THE FIRST DAY Chapter Six

 

I can almost taste the fear and the fascination when reading 27 year old pretty and proudly plain dunkard Rachel Bowman-Cormnay's account of being awakened by the “clatter of hoofs” in the last half hour of Tuesday, 16 June, 1863. Glancing to make sure her infant daughter Cora was still asleep, Rachel padded barefoot to the front window of her boarding-house and saw, “...sure enough the Greybacks were going by as fast as their horses could take them.” 

The rebel cavalrymen disappeared northward up the dark street toward “The Diamond” at the center of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. But rather than turn away to dress or climb back into bed,  Rachel waited at the window until,  in a few moments,  she heard a gun shot.  And “then they came back faster...” You can almost feel her anticipation as she waited in her nightgown for what would come next.

What came were the leading elements of “Grumble” Jenkin's 1,600 man cavalry brigade. “They came in, the front ones with their hands on the gun triggers ready to fire and calling out...that they would lay the town in ashes if fired on again...” Finally, about 2 in the morning of Wednesday, 17 June, things quieted, and Rachel caught a few hours of sleep. She was up again at 5 in the morning. “All seemed quiet...We almost came to the conclusion that the reb's had left again...Soon however they became more active.”

Their activity was hunting food, horses, clothing and Negroes. Any who think the American Civil War was not about human bondage, need only read Rachel's diary. “O! How it grated on our hearts to have to sit quietly and look at such brutal deeds...Some of the colored people who were raised here were taken along.” In other words, about 50 black skinned human beings were kidnapped at the point of a gun. “I sat on the front step,” said Rachel, “as they were driven by just like we would drive cattle...nearly all hung their heads. One woman was pleading wonderfully with her driver for her children – but all the sympathy she received from him was a rough "March along". 

Like most people in any age, Rachel Bowman (above) was a collection of contradictions. Raised in a conservative evangelical family, her parents sacrificed to get her a college education - a rare liberal achievement for any woman 1850. At Otterbein College, just north of Columbus, Ohio, she met a divinity student named Samuel Cormany. And after they were graduated, they were married in 1860. They moved to her native Ottawa, Canada, where Cora was born in 1861.

With the outbreak of the American Civil War, the devout pacifists and dedicated abolitionists returned to the Cormay family farm just north of Chambersburg (above), where Samuel joined the 16^th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and marched off to war. Rachel and Cora lived with Samuel's parents for a time, but when family tensions rose she moved into town, surviving on Samuel's pay.

The rebels who frightened and fascinated the 4,000 residents of Chambersburg were not regulars but self named “Border Rangers”, irregulars under 33 year old Brigadier General Albert Gallatin Jenkins (above, before the war) - described as  "about 5 foot 10 inches high, well-formed and of good physique; dark hair, blue eyes, and heavy brown beard; pleasing countenance, kind affable manners, fluent and winning in conversation; quick, subtle, and argumentative in debate". Upon his father's death Albert exchanged his law career for running the family's 4,400 acre plantation, Green Bottom, on the banks of the Ohio River – worked by about 100 black slaves. His troopers were mostly local small farmers who had spent the war trading raids – house burning,  kidnapping,  murder and mutilation - with local Union sympathizers. Like border “rangers” on both sides, these men fought more out of hate than principle.

The troopers under “Grumble” Jenkins were scouts for Major General Robert Edwin Rodes' 21,000 man infantry division. On 14 June, 1863, after being relieved in front of Martinsburg, most of Jenkin's men crossed the Potomac and drove the 25 miles north to Chambersburg on Tuesday, 15 June.. On Wednesday morning, 16 June, Rachel Cormany observed “they were carrying away men's clothing and darkeys.” - slaves. The rebels showed a particular affinity for stealing men's hats, snatching them right off the owner's heads. 

Rachel also saw General Jenkins in the flesh ( in his best pirate appearance) . “He is not a bad looking man,” she confided to her diary. “There were a few real intelligent, good looking men among (his troopers). What a pity that they are rebels. After the main body had passed the news came that our soldiers were coming...” And with that, Jenkin's entire Brigade grabbed what they could carry and headed back south.

