GETTYSBURG Chapter Eleven

 

I am certain the office of 63 year old Edwin McMasters Stanton was busy on that Friday afternoon, 27 June, 1863, because the office of Secretary of War was always busy. The mercurial and asthmatic Stanton kept 3 assistants, 49 clerks, 4 messengers and 20 non-commissioned officers busy from dawn to dawn, typing orders, compiling records, and running back and forth between Stanton's inner sanctum on the second floor of the War Department (above) and the telegraph office downstairs. 

So when 40 year old Lieutenant Colonel James Allen Hardie  (above) was called into the the Secretary's office, he thought it nothing special. But inside he found the short but larger-than-life Stanton, the phlegmatic General-in-Chief Henry Halleck and, with his legs stretched out half way across the room, the 16^th President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, all waiting for him.

Once the door closed behind him, Stanton (above) handed Colonel Hardie  some papers, and told him to read them, and commit their substance to memory. 

Balancing his prinze nez eyeglasses on his nose, Hardie was shocked to read orders for Fifth Corps Commander, Major General George Gordon Meade (above) to assume command of the entire Army of the Potomac. 

This page was followed by orders intended for Major General Joseph Hooker (above), current holder of that post, relieving him of it. Given that the rebel Army of Northern Virginian was currently invading Pennsylvania, and that a major battle seemed certain in the next few days, a change in command at this instant seemed risky. But it also seemed obvious to Hardie that he had not been called to provide an opinion. And given Stanton's reputation for explosive fits of temper, Hardie kept his mouth shut.

Stanton now told the colonel he was share his mission with no one. Hardie was to immediately change into civilian clothes, and guarding the papers with his life, travel by train to Frederick, Maryland (above). If the rail lines were cut he was to continue by whatever means available. If threatened with capture he was to destroy the orders, but continue to General Meade's headquarters and deliver them verbally. He was not to communicate his mission with anyone, not even the General's staff, until he had handed the orders to George Meade himself. If Meade refused to obey, Hardie was to bring the orders straight back to Stanton, and speak to no one. If Meade accepted the orders, he and Hardie were to go together to hand deliver the orders to General Hooker.

Hardie (above) was the perfect officer to preform this duty. As an 1845 West Point graduate and an aide-de-camp to Generals McClellan and Burnside in 1862, both Hooker and Meade, and their staffs, knew him on sight. Hardie also held the civilian appointment of an Assistant Secretary in the War Department, giving him authority outside of the military chain of command. It must have been well after 3:00pm when Hardie left the War Department. 

After stopping by his rooms to change into civilian clothes, he headed to the corner of New Jersey Avenue and C Street to board a train at the  Baltimore and Ohio  railroad station (above).

Frederick, Maryland was 40 miles west northwest of Baltimore on the National Road, and just 6 miles north of the Potomac River. But because of the panic caused by Lee's invasion, Hardie did not arrive at the Market Street station until after midnight, Saturday, 28 June. He found the town (above)  filled with soldiers on official and unofficial leave from the Army of the Potomac, now camped all around the town. The last units had crossed the river just today, and many of the 85,000 men had taken the opportunity to “go and see the elephant.”

It took time for Colonel Hardie to discover the location of the Fifth Corps headquarters. He managed to wake a stableman and hire a buggy and horse. This he drove 3 miles south on the Ballenger Pike, to the Robert McGill plantation, called Arcadia.   By the time he arrived it was almost 3:00am. The sentry outside Meade's tent stopped him, but luckily his attempts to talk his way past, woke the 47 year old “goggle-eyed snapping turtle” that was Brigadier George Gordon Meade (above).

As was his nature, Meade awoke thinking Hooker was about to place him under arrest, unfairly blaming Meade for the disaster at Chancellorsville. But even groggy from sleep, Meade recognized Hardie, and was oddly reassured when the Colonel admitted, “I’ve come to bring you trouble”. Meade assured Hardie, “I have a clear conscious.” Hardie then announced he was here on business from Washington, not from Hooker. Relieved, Meade admitted the visitor into his tent (above), where Hardie was able to hand over the orders. 

Reading them, all the blood drained from Meade's face. They reminded him in part, ".. the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore..."  After he folded the orders, Meade said sadly, “Well, I’ve been tried and condemned without a hearing, and I suppose I shall have to go to execution,” Meade then began awakening his staff, shouting, “Get up! I’m in command of the Army of the Potomac!”

Meade telegraphed Halleck, “The order...is received....I can only now say that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered...So soon as I can post myself up I will communicate more in detail.” By “post himself up”, Meade meant talking to Hooker and relieving him of his command. 

