. Lieutenant General James (Old Pete) Longstreet (above) retained command of the First Corps. 

Newly promoted Lt. General Richard (Old Bald Head) Ewell (above) took over the Second Corps, including Jackson's old division. 

And new Lt. General Ambrose Powell (A.P.) Hill (above) assumed command of the Third Corps.

The 6,400 men in the Cavalry Corps under General James Ewell Brown (J.E.B.) Stuart (above) raised Lee effective strength to about 75,000 officers and men.

The Army of Northern Virginia was as close to a national army as the Confederacy ever had. Most of its men came from Virginia and North Carolina, but it contained regiments from every state in the Confederacy. This was both a strength and a weakness. As wastage and casualties thinned their ranks, new recruits were fed into the veteran regiments, maintaining and extending unit experience. In the north, new recruits were formed into new regiments, which meant part of the Army of the Potomac was always at the bottom of the learning curve.

But it also meant Lee's soldiers were usually ill supplied and underfed, many lacking even shoes. The South's collapsing transportation system meant individual states could not get supplies to their regiments in the field, even if they could obtain them.  Increasingly, the burden of feeding the ANV fell on Virginia and the Carolinas. And increasingly they had little to give. The depots of the Federal Army of the Potomac had become an attractive supply source. By invading Pennsylvania, Lee could cut out the middle man and get his supplies directly from the source. 

The only thing that held this rebel army together as a cohesive force was “Massur Lee”.  He was more than their mounted commander. As a Georgia regiment passed Lee on the road to Pennsylvania, one private told his fellows, “Boys, there are ten thousand men sitting on that one horse.” Soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia would kill and die for their regimental flag, and for General Lee.

A private soldier in Lee's army earned $11 a month. He was, on average, 24 years old, and single, a small farmer or an unskilled laborer. The vast majority had volunteered during the first two years of the war, all most half either owned or someone in their extended family owned slaves. And increasingly the support and supply for the ANV was operated by conscripted slaves, driving supply and ambulance wagons. No Confederate officer ever gave a slave a musket, but the war was forcing changes on the slave culture.

In April of 1862 The Confederate Congress passed the first “conscription” act in American history, even before the north did. This supposedly drafted all able bodied unmarried white males between 18 and 35 years of age. The same law also extended by 2 years the service of volunteers already in the army.  But Southern conscription never really worked. Besides being run by and for the states - who did not let many of the conscripted men leave their jurisdiction -  wealthy men could buy their way out of the system, and most of the 82,000 low and middle class men drafted, deserted within weeks. And  desertion would always remain a serious problem for all Confederate armies. On 19 August of 1862 “Stonewall” Jackson executed 5 of his own men for desertion, the first recorded in the ANV - but far from the last.

The first units to shift away from Fredricksburg, on 3 June, 1863, were members of A.P .Hill's Corps, on the A.N.V.'s right flank. First they pulled back toward Culpepper Courthouse, Virginia, for resupply and reorganization. Everything depended on doing little fighting until the army got north of the Potomac River, and into Pennsylvania. And first on the "To Do" list was to capture the crossroads of  Winchester, Virginia, as quickly and cheaply as possible. Once that was achieved, the invasion of the north became possible. 

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