General Rodes (above) had ordered Jenkins to hold Chambersburg. But hearing a bugle call, and fearing approaching Federal troops, Jenkins abandoned the town on Thursday, 18 June, retreating 20 miles back to Hagerstown, Maryland, where he met General Rodes, who had just crossed the Potomac. Rodes was infuriated. In fact, on 18 June, there were no Federal troops within 50 miles of Chambersburg, and in their rush any goods not of immediate use to Jenkin's men were abandoned. The fuming 34 year old Rodes noted, “The result was that most of the property... which would have been of service to (my) troops...was removed or concealed before it (Chamberburg) was reoccupied.” Although Rodes commissariats estimated some 3,000 head of cattle had already been captured in Pennsylvania, only some 1,500 head had reached the rest of the army. Meanwhile, “The horses were almost all seized by the cavalry of General Jenkins, and were rarely accounted for.”

In all fairness, the “Border Rangers” were neither trained nor equipped to stand and fight. And hearing Rodes' complaints, his boss, Second Corp commander Lieutenant General Richard Ewel (above)l, took over direct command of Jenkins' brigade. He no more approved of Jenkins actions than Rodes, but he knew Jenkins raiders were the only cavalry his corps had to lead the way into Pennsylvania. The best troopers were riding with Stuart, shielding the right flank of the army from the Federals.

Meanwhile, Ewell's own infantry had been exhausted by the forced marches since Front Royal, the capture of Winchester and Martinsburg, and then the advance to the Potomac. So after crossing the river at Williamsport  (above) , “Baldy” Ewell sent his 4 brigades into camp, allowing them to rest and send out foraging parties to confiscate food and goods, the excess which could be ferried back across the river.. The pause also allowed Lieutenant General James Longstreet's First Corps to close up to the south shore of the Potomac, and Lieutenant General A. P. Hill's Third Corps to do the same, closer to Harpers Ferry.

Lee's plan continued to tempt Federal General Joe Hooker to strike toward Richmond. Had Fighting Joe done so, J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry would delay the Army of the Potomac while Longstreet forced march his First Corp to meet them from behind Richmond's defenses. At the same time, A.P. Hill's Third Corps was just a 2 day march from the outskirts of Washington. And, Ewell could continue his collecting supplies from the Pennsylvania country side, unmolested. In the same tactical position Hooker had faced -  with part of one corps across the Rappahancock -  Lee was in the stronger strategic position with one corps across the Potomac. And Hooker continued to seem determined not to understand that.

During the afternoon of Wednesday,  16 June, 1863, while Rachel Cormany was watching Jenkin's Brigade looting Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, a panicky General-in-Chief Henry “Old Brains” Halleck (above) telegraphed Major-General Joesph Hooker, “There is now no doubt that the enemy is surrounding Harper's Ferry, but in what force I have no information...our force there...cannot hold out very long.” He added there was no hope for relief “excepting from your army.” 

Hooker (above) took the bait and replied a few hours later, “In compliance with your directions, I shall march to the relief of Harper's Ferry. I put my column again in motion at 3 a.m. tomorrow. I expect to reach there in two days...” Hooker then sent a similar notification to the President, Abraham Lincoln, adding, “I am prepared to move without communications with any place for ten days”

At that point, it seems,  the long suffering Abraham Lincoln (above) hit the roof of both the White House and the War Department. Hooker had been playing Lincoln and Halleck against each other, like a child plays divorced parent.  Lincoln also suspected Hooker of attempting to sneak in his plan for a march south while Lee's Army was headed north, despite Lincoln's repeated orders, “Your objective is Lee's army.” 

At 10:00 that night, Lincoln replied to Hooker, “ To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but as it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders and you to obey them.”

Within 15 minutes, Hooker received a second telegram, this one from Halleck. “I have given no directions for your army to move to Harper's Ferry. I have advised the movement of a force, sufficiently strong to...ascertain where the enemy is...I want you to push out your cavalry, to ascertain something definite about the enemy.” It was as complete a smack down as could be conceived. 

And yet Hooker, ever the anarchist,  was determined to find somebody to play along with his dramatic performance. Half an hour after receiving Hallecks telegram, “Fighting Joe” dispatched a new request to Secretary of War William Stanton. “If General Cadwalader has gone to Pennsylvania, please request him to send me information of the rebel movements...”

But Stanton (above)  was a Washington drama queen himself and far better at the game then Hooker. He responded before midnight, “General Cadwalader has not gone to Pennsylvania, but is here waiting for orders. You shall be kept posted upon all information received here as to enemy's movements, but must exercise your own judgment as to its credibility. The very demon of lying seems to be about these times, and generals will have to be broken for ignorance before they will take the trouble to find out the truth of reports”.