Officially at that moment the Army of the Potomac consisted of 7 infantry corps, divided into 19 divisions made up of 51 infantry brigades, 3 Cavalry divisions and 67 artillery batteries of 362 guns, for a total of 115,256 officers and men. Some 30,000 of those men were on reenlistment leave, recruiting duty, extended sick leave or other duties, reducing the men available for actual combat to about 85,000.

Once Hooker had been officially relieved – and he seemed relieved to be relieved – Meade began rearranging the army. Hooker had advanced 3 corps to capture passes through South Mountain in Maryland (above, blue squares). The new commander ordered all three to pull back and move north toward Taneytown. He dispatched the 3 infantry corps around Frederick toward the road junction of Gettysburg, under the overall command of General John Reynolds. Meade also dispatched Pleasonton's Cavalry corps to sweep his own right flank, looking for Stuart's cavalry. 

He held one corps in reserve, and dispatched it and his engineers to begin laying out a defensive line on high ground along the south bank of Pipe Creek, in Maryland. Meade might not have been a military genius, but he was competent -  which was an improvement.

Opposing them this morning of Saturday, 28 June 1863, was the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by 56 year old General Robert Edward Lee (above). His command consisted of 3 infantry Corps of 3 divisions each, each containing 3 or 4 brigades each, supported by 282 artillery tubes, and Stuart's cavalry for a total of 76,224 men, reduced to perhaps 70,000 effectives on the battle field. But as of this morning, Stuart was missing.

The First Corps, commanded by 42 year old North Carolinian Lieutenant General James Longstreet (above), was camped to the south of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. 

To the east of that town, and in position to guard the Cashtown Gap in South Mountain, was the Third Corps of 38 year old Virginian Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill (above) .

The Second Corps, commanded by 46 year old Virginian, Lieutenant General Richard Stoddard "Baldy" Ewell, was spread out, probing and screening for the entire army.

One division of Ewell's Corps, commanded by 47 year old Virginian Major General Jubal Anderson Early, was, this Saturday, pushing east. Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade of 2,800 men captured York, 12 miles west of the bridge over the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, 25 miles downstream from the state capital of Harrisburg. A regiment from Jenkin's division, White's Comanche's burned a railroad bridge just north of Hanover Junction. As expected there was nothing in front of Gordon but badly trained and unprepared state militia.

To the north that Saturday, at about 3:00pm, the Rebel Second Corps divisions of 34 year old Major General Robert Emmit Rodes and 47 year old Major General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson, entered Carlisle Pennsylvania, 35 miles north of Chambersburg, and about 25 miles due west of the railroad bridge across the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg. 

 In front of Ewell's main body at Carlisle - where he could keep and eye on them – were most of the cavalry of 33 year old General Albert Gallatin “Grumble” Jenkins. And about 5:00pm, his “Border Rangers” pushed a determined band of state militia out of the town of Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania – famed for its wagon makers. The next day, Sunday, 29 June, Jenkins would push up to the banks of the Susquehanna River, and search for a way across.

But about the same time Jenkins was pushing into Mechanicsburg, a “filthy and ragged” rider came into the rebel lines around Chambersburg. He identified himself to the pickets as “Harrison”, and asked to speak to Colonel Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, on Lieutenant General Longstreet's staff. 

Sorrel recognized him as Henry Thomas Harrison (above), although he was “showing some rough work and exposure.” Harrison was a “scout” (or spy) originally employed by the Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon, and doing most of his work in Washington, D.C.. Over the last year he had been on loan to Longstreet, and his story and his appearance on this evening was nothing short of miraculous.

Harrison brought word that the Federal Army was north of the Potomac River, camped around Frederick, Maryland. And he brought word that Joe Hooker had just been replaced by George Meade. But Meade had agreed to accept the post barely 12 hours earlier. To have ridden the 55 miles from Frederick to Chambersburg would have taken about 18 hours. What seems likely is that Longstreet's scout or people working for him, had actually been in the War Department in Washington. He already knew the Federal army was moving, but upon hearing that Hooker had been replaced, he left, possibly on the same train as Colonel Hardie, and traveled directly to Chambersburg.

Sorrel immediately took Harrison to Longstreet, who immediately notified Lee. And it must have been at that moment, sometime after 6:00pm, on Saturday, 28 June, 1863, that Lee first missed “the eyes of his army”, General Stuart. The Confederate cavalry was not expected to report in until the next day. But if the Army of Northern Virginia had won a march on the Federals, Lee must have suddenly felt blind. 

