THE FIRST DAY Chapter Ten

 

I am certain the office of 63 year old Edwin McMasters Stanton was busy on that Friday afternoon, 27 June, 1863, because the office of Secretary of War was always busy. The mercurial and asthmatic Stanton kept 3 assistants, 49 clerks, 4 messengers and 20 non-commissioned officers busy from dawn to dawn, typing orders, compiling records, and running back and forth between Stanton's inner sanctum on the second floor of the War Department (above) and the telegraph office downstairs. 

So when 40 year old Lieutenant Colonel James Allen Hardie  (above) was called into the the Secretary's office, he thought it nothing special. But inside he found the short but larger-than-life Stanton, the phlegmatic General-in-Chief Henry Halleck and, with his legs stretched out half way across the room, the 16^th President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, all waiting for him.

Once the door closed behind him, Stanton (above) handed Colonel Hardie  some papers, and told him to read them, and commit their substance to memory. 

Balancing his prinze nez eyeglasses on his nose, Hardie was shocked to read orders for Fifth Corps Commander, Major General George Gordon Meade (above) to assume command of the entire Army of the Potomac. 

This page was followed by orders intended for Major General Joseph Hooker (above), current holder of that post, relieving him of it. Given that the rebel Army of Northern Virginian was currently invading Pennsylvania, and that a major battle seemed certain in the next few days, a change in command at this instant seemed risky. But it also seemed obvious to Hardie that he had not been called to provide an opinion. And given Stanton's reputation for explosive fits of temper, Hardie kept his mouth shut.

Stanton now told the colonel he was share his mission with no one. Hardie was to immediately change into civilian clothes, and guarding the papers with his life, travel by train to Frederick, Maryland (above). If the rail lines were cut he was to continue by whatever means available. If threatened with capture he was to destroy the orders, but continue to General Meade's headquarters and deliver them verbally. He was not to communicate his mission with anyone, not even the General's staff, until he had handed the orders to George Meade himself. If Meade refused to obey, Hardie was to bring the orders straight back to Stanton, and speak to no one. If Meade accepted the orders, he and Hardie were to go together to hand deliver the orders to General Hooker.

Hardie (above) was the perfect officer to preform this duty. As an 1845 West Point graduate and an aide-de-camp to Generals McClellan and Burnside in 1862, both Hooker and Meade, and their staffs, knew him on sight. Hardie also held the civilian appointment of an Assistant Secretary in the War Department, giving him authority outside of the military chain of command. It must have been well after 3:00pm when Hardie left the War Department. 

After stopping by his rooms to change into civilian clothes, he headed to the corner of New Jersey Avenue and C Street to board a train at the  Baltimore and Ohio  railroad station (above).

Frederick, Maryland was 40 miles west northwest of Baltimore on the National Road, and just 6 miles north of the Potomac River. But because of the panic caused by Lee's invasion, Hardie did not arrive at the Market Street station until after midnight, Saturday, 28 June. He found the town (above)  filled with soldiers on official and unofficial leave from the Army of the Potomac, now camped all around the town. The last units had crossed the river just today, and many of the 85,000 men had taken the opportunity to “go and see the elephant.”

It took time for Colonel Hardie to discover the location of the Fifth Corps headquarters. He managed to wake a stableman and hire a buggy and horse. This he drove 3 miles south on the Ballenger Pike, to the Robert McGill plantation, called Arcadia.   By the time he arrived it was almost 3:00am. The sentry outside Meade's tent stopped him, but luckily his attempts to talk his way past, woke the 47 year old “goggle-eyed snapping turtle” that was Brigadier George Gordon Meade (above).

As was his nature, Meade awoke thinking Hooker was about to place him under arrest, unfairly blaming Meade for the disaster at Chancellorsville. But even groggy from sleep, Meade recognized Hardie, and was oddly reassured when the Colonel admitted, “I’ve come to bring you trouble”. Meade assured Hardie, “I have a clear conscious.” Hardie then announced he was here on business from Washington, not from Hooker. Relieved, Meade admitted the visitor into his tent (above), where Hardie was able to hand over the orders. 

Reading them, all the blood drained from Meade's face. They reminded him in part, ".. the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore..."  After he folded the orders, Meade said sadly, “Well, I’ve been tried and condemned without a hearing, and I suppose I shall have to go to execution,” Meade then began awakening his staff, shouting, “Get up! I’m in command of the Army of the Potomac!”