At 9:30 the next morning, Thursday, 17 June, Lincoln telegraphed Hooker yet again, informing him that the superintendent of the telegraph office had assured the President that everything about enemy movements had been and would be forwarded to Army of the Potomac. The rough translation was that Lincoln was just about fed up with Hookers equivocation and excuses.

To which Hooker (above) offered up yet his final whining excuse. “The advice heretofore received by telegraph from Washington has stated successively that Martinsburg and Winchester were invested and surrounded; that Harper's Ferry was closely invested, with urgent calls upon me for relief; that the enemy were advancing in three columns through Pennsylvania...Now I am informed...that General Tyler, at Harper's Ferry...seems to think that he is in no danger. Telegraph operator just reports to me that Harper's Ferry is abandoned by our forces. Is this true?...I should very much like to have reliable and correct information concerning the enemy on the north side of the Potomac.”

Imagine that - a general in time of war, wishing he knew for for certain what his enemies' intentions were.  And just where did Hooker think that information was going to come from? Before noon General Halleck replied to Hooker as bluntly as he could, without actually calling him a lunatic and a great big baby. “No reliable information of rebel movements in Maryland.” 

Then, just in case Hooker was unaware that his bosses were looking over his shoulder, Halleck added - “All telegrams from you or to you are subject to the hourly inspection of the Secretary of War and the President. No important instructions have or will be sent to you without their knowledge.” In other words -  Hooker, you wanted this job, so go do it. 

Halleck later added, “I regret...that reports from north side of the Potomac are so unreliable and contradictory, but they are given to you as received. What is meant by abandoning Harper's Ferry is merely that General Tyler has concentrated...on Maryland Heights. No enemy in any force has been seen below Harper's Ferry, north of the river...So far, we have had only the wild rumors of panic-stricken people.” And, Halleck might have added, one of those panic-stricken people seemed to be Hooker.

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THE FIRST DAY Chapter Five

 

I think the smartest thing Brigadier General Daniel Tyler did that June – and he did a lot of very smart things the last 2 weeks of that month - was to not assert his authority on arriving in Martinsburg, Virginia. But when he stepped off the train from Harpers Ferry at 8:00 that Sunday morning, 14 June, 1863, the 62 year old Tyler found Colonel B.F. Smith just leading the 1,200 man Martinsburg garrison out to face a rebel threat. Rather than create confusion on the eve of battle, Tyler sized up Smith in a glance, judged him competent, wished him good luck, offered to supply advice if asked, and concentrated on loading the last train out of town.

An hour later a rider appeared in front of the Federal lines with a note from sourful rebel Brigadier General Albert “Grumble” Jenkins (above), addressed to the “Commanding Officer U.S. Forces near Martinsburg”. The note demanded the immediate surrender of the town or threatened its destruction. The post script added: “An immediate reply is necessary.” Technically, the Federal Commander was Tyler. But the Mexican War veteran never hinted, then or later, that he should have answered. Colonel Smith did - after delaying for an hour to buy time. He told Jenkins, “ You may commence shelling as soon as you choose.”

It was now closing in on 11:00 a.m., and the old man who had spent a sleepless night on an express train out of Baltimore, still found the energy to supervise the loading of ammunition and food, and dispatching it to safety, while at the same time laying out a line of retreat for Smith and his soldiers. It is a testament to Tyler's cool competence that he marched into Harper's Ferry (above)  the next morning, Monday, 15 June at the head of all Colonel Smith's men. Tyler's reward for this display of cool professionalism was to be saddled with defending a place the legendary “Stonewall” Jackson himself considered indefensible.

Since 1761, when Robert Harper began operating his ferry where the Potomac River cut through the quartzite crests of the once towering Appalachian mountains, its junction with the Shenandoah River had been a magnet for power hungry people. Between 1801 when it opened, and 1861, when retreating federals burned most of it, the “U.S. Musket Factory” at Harpers Ferry built half a million weapons. But even after the factorties' destruction and looting in 1861, the site lost very little of its strategic importance. If you wanted to enter the fertile Shenandoah Valley from the north, you had to start at Harpers Ferry. And the fastest way to get there was on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

By the start of the Civil War the B & O ran 380 miles of iron rails, beginning in Baltimore and running first to Fredrick, Maryland, where it touched the north shore of the Potomac River. Turning west for 12 miles the railroad squezzed around the base of the 300 foot tall Maryland Heights, before crossing to the southern shore at Harpers Ferry. 