Lee immediately dispatched riders to General Ewell in Carlisle, and General Goron in York, with orders to concentrate at once on the Cashtown Gap in South Mountain. Lee was thinking of a defensive posture, as he had promised Longstreet. It remained to be seen if events would develop that way.

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GETTYSBURG Chapter Ten

 

I suppose the Rebel troopers deserved their brief moment of exhilaration.  After the dark, hushed and nervous passage through the Bull Run Mountains, the gray morning light of Thursday, 25 June, 1863 revealed the canvas tops of Federal supply wagons, white pearls on a string, sparkling in the myriad prisms left by the overnight rain - like presents just waiting to be opened. The Rebels  unlimbered some artillery and sent a few shells whistling like shots across the caravan's bow.  But within  moments federal artillery returned fire. And the growing light revealed the dark threatening blue of massed Federal infantry. The flicker of Rebel delight faded into shadow.

Major General James Ewell Brown (J.E.B.) Stuart was leading 3 brigades of the best light cavalry in the world. First in line were the 1,300 troopers of Lieutenant General John Randolf Chambliss, then the 1,900 men of Lt. General Wade Hampton, with Fitzhugh Lee's 2,000 men bringing up the rear. 

The goal for these 4,500 effectives was to make an easy 28 miles a day, covering 110 miles over 4 days to arrive no latter than 29 June, at Hanover Pennsylvania, collecting supplies as they came. There Stuart expected to join Brigadier General Richard Ewell's 2^nd Corps, which was to be in Carlise, Pennsylvania on that date. As historian Scott Nesbit has written, “Realistically, Lee could not have expected to hear from Stuart until the 28th and quite possibly the 29^th...”.

The 40 mile first day's route had been scouted in advance by the diminutive General John S. Mosby. Once through the mountains Stuart planned to slip between the units of the somnambulist Joe Hooker's army to reach Haymarket, and then to cross the Potomac River at Seneca Ford. From there the cavalry corps would pass west of Washington, D.C., and on to Hanover. There would then be plenty of time to destroy railroad bridges, burn supply stores and spar with Federal cavalry. Stuart had done this twice the year before. And there was no reason not to assume he could do it again. Except...

Except there had been Brandy Station the month before – where union cavalry had come within a hair of capturing “Jeb” Stuart himself. And just 10 days ago a Rhode Island regiment had surprised Stuart again in Middleburg, Virginia. And now, setting out on a maneuver that required stealth and speed, Stuart found himself, within 15 miles of his starting point blocked by an entire Federal infantry division - on the move. They were not supposed to be there.  Mosby had discovered as much the day before, but trapped behind shifting Federal lines, he had been unable to warn Stuart.

Military Historian David Powell described Stuart's options as either a “detour to the southeast in hopes of getting around the Union army; or returning to...fall in behind the Confederate infantry...(at) Williamsport. Either choice would necessitate a delay...”. Being who he was, Stuart chose to double back to Buckland, Virginia , and look for a another way through the Federal army. But he was already a day behind schedule.

Before dawn on Friday, 26 June, Stuart led his troopers south and then 20 miles eastward, to the ford over the Occoquan River at Wolf Run Shoals, barely avoiding the Federal Second Corp, which had finished crossing just the day before. Realizing now that the entire Federal army was marching north, Stuart sent a warning to Lee, who was still at Williamsport. But that message also failed to arrive. And because of the Federal cavalry screening the rear of Hanncock's corps, Stuart was forced to inch his way forward, making just 20 miles this day. He was now 2 days behind schedule, and further from the Potomac River than ever. Growing desperate to make up lost time, on Saturday, 27 June, Stuart pushed his men and horses 60 miles to the Potomac – his first troopers crossing the river at 3:00 am. on Sunday, 28 June at Rockville, Maryland. The “Southern Cavalier” was forced to spend the rest of the day letting his men and horses recover from that brutal forced march.

But now their luck changed, or so it seemed. They captured an entire Federal supply train of 125 “best United States model wagons” - pulled by mules, in the words of 54 year old Colonel Richard Lee Tuberville Beal, “..fat and sleek and harness in use for the first time.” The wagons were so desperately needed by the Confederacy, and their cargo of oats so valuable to Stuart's own horses, that Stuart didn't burn them, but took them with him, when he headed north the next morning, Monday, 29 June, 1863.

Having been forced to finally give up his dreams of capturing Richmond – and avoiding a rematch with Robert E, Lee - General Joseph Hooker (above) had, on Wednesday, 24 June, finally begun shifting his Army of the Potomac,  northward. These were the movements which had so disrupted Stuart’s own intentions. But at last Hooker was moving. He was moving slowly, in part,  because of the troops lost when their enlistments expired, had convinced Hooker that Lee now outnumbered him. In desperation, Hooker dispatched his Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Crawford, to Washington to collect 15,000 men from the forts surrounding the capital. 