Meade telegraphed Halleck, “The order...is received....I can only now say that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered...So soon as I can post myself up I will communicate more in detail.” By “post himself up”, Meade meant talking to Hooker and relieving him of his command. 

Officially at that moment the Army of the Potomac consisted of 7 infantry corps, divided into 19 divisions made up of 51 infantry brigades, 3 Cavalry divisions and 67 artillery batteries of 362 guns, for a total of 115,256 officers and men. Some 30,000 of those men were on reenlistment leave, recruiting duty, extended sick leave or other duties, reducing the men available for actual combat to about 85,000.

Once Hooker had been officially relieved – and he seemed relieved to be relieved – Meade began rearranging the army. Hooker had advanced 3 corps to capture passes through South Mountain in Maryland (above, blue squares). The new commander ordered all three to pull back and move north toward Taneytown. He dispatched the 3 infantry corps around Frederick toward the road junction of Gettysburg, under the overall command of General John Reynolds. Meade also dispatched Pleasonton's Cavalry corps to sweep his own right flank, looking for Stuart's cavalry. 

He held one corps in reserve, and dispatched it and his engineers to begin laying out a defensive line on high ground along the south bank of Pipe Creek, in Maryland. Meade might not have been a military genius, but he was competent -  which was an improvement.

Opposing them this morning of Saturday, 28 June 1863, was the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by 56 year old General Robert Edward Lee (above). His command consisted of 3 infantry Corps of 3 divisions each, each containing 3 or 4 brigades each, supported by 282 artillery tubes, and Stuart's cavalry for a total of 76,224 men, reduced to perhaps 70,000 effectives on the battle field. But as of this morning, Stuart was missing.

The First Corps, commanded by 42 year old North Carolinian Lieutenant General James Longstreet (above), was camped to the south of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. 

To the east of that town, and in position to guard the Cashtown Gap in South Mountain, was the Third Corps of 38 year old Virginian Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill (above) .

The Second Corps, commanded by 46 year old Virginian, Lieutenant General Richard Stoddard "Baldy" Ewell, was spread out, probing and screening for the entire army.

One division of Ewell's Corps, commanded by 47 year old Virginian Major General Jubal Anderson Early, was, this Saturday, pushing east. Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade of 2,800 men captured York, 12 miles west of the bridge over the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, 25 miles downstream from the state capital of Harrisburg. A regiment from Jenkin's division, White's Comanche's burned a railroad bridge just north of Hanover Junction. As expected there was nothing in front of Gordon but badly trained and unprepared state militia.

To the north that Saturday, at about 3:00pm, the Rebel Second Corps divisions of 34 year old Major General Robert Emmit Rodes and 47 year old Major General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson, entered Carlisle Pennsylvania, 35 miles north of Chambersburg, and about 25 miles due west of the railroad bridge across the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg. 

 In front of Ewell's main body at Carlisle - where he could keep and eye on them – were most of the cavalry of 33 year old General Albert Gallatin “Grumble” Jenkins. And about 5:00pm, his “Border Rangers” pushed a determined band of state militia out of the town of Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania – famed for its wagon makers. The next day, Sunday, 29 June, Jenkins would push up to the banks of the Susquehanna River, and search for a way across.

But about the same time Jenkins was pushing into Mechanicsburg, a “filthy and ragged” rider came into the rebel lines around Chambersburg. He identified himself to the pickets as “Harrison”, and asked to speak to Colonel Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, on Lieutenant General Longstreet's staff. 

Sorrel recognized him as Henry Thomas Harrison (above), although he was “showing some rough work and exposure.” Harrison was a “scout” (or spy) originally employed by the Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon, and doing most of his work in Washington, D.C.. Over the last year he had been on loan to Longstreet, and his story and his appearance on this evening was nothing short of miraculous.

Harrison brought word that the Federal Army was north of the Potomac River, camped around Frederick, Maryland. And he brought word that Joe Hooker had just been replaced by George Meade. But Meade had agreed to accept the post barely 12 hours earlier. To have ridden the 55 miles from Frederick to Chambersburg would have taken about 18 hours. What seems likely is that Longstreet's scout or people working for him, had actually been in the War Department in Washington. He already knew the Federal army was moving, but upon hearing that Hooker had been replaced, he left, possibly on the same train as Colonel Hardie, and traveled directly to Chambersburg.