The line then wound west through 11 tunnels and over 113 bridges to Piedmont and Grafton, Virginia before reaching the Ohio River at Wheeling. Branch lines drew in the produce from the rich farms of the Shenandoah Valley, and coal from the mines of western Virginia and Pennsylvania – 1/3 of the railroad's profits in 1861 came from transporting coal to northern factories. And even though northern military commanders were slow to realize the advantages of the B&O for moving troops, their political master were always sensitive to threats to corporate property.

However, the Rebels occupying Harpers Ferry found Federal artillery glowering down from Maryland Heights (above), which forced them to evacuate the town within months of its capture. But they captured it again during Lee's 1862 invasion of Maryland. They returned it after the failure at Antietam, but many assumed the rebels would be back this year, 1863. And after General Milroy's disastrous stand at Winchester, the new commander of Harper's Ferry, General Taylor, lacked the manpower to even be certain of holding the Heights.

Daniel Tyler (above) knew Harpers Ferry well. After graduating from West Point in 1819, the Connecticut native had specialized in ordinance, and in 1832 he was made "Superintendent of the Inspectors of Contract Arms." The next year he rejected every musket offered by private industry. His integrity so angered the industrialists that the following year, when Tyler was recommended for promotion to Chief of Ordinance, President Andrew Jackson appointed a business friendly southerner instead. In his letter of resignation, Tyler complained, “I have lost all ambition to be connected with the service where... the fact that a man was not born in the South was a bar to promotion."

But Daniel Tyler's brains and patriotism were never in doubt. As a civil engineer, he got rich saving 3 failing railroads from bankruptcy, the last being the Macon and Western, which paid 8% dividends under his direction. In 1849, when asked to explain why he unexpectedly resigned, he told the board of directors, “Gentlemen...You are educating your young men to hate the Union and despise the North, and the result will be a conflict within ten years, and in that event I mean to be with my family north of Mason and Dixon Line.” And he was, growing richer over the decade serving on 4 more northern railroads before the outbreak of war in December of 1860.

General Tyler (above) served with distinction at Bull Run, but a year of service outside Cornith, Mississippi, under the indecisive and untrustworthy General Henry Halleck broke his health and spirit. But the old man came back in the spring of 1863, and was dispatched to rescue the disaster in the Shenandoah Valley. At 7:00 p.m. on the Monday he took command at Harpers Ferry, Tyler telegraphed that the remnants of General Milroy's mismanagement had arrived. “I am sending everybody over to Maryland Heights... Our effective force here...is not over 4,000 men.”

The cool head at Harpers Ferry soon showed it value. At midday, Tuesday, 16 June, Tyler told his boss in Baltimore, Major General Robert Shenck, “...rebel cavalry this side of Halltown (3 miles to the south west), (are) endeavoring to flank our pickets.” But by 9:40 that night he could reassure his superior, “We have not been attacked at Harpers Ferry. We have been threatened from the direction of Charlestown (6 miles to the southwest), but no rebel columns have advanced nearer...” Then, at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday, 17 June, General Tyler was forced to telegraph his boss, “I am requested by Major General Hooker to (send) our infantry...(to) Noland and Haulings Fords. This is out of my command. Will you attend to it?”

It was a simple matter of chain of command. Brigadier General Daniel Tyler in Harper's Ferry, reported to Major General Robert Shenck (above) who commanded the VIII Corps headquartered 70 miles away in Baltimore. Tyler's orders came from Baltimore. Tyler's logistics – his supplies and reinforcements - came from Baltimore. 

And from Baltimore, Major General Shenck reported to General-of-the-Army Henry Halleck (above) in Washington, D.C..

Major General "Fighting Joe" Hooker (above) commanded the Army of the Potomac, which usually operated south of Washington, D.C.  But as the mercurial Hooker followed the Army of Northern Virginia north of the Potomac river, he was a lot closer to Harpers Ferry than Shenck was in Baltimore. And the increasingly panicky Hooker seemed determined not to understand he had no authority to issue orders to General Tyler.  Nor did the commander of 80,000 Federal infantry, artillery and cavalry seem willing to understand why Tyler's 4,000 men could not simply abandon Maryland Heights, to provide information to benefit Hooker. Fighting Joe's  inability to order about Tyler's paltry command became an obsession, to the point that the Major General went a little nuts – never a good thing in a field commander.