Fierce Union man, lawyer, politician and Brigadier General John Potts Slough, military governor of Alexandria, Virginia, ordered his men to ignore Crawford. . On 25 June, Hooker demanded that Slough be arrested. Slough was not, and Halleck informed Hooker, “No other troops can be withdrawn from the Defenses of Washington.” In his growing frustration, Hooker admitted “I don't know whether I am standing on my head or feet.”

On Friday, 26 June, Hooker had finally moved his headquarters north across the Potomac, but over half of his army was still in Virginia. And so was his mind. That evening he telegraphed Halleck, “Is there any reason why Maryland Heights (above, BG)  should not be abandoned...?” Saturday morning he arrived in Harper's Ferry (above) himself, and informed Halleck, “I find 10,000 men here, in condition to take the field.” Hooker wanted Harper's Ferry and the heights abandoned, and those 10,000 men enlisted in his army. And he didn't trust Halleck to make the decision. “I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War and His Excellency the President.”  In response Halleck dispatched a telegram to the new commander at Harper's Ferry, ordering him to ignore any instructions from Hooker. The telegram was opened and read right in front of "Fighting Joe". And that was the final insult to Hooker's fragile ego.

At 1:00 pm. on Friday, 27 June, Hooker telegraphed Washington, “My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington...I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.” To which Halleck replied, “As you were appointed to this command by the President, I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred for executive action.”

The Hooker had finally hit the fan.

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GETTYSBURG Chapter Nine

 

I can feel the anger dripping from every word in the diary entry of Rachel Bowman-Cormany for Tuesday, 23 June, 1863. The rebel cavalrymen had returned. “They rode in as leisurely as you please,” wrote Rachel, “I just wonder what they want this time...” 

Jenkin's raiders again invaded the town's businesses “... and were dealing out flour by the barrel and molasses by the bucketful. They made people take them bread and meat...Some dumb fools carried them jellies and the like.” The war for the citizens of Chambersburg was no longer a matter of political principle, religious conviction or moral imperative. Lee's march into Pennsylvania, like Sherman's later march through Georgia, had made it personal.

Two companies of Brigadier General Albert Jenkins' “Border Rangers” had snuck into Chambersburg the night before, and Captain Moorman's Company was ordered to “commender” horses from the farms on the western slope of South Mountain. The remaining 1,500 troopers arrived late in the morning. And 24 hours later, on Wednesday, 24 June, the cavalry were replaced by the 22,000 men of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. “At 10 a.m.,” wrote Rachel, “the infantry commenced to come and for 3 hours they just marched on as fast as they could.”  They were hurrying to the top of Jedediah Hotchkiss' 7 ½ foot long map of the Cumberland Valleys - The state capita. The road itself made their intended destination obvious. Wrote Rachel, “It is thought by many that a desperate battle will be fought at Harrisburg.”

Following Lieutenant General Ewell's men was the Third Corps under Lieutenant General A.P. Hill, which had crossed the Potomac 3 days before. Still in Virginia, but ready to cross the river at Williamsport, was the First Crops of Lieutenant General James Longstreet. When his entire 70,000 man Army of Northern Virginia was unified north of the Potomac, General Robert E. Lee would be positioned to raid the rich farms and factories of Pennsylvania, confiscating weapons, clothing, food, horses, escaped slaves and even impress free black citizens. And perhaps force the Federal government to its knees.

To mask his movements in Pennsylvania,  Lee was operating behind the 70 mile long South Mountain - actually a jumble of peaks and folds up to 12 miles wide. There were only 2 gaps through the range. In the south, touching the Maryland border, was the 10 mile corkscrew Monterey Gap (above).. 

The Waynesboro - Emittsburg Turnpike (above)  followed Red Run creek, which meandered westward into the Cumberland valley. 

Half way up the palisade was the lower, wider and straighter 8 mile long Cashtown Gap, “... through which it was possible to move expeditiously a large force with artillery and wagon trains” (above). Past the Cashtown store, Marsh Creek ran eastward, into the rolling Piedmont of Pennsylvania. Fortifying these two passes would shield Lee's communications and his line of retreat. But even a hundred fifty years later it is unclear exactly what the 56 year old Confederate commander sought to accomplish behind that mountain curtain.

Part of the confusion was created by Lee's personality. On Monday, 22 June, he took note that many of the supplies Jenkin's cavalry had seized were not reaching the rest of the army. So he ordered General Ewell to “If necessary send a staff officer to remain with Jenkins.” Why not just insist on the staff officer? Not that it mattered in this instance because Lee immediately transferred Jenkins brigade out of Ewell's command and into J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry corps. 