Sorrel immediately took Harrison to Longstreet, who immediately notified Lee. And it must have been at that moment, sometime after 6:00pm, on Saturday, 28 June, 1863, that Lee first missed “the eyes of his army”, General Stuart. The Confederate cavalry was not expected to report in until the next day. But if the Army of Northern Virginia had won a march on the Federals, Lee must have suddenly felt blind. 

Lee immediately dispatched riders to General Ewell in Carlisle, and General Goron in York, with orders to concentrate at once on the Cashtown Gap in South Mountain. Lee was thinking of a defensive posture, as he had promised Longstreet. It remained to be seen if events would develop that way.

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GETTYSBURG Chapter Twenty-One

 

I wish I had been standing atop Seminary Ridge at about 5:00 p.m. on 1 July, 1863, when Lieutenant General James Longstreet arrived with his small staff.  He had come to tell his boss, General Robert E. Lee, that lead elements of his First Corps would be reaching the battlefield shortly after dark. And while Lee was issuing his "if practicable" orders to General Ewell, "Old Pete" took the opportunity to scan the Federal lines on Cemetery Hill through his binoculars. 

Longstreet expressed his pleasure that the Federals had revealed themselves, saying "All we have to do is...secure good ground between him and his capital." But Lee rejected the idea with anger. Jabbing his fist at Cemetery Hill he said, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him." Longstreet said he was shaken by Lee's vehemence. And that was the moment when Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg.

At first glance the idea that Lee lost the 3 day battle of Gettysburg on the first day seems odd, since Lee won the first day at Gettysburg. Sort of. The federal troops had been swept from the field in panic and confusion, and had suffered almost 900 dead and more than 4,000 wounded. But Lee's army had also suffered. Still, the first day's success and its cost tempted Lee to stay and fight. 

Over the next 2 days Lee would lose another 3,000 dead, 15,000 wounded, with 5,500 missing or captured - more than a third of the army Lee took to Gettysburg would be lost. And over the next 2 years the 9 million citizens defending human slavery would suffer over 300,000 military dead. The defeat at Gettysburg was truly the turning point in the war.

We know Lee suffered from rheumatism, exacerbated by spending long hours in the saddle under hot suns and bone chilling rains, and sleeping outside night after night. He was also deeply worried about the whereabouts of Lieutenant General J.E.B. Stuart's 6,000 cavalrymen. But more than that, Lee seemed to be exhibiting the effects of "stable angina." - a reoccurring, short burst of pressure felt in the chest which mimics indigestion. Lee later told his doctors the condition began in 1863. The angina was caused by insufficient blood flow to the muscles of the heart. It could be triggered by emotional stress, exhaustion or temperature extremes - all of which Lee experienced during the Pennsylvania campaign. The only treatment available at the time was rest, and Lee got less of that as the battle went on.

The key position was Culp's Hill, the place Lee had just urged Lieutenant General Ewell to capture "if practicable". It dominated Cemetery Hill, the new center of the Federal line. But Ewell had just decided that without support from A.P. Hill's bloodied exhausted men, his men could not take it. Shortly after dark Lee arrived at the II Corps headquarters to meet with Ewell and two of his division commanders - Brigadier Generals Robert Rodes and Jubal Early. Lee asked for a morning assault on Cemetery and Culp's Hill.

All of General Rodes' 5 brigades had suffered such heavy casualties, he felt unable to contribute. General Early was actually facing Culp's Hill, but had only one brigade in position to launch an assault. The rest were scattered between Barlow's Knoll to 2 miles out on the Hanover Pike, licking their substantial wounds and guarding the 3,000 Federal prisoners taken that first Day. Early told Lee the effort should be made against Cemetery Hill. Ewell (above), thinking of Cemetery Hill's 70 foot high slope, warned an assault, even if successful, “...would be at a very great cost.” Old Baldy again suggested A.P. Hill's Corps should do the heavy lifting, attacking the Federal right flank from Seminary Ridge, instead. And Lee did not press the issue. The best that Lee could get was a commitment for a morning display against Culp's Hill.

When faced with insubordination by his officers in the attack, Lee (above) had acquiesced - even though by bringing on a "general engagement" east of South Mountain, they violated his orders, and risked his army. This evening, when presented face to face with similar disobedience to continue the attack, Lee gave in again. It was true that it was late, that Lee was tired, that he was ill and that he still had no word from General Stuart. But Lee allowed his subordinates to control the battle. The only general in the Army of Northern Virginia who did not disobey Lee at Gettysburg, was Lieutenant General James Longstreet.