I am tempted here to remind you of what General Omar Bradly said – so I will. “Amateurs study strategy. Professionals study logistics.”

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THE FIRST DAY Chapter Four

 

I find it such a deceptively simple sentence: on Wednesday, 10 June, 1863, the second corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, marched out of their camps around Culpeper Virginia, headed for Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 130 miles to the north. The reality is that Ewell's corps did not move as 22,000 individuals. The second regiment in line could not step off until the first regiment had cleared the road space, and the third not until the second was away. And as Ewell's men were using a single dirt road, any delays would be multiplied accordion like for the regiments behind. It is has been a tried and reliable and potentially exhausting mode of march since the days of Julius Caesar's grandfather.

In the American Civil War the object of every march – no matter its length - was to put as many of your regiments as possible within musket range of what Napoleon called the “point d'équilibre - "Fire must be concentrated on one point”, he said, “and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing." Achieving that is not strategy or tactics. It is logistics. And as 20^th century 5 Star General Omar Bradley put it - “Amateurs study strategy. Professionals study logistics.”

The marching routes were always scouted in advance by cavalry, searching for information on roads and enemy troops. The lead infantry regiments for Ewell's corps rose about 4:00 in the morning, and after a quick breakfast, assembled and then set out at dawn at the route march - about 2 miles an hour, with a 10 minute break to rest and close up for “lame ducks” every hour. Each regiment was followed by a horse drawn wagon carrying it's tents and tent pegs, tarps, cooking utensils – pots, pans, knives and ladles, flour and salt, and reserve ammunition. Each foot soldier carried about 40 pounds of personal gear – musket and bayonet, canteen, blanket, shot and powder, a lead shot making kit and extra clothing if available.

The average day's march was limited to between 8 and 10 hours, so that tailing regiments could get off the road before dark. The first day's march – Wednesday, 10 June - was made in “pleasant” weather and covered 25 miles. It ended at the base of the 4,600 foot high Chester Gap (above), through the Blue Ridge Mountains. 

On Thursday, 11 June – after a ten mile march through the Gap and down the western slope along side Slaone Creek, Ewell's infantry reached the pretty little village of Front Royal (above), where north and south forks joined to form the Shenandoah River. 

The road in front of Lt. General Ewell now split. The Valley Pike followed the Shenandoah northeast 35 miles to Harper’s Ferry, where the river joined the Potomac. The Front Royal Pike angled northwest 20 miles to Winchester, where Major General Robert Milroy patiently waited with his 9,000 man Federal division. Ewell spent Friday 12 June, closing up his men, and and inching forward.

On Saturday, 13 June, 1863, Brigadier General Ewell sent Major General Edward Johnson's division straight up the Front Royal Pike, slowly driving the Federal skirmishers back onto their entrenchments. At the same time Major General Jubal Early's division marched up the Valley Pike, out flanking the Federal positions. That night it rained hard but stopped shortly after midnight, allowing Early's men to launch their flanking assault on Sunday morning, 14 June, unimpeded by mud. Squeezed between the 2 Confederate attacks, the Federals were driven into their forts where rebel artillery pounded them most of the afternoon.

It was after 1:00 on the morning of Monday, 15 June, that General Milroy realized his mistake in waiting, and pulled his men out of Winchester. But at dawn Ewell's trap sprang shut, when troops of Major General Robert Rodes' division caught the Federals out in the open at Stephen's Depot, and forced half of them to surrender. General Ewell immediately released a cavalry brigade under Brigadier General Albert Jenkins’ which galloped 20 miles on to the railroad warehouses at Martinsburg, Virginia. 

A detachment even reached the Potomac River before nightfall and crossed into Maryland at Williamsport, thus confirming the Shenandoah Valley was now clear of Federal troops.

That same day, 15 June, 1863, the 21,000 men of 42 year old Lieutenant General James Lonstreet's (above) First Corps left Culpeper and began their march up the same road to Front Royal. 

Riding with “Old Pete” was his boss, the 53 year old commander of the entire Army of Northern Virginia, Robert Edward Lee (above). The First Corps was the middle of Lee's army, a logical place for the commander to be. But I suspect he also wanted to keep a close eye on his “old war horse”. Until the death of “Stonewall” Jackson in early May, Longstreet had been Lee's second favorite subordinate.