 Lee also decided it was time to let General Stuart off the leash. He told his charismatic drama queen , “If you find...that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge...you can move with the other three...and take position on General Ewell’s right.” He then warned Stuart these orders were to be “...strictly complied with”, but he never told Stuart how close to Ewell's right he should stay.

At that moment Stuart was guarding the flank of the First Crops of General James Longstreet. And Longstreet, who saw Stuart's orders, and warned Lee that a shift directly north, to cover Ewell, might tip off Hooker to the grand plan. “Pete" Longstreet  talked it over with General Lee, and convinced him that maybe, if Hooker was not moving north, possibly, Stuart could slip in-between the units of the Army of the Potomac, get on their eastern flank, raise hell, grab supplies and even beat Ewell to Harrisburg. It was the kind of maneuver Stuart had pulled before. It had the advantage of forcing Hooker to look to his own flank instead of Ewell's, putting Stuart in the soft underbelly of the Federal Army, and maybe surprising and capturing Harrisburg. And, since Lee had given Stuart the option, Stuart naturally decided to take it.

Lee's nonspecific orders, particularly when issues were vital, can be seen as either offering freedom of action for his subordinates, perhaps southern gentility, or a passive-aggressive refusal to plainly state what he really wanted when it really mattered. And he had an almost religious faith in his soldiers. He wrote one of his division commanders, John Bell Hood, " There were never such men in an army before. They will go anywhere and do anything if properly led"  Such devotion covered a lot of failings in command. Also, whatever his intent his southern manners left his subordinates, like Stuart, struggling with ambiguous wording, and often choosing a course of action they preferred, rather than the one Lee preferred. When they were right, Lee was right. When they were wrong, they had failed Lee. Like his counterpart, Joseph Hooker, Robert E. Lee's talents and shortcomings would be on full display during the Gettysburg campaign.

Trying to guess Lee's intentions for the Union in late June of 1863 was the job of 33 year old Chief Engineer for the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren (above)  – a man Lee described as “calm, absorbed, and earnest”.  Warren resembled a professor of mathematics - which he had taught at West Point. He was “short and willowy...no more substantial... than a young boy...his uniforms tended to hang off him as if they were several sizes too big.” He was an introvert, rarely smiled, and suffered long periods of depression. But he was a fierce and capable warrior with a quick and powerful mind, and he was so honest his fellow Union officers either hated or admired him.

While the Army of the Potomac was still gathered around Fairfax Courthouse, Virginia, Major General Hooker (above) asked Warren to consider what would happen if he moved the army to Harpers Ferry. Warren admitted such a move would allow them to “protect Washington...and Baltimore... and...enable us to operate on (Lee's) communications.” And maybe catch his army divided by the Potomac. In addition, Warren mused, “It will prevent Lee from detaching a corps to invade Pennsylvania...”

But Lee already had 44,000 men in Pennsylvania. It was too late for Hooker to move his center of operations to Harpers Ferry, and Warren clearly suspected that, since, in his presentation to Hooker the shy and arrogant genius added “These opinions are based upon the idea that we are not to try and go round his army, and drive it out of Maryland, as we did last year, but to paralyze all its movements by threatening its flank and rear if it advances...”

This was the key to the balance of power between the two armies that June of 1863. By staying south of Lee, between his army and Washington, The Army of the Potomac was positioned to cut Lee off, trap him in enemy territory, and defeat the Army of Northern Virginia “in detail” - a piece at a time. It was a golden opportunity. General Warren knew it. Lincoln knew it. It seems Longstreet and Lee both knew it. But it does not seem to have occurred to “Fighting Joe” Hooker.

That Monday afternoon, 21 June, Company “D” – 50 to 100 men - of Jenkin's troopers under Captain Robert Moreman (above) were in the woods just west of Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania, at the high point of Monterey Pass. They were looking for horses. What they found was some Pennsylvania militia. After firing a few shots the militia scattered, and the rebels pushed ahead to the town Fairfield (below), at the northwestern entrance to the pass. And with that, the south gate to the Cumberland valley was slammed shut.

About 5:00 p.m., 21 June, 1863, Stuart's formal orders arrived by courier and repeated Lee's earlier instructions. But now, they ended, “You...will...be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can...” Once again Lee had given Stuart permission to ride around the Army of the Potomac – again. He had not ordered it, but he had not forbidden it, either. Just after dark, another thunderstorm broke over the soldiers sleeping under the stars of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia..

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