The intransigence of Early left General Lee with no choice but to launch his main effort from Seminary Ridge, led by Johnson's division, and supported from 2 of Longstreet's I Corps 3 divisions. Longstreet did not approve of the attack, but he did his best to execute it. His men were weary from marching but as far as combat were concerned, they were fresh. But it would take them over half the day to move into position to launch an assault. So, more marching.  And the delay meant any demonstration against Culp's Hill would be over long before Longstreet's men threw themselves against Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge, on the Federal left. Which meant that Federal commander George Gordon Meade could deal with the crises on his flanks one at a time.

As the 1959 "West Point Atlas of American Wars" explained, "Undoubtedly, Gettysburg was the lowest point of Lee's generalship. He was careless; his orders were vague; he suggested when he should have commanded...(he) had become enmeshed in a trap of his own making. He had invaded the North in the hope of winning a decisive battle, yet he had scattered his infantry across south-central Pennsylvania and had lost control of his cavalry. Now, with his army half concentrated, aggressive subordinates had plunged him into a major battle. He had won a partial success against a weaker enemy, but he did not know where the rest of the Union army might be."

Meanwhile, Meade had also turned the battle over to his subordinates, because he was 13 miles to the south at Tanytown, Maryland, still learning details of his army not shared by the bitter outgoing General Hooker. Upon learning the brilliant John Reynolds had been killed, and that the puritanical Howard had taken command of the battle, Meade immediately dispatched 40 year old Major General Winfield Scott Hancock to take charge at Gettysburg. 

He was not next in line for command. But he was "Hancock the Superb" (above), "The Thunderbolt of the Army of the Potomac," and Meade trusted him to make the decision whether to stay at Gettysburg or withdraw to the Pipe Creek line. Hancock's presence stabilized the situation until after nightfall, when Major General Henry Warner Slocum arrived on Cemetery Hill, with his XII Corps camping 3 miles south.

Slocum outranked Hancock, and with his arrival at about 8:00 p.m., Hancock road back to Tanytown to report. Two hours earlier, with only the knowledge that two infantry corps had been defeated and badly injured, Meade had telegraphed General of the Army Halleck at the War Department, " I see no other course than to hazard a general battle". Unlike Lee, Meade (above, center) had inherited a large staff (above), some 6 General and 5 line officers. And he used them - most significantly Chief of Staff Major General Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Engineers Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren, and Quartermaster Brigadier General Rufus Ingalls.

As Major Christian B. Meisel expressed in his 1995 paper for the USMC staff college, Meade's staff "...proved decisive in re-positioning supplies for the Army of the Potomac."  Specifically, "...Rufus Ingalls (above) worked closely with the commanding general to gain an understanding of his intent. He then...developed as simple a plan as possible with corps moving along different routes nearly simultaneously..."  There would be no road blocks such as Johnson's rebel division encountered blocking the Cashtown Gap. Meade's Army of the Potomac arrived at the battle having wasted less effort to get there, with new supply depots established within reach of Gettysburg. All that had been arraigned by Ingalls and the other members of Meade's staff before Hancock got back to Tanytown.

Hancock arrived at about 10:00 p.m. and found Meade already packing up his headquarters staff for the move to Gettysburg. They left an hour later for Cemetery Hill, the logistics of a fight at Gettysburg already established. Lieutenant General George Gordon Meade walked into the little farmhouse back of Cemetery Hill (above)  at about 2:00 a.m. on now 2 July, 1863 

His lack of sleep over the previous 48 hours was obvious. General Schurz noted his "long-bearded, haggard face, his careworn and tired look." When assured by Generals Slocum, Howard, Doubleday and Dan Sickles that the position was strong, the grumpy google eyed Meade responded that he was glad to hear it, "since it was too late to leave."

In the light of the full moon, Meade (above) examined the Federal positions, and ordered modifications to strengthen the line. He took the time to reassure General Howard that he would suffer no discipline for the defeat that day. And he replaced General Doubleday with General Newton in command of I Corps - it was housekeeping for a General. And then he got a couple of hours sleep, to be ready for the Second Day at Gettysburg.

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GETTYSBURG Chapter Eleven

 

I am certain the office of 63 year old Edwin McMasters Stanton was busy on that Friday afternoon, 27 June, 1863, because the office of Secretary of War was always busy. The mercurial and asthmatic Stanton kept 3 assistants, 49 clerks, 4 messengers and 20 non-commissioned officers busy from dawn to dawn, typing orders, compiling records, and running back and forth between Stanton's inner sanctum on the second floor of the War Department (above) and the telegraph office downstairs. 

