VICKSBURG Chapter Forty - Seven

 

Late on the evening of Thursday, 14 May, 1863, General Joe Johnston (above) paused 6 miles north of Jackson, Mississippi, along the New Orleans and Memphis rail line. There he composed another missive – to call it an order stretches that definition to the breaking point - to Lieutenant General Pemberton, somewhere near Bovina Station. He wondered if Pemberton might be able to cut Grant's supply line. And he urged, again, that if Pemberton's units could not do that, then their forces should unite. And that was the passive aggressive "order" he sent to Pemberton, near midnight on Friday, 15, May.

Later that morning another 4,000 man brigade joined his forces, bringing Johnston's strength to about 10,000 men. But the new arrivals were exhausted, and needed at least a day to recover.  Within a week Johnston would have perhaps 30,000 men. But ominously, forty miles to the west on that morning, Lieutenant General Pemberton and his army was moving not toward a junction, as Johnston had urged and ordered earlier, but were still waiting.

Pemberton's original plan had been a compromise between his conflicting orders from Confederate President Jefferson Davis to hold Vicksburg (above), and his “orders” from Joe Johnston, to abandon the city and march his army east to Jackson. Pemberton's compromise to this conflict was the worst of both worlds. 

Pemberton left 2 divisions of infantry and the battalion of artillery – about 13,000 men in total – to hold Vicksburg and the heights above the Yazoo River. With his remaining 3 divisions of infantry and Wade Adam's Cavalry -about 17,000 men in total - he advanced eastward along the Southern Railroad to Edward's Depot (above). By staying along the railroad he was protecting his own supply line back to Vicksburg, and, he could argue, thus Vicksburg as well.

However last night, at a council of war, Pemberton had accepted Major General Loring's suggestion, that the army should strike toward Raymond – 20 miles to the southeast. The goal was to cut Grant's supply line, and allow Johnston's smaller force to safely advance and link up with Pemberton.  But, leaving the railroad required finding more horses and wagons.

It took time to seize the transport – until now Pemberton had refused to simply take what he needed – and to load the wagons and organize them into a column. And so Pemberton's entire army spent the morning on their asses while this wagon train was created. The rebel army was not ready to move until the morning was almost gone. And then, before the great advance had made much more than a single mile, it was forced to halt again.

You see, there were three routes which could be taken from Edward's Depot to Raymond. The most direct route crossed Baker's Creek (above, blue line) on a bridge and then turned toward Raymond.  Or, the army might first march east on the Bolton Road, where eventually a road net would allow the troops to turn south/east. The central route followed The Jackson road, climbing a 75 foot tall hill. On its broad flat top the Jackson road crossed a narrow north/south lane called the Ratcliff Road, before descending to level ground where it passed the farmhouse of Sid and Matilda Champion, who had given their name to the entire hill.

The hill top farm had been a wedding gift from the father of the bride, and in the 7 years since their nuptials, Sid and Matilda  (above) had built a 2 story home, and introduced 4 children into the world. Sid had joined the 28^th Mississippi cavalry in '62. And a year later, with soldiers from both sides gathering around her home, Matilda escaped with her children to her father's home in Madison County, Mississippi. The property was left to be guarded by the slaves who toiled the soil against their will. 

After crossing the small Jackson Creek, this central route, headed toward Clinton and beyond to the state capital of Jackson. But before doing that it also crossed another road which turned south toward Raymond