Back in May it had been Longstreet who suggested to Confederate Secretary of War Seddon that the First Corps be sent west to rescue Vicksburg, rather than invade Pennsylvania. But Lee had persuaded Longstreet to drop his own plan by promising to remain on the defensive during the Pennsylvania invasion, and entice the Federals into doing all the attacking. But Longstreet also surrendered his own plan because “Old Pete” realized, as that Georgia soldier had put it, the fate of the Confederacy rode on Robert E. Lee's horse (above). The slave south had tied its fate to the personal strengths and weaknesses of the man from Virginia.

At the moment the fate of the Federal Union was tied to General “Fighting Joe” Hooker (above), who held onto his bridges at Frederick's Crossing and his dream of a coupe de main on Richmond, until Saturday, 13 June when he finally had the bridges dismantled.  Sunday was “Fighting Joe”'s “come to Jesus” moment. The next morning, Monday, 15 June he was able to telegraph Halleck that he was pulling back from the river and gathering his troops further north around Manassas. And that evening he even displayed the self confidence to admit to Lincoln “...the enemy nowhere crossed the Rappahannock on our withdrawal from it, but General Hill's (rebel) troops moved up the river in the direction of Culpeper this morning, for the purpose, I conclude, of re-enforcing Longstreet and Ewell, wherever they may be.” Then, at this very moment of insight and self awareness, Joseph Hooker's paranoia reared its ugly head again in his very next words to the President. “ I request that I may be informed what troops there are at Harper's Ferry, and who is in command of them, and also who is in command in this district.”

Like most paranoids, Hooker had reason to suspect others were out to get him. First there was what Lincoln had warned him about - the way he had undermined his old boss, Burnside. And second there was his old-old boss, "Old fuss and feathers", the 300 pound Winfield Scott (above). 

General Scott had promoted Hooker to Lieutenant Colonel during the Mexican-American war, and assigned him as second in command to General of volunteers, Gideon J. Pillow (above), “One of the most reprehensible men to ever wear 3 stars”. Hooker kept Scott informed of Pillow's disloyalty to Scott. After the Mexican War, as General-in-Chief of the Army,  Scott court marshaled Pillow,  mostly based on information Hooker supplied. But Hooker was called to testify in Pillow's defense, and Pillow got off. Scott then preceded to hound Hooker out of the army. “Fighting Joe” only got back in the fight after the outbreak of war in 1861 as a general of volunteers.

Hooker's current superior was called “Old Brains” as a joke. Henry Halleck (above) was described by historian Allen Nevins as displaying “...irresolution, confusion, and timidity...” A contemporary Union General described Hallek as “a lying, treacherous, hypocritical scoundrel with no moral sense." That other general was Benjamin Butler, and he might have been describing himself, but most of the Federal officer corps agreed with him about Halleck.  But behind Halleck stood Lincoln, who had entrusted Hooker with the Army of the Potomac, even after he was defeated at Chancellorsville. Still, by June of 1863 Hooker was becoming ever more sensitive to slights and insults from superiors. Which may explain why he did the stupid thing he did next.

On 16 June he telegraphed Lincoln again. “You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success”. He then suggested that he might defeat A.P. Hill's Corps before it could rejoin the rest of Lee's Army, but insisted, “... the chances for my doing this are much smaller than when I was on the Rappahannock.” It is hard to see a purpose in this whining, petulant note other than to provide post failure proof he had kept Lincoln fully informed.

Halleck obviously saw Hooker's message, because within half an hour he telegraphed Hooker, “Unless your army is kept near enough to the enemy to ascertain his movements, yours must be in the dark or on mere conjecture.” He then provided the information Hooker had requested from Lincoln -  just in case there was any doubt the 2 men in Washington were speaking with each other.  “ Tyler is in command at Harper's Ferry, with...little or no movable troops.” Halleck closed by suggesting that if Hooker wanted to use Tyler's men, he should contact Tyler's superior directly.”

So there was a single simple sentence to describe the situation. The 70,000 man Army of Northern Virginia was moving north behind the Blue Ridge Mountains, and the 85,000 man Army of the Potomac was belatedly moving north to follow it. But although both armies were moving en-mass, their members remained individuals - particularly their commanders - prey to all the failings of individuals – pride, panic and lack of perception - proving as they approached the moment of most violent contact, how alike as individuals they all were.

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