So when 40 year old Lieutenant Colonel James Allen Hardie  (above) was called into the the Secretary's office, he thought it nothing special. But inside he found the short but larger-than-life Stanton, the phlegmatic General-in-Chief Henry Halleck and, with his legs stretched out half way across the room, the 16^th President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, all waiting for him.

Once the door closed behind him, Stanton (above) handed Colonel Hardie  some papers, and told him to read them, and commit their substance to memory. 

Balancing his prinze nez eyeglasses on his nose, Hardie was shocked to read orders for Fifth Corps Commander, Major General George Gordon Meade (above) to assume command of the entire Army of the Potomac. 

This page was followed by orders intended for Major General Joseph Hooker (above), current holder of that post, relieving him of it. Given that the rebel Army of Northern Virginian was currently invading Pennsylvania, and that a major battle seemed certain in the next few days, a change in command at this instant seemed risky. But it also seemed obvious to Hardie that he had not been called to provide an opinion. And given Stanton's reputation for explosive fits of temper, Hardie kept his mouth shut.

Stanton now told the colonel he was share his mission with no one. Hardie was to immediately change into civilian clothes, and guarding the papers with his life, travel by train to Frederick, Maryland (above). If the rail lines were cut he was to continue by whatever means available. If threatened with capture he was to destroy the orders, but continue to General Meade's headquarters and deliver them verbally. He was not to communicate his mission with anyone, not even the General's staff, until he had handed the orders to George Meade himself. If Meade refused to obey, Hardie was to bring the orders straight back to Stanton, and speak to no one. If Meade accepted the orders, he and Hardie were to go together to hand deliver the orders to General Hooker.

Hardie (above) was the perfect officer to preform this duty. As an 1845 West Point graduate and an aide-de-camp to Generals McClellan and Burnside in 1862, both Hooker and Meade, and their staffs, knew him on sight. Hardie also held the civilian appointment of an Assistant Secretary in the War Department, giving him authority outside of the military chain of command. It must have been well after 3:00pm when Hardie left the War Department. 

After stopping by his rooms to change into civilian clothes, he headed to the corner of New Jersey Avenue and C Street to board a train at the  Baltimore and Ohio  railroad station (above).

Frederick, Maryland was 40 miles west northwest of Baltimore on the National Road, and just 6 miles north of the Potomac River. But because of the panic caused by Lee's invasion, Hardie did not arrive at the Market Street station until after midnight, Saturday, 28 June. He found the town (above)  filled with soldiers on official and unofficial leave from the Army of the Potomac, now camped all around the town. The last units had crossed the river just today, and many of the 85,000 men had taken the opportunity to “go and see the elephant.”

It took time for Colonel Hardie to discover the location of the Fifth Corps headquarters. He managed to wake a stableman and hire a buggy and horse. This he drove 3 miles south on the Ballenger Pike, to the Robert McGill plantation, called Arcadia.   By the time he arrived it was almost 3:00am. The sentry outside Meade's tent stopped him, but luckily his attempts to talk his way past, woke the 47 year old “goggle-eyed snapping turtle” that was Brigadier George Gordon Meade (above).

As was his nature, Meade awoke thinking Hooker was about to place him under arrest, unfairly blaming Meade for the disaster at Chancellorsville. But even groggy from sleep, Meade recognized Hardie, and was oddly reassured when the Colonel admitted, “I’ve come to bring you trouble”. Meade assured Hardie, “I have a clear conscious.” Hardie then announced he was here on business from Washington, not from Hooker. Relieved, Meade admitted the visitor into his tent (above), where Hardie was able to hand over the orders. 

Reading them, all the blood drained from Meade's face. They reminded him in part, ".. the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore..."  After he folded the orders, Meade said sadly, “Well, I’ve been tried and condemned without a hearing, and I suppose I shall have to go to execution,” Meade then began awakening his staff, shouting, “Get up! I’m in command of the Army of the Potomac!”

Meade telegraphed Halleck, “The order...is received....I can only now say that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered...So soon as I can post myself up I will communicate more in detail.” By “post himself up”, Meade meant talking to Hooker and relieving him of his command. 

Officially at that moment the Army of the Potomac consisted of 7 infantry corps, divided into 19 divisions made up of 51 infantry brigades, 3 Cavalry divisions and 67 artillery batteries of 362 guns, for a total of 115,256 officers and men. Some 30,000 of those men were on reenlistment leave, recruiting duty, extended sick leave or other duties, reducing the men available for actual combat to about 85,000.

Once Hooker had been officially relieved – and he seemed relieved to be relieved – Meade began rearranging the army. Hooker had advanced 3 corps to capture passes through South Mountain in Maryland (above, blue squares). The new commander ordered all three to pull back and move north toward Taneytown. He dispatched the 3 infantry corps around Frederick toward the road junction of Gettysburg, under the overall command of General John Reynolds. Meade also dispatched Pleasonton's Cavalry corps to sweep his own right flank, looking for Stuart's cavalry. 

He held one corps in reserve, and dispatched it and his engineers to begin laying out a defensive line on high ground along the south bank of Pipe Creek, in Maryland. Meade might not have been a military genius, but he was competent -  which was an improvement.

Opposing them this morning of Saturday, 28 June 1863, was the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by 56 year old General Robert Edward Lee (above). His command consisted of 3 infantry Corps of 3 divisions each, each containing 3 or 4 brigades each, supported by 282 artillery tubes, and Stuart's cavalry for a total of 76,224 men, reduced to perhaps 70,000 effectives on the battle field. But as of this morning, Stuart was missing.

The First Corps, commanded by 42 year old North Carolinian Lieutenant General James Longstreet (above), was camped to the south of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. 

To the east of that town, and in position to guard the Cashtown Gap in South Mountain, was the Third Corps of 38 year old Virginian Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill (above) .

The Second Corps, commanded by 46 year old Virginian, Lieutenant General Richard Stoddard "Baldy" Ewell, was spread out, probing and screening for the entire army.

One division of Ewell's Corps, commanded by 47 year old Virginian Major General Jubal Anderson Early, was, this Saturday, pushing east. Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade of 2,800 men captured York, 12 miles west of the bridge over the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, 25 miles downstream from the state capital of Harrisburg. A regiment from Jenkin's division, White's Comanche's burned a railroad bridge just north of Hanover Junction. As expected there was nothing in front of Gordon but badly trained and unprepared state militia.

To the north that Saturday, at about 3:00pm, the Rebel Second Corps divisions of 34 year old Major General Robert Emmit Rodes and 47 year old Major General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson, entered Carlisle Pennsylvania, 35 miles north of Chambersburg, and about 25 miles due west of the railroad bridge across the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg. 

 In front of Ewell's main body at Carlisle - where he could keep and eye on them – were most of the cavalry of 33 year old General Albert Gallatin “Grumble” Jenkins. And about 5:00pm, his “Border Rangers” pushed a determined band of state militia out of the town of Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania – famed for its wagon makers. The next day, Sunday, 29 June, Jenkins would push up to the banks of the Susquehanna River, and search for a way across.

But about the same time Jenkins was pushing into Mechanicsburg, a “filthy and ragged” rider came into the rebel lines around Chambersburg. He identified himself to the pickets as “Harrison”, and asked to speak to Colonel Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, on Lieutenant General Longstreet's staff. 

Sorrel recognized him as Henry Thomas Harrison (above), although he was “showing some rough work and exposure.” Harrison was a “scout” (or spy) originally employed by the Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon, and doing most of his work in Washington, D.C.. Over the last year he had been on loan to Longstreet, and his story and his appearance on this evening was nothing short of miraculous.

Harrison brought word that the Federal Army was north of the Potomac River, camped around Frederick, Maryland. And he brought word that Joe Hooker had just been replaced by George Meade. But Meade had agreed to accept the post barely 12 hours earlier. To have ridden the 55 miles from Frederick to Chambersburg would have taken about 18 hours. What seems likely is that Longstreet's scout or people working for him, had actually been in the War Department in Washington. He already knew the Federal army was moving, but upon hearing that Hooker had been replaced, he left, possibly on the same train as Colonel Hardie, and traveled directly to Chambersburg.

Sorrel immediately took Harrison to Longstreet, who immediately notified Lee. And it must have been at that moment, sometime after 6:00pm, on Saturday, 28 June, 1863, that Lee first missed “the eyes of his army”, General Stuart. The Confederate cavalry was not expected to report in until the next day. But if the Army of Northern Virginia had won a march on the Federals, Lee must have suddenly felt blind. 

Lee immediately dispatched riders to General Ewell in Carlisle, and General Goron in York, with orders to concentrate at once on the Cashtown Gap in South Mountain. Lee was thinking of a defensive posture, as he had promised Longstreet. It remained to be seen if events would develop that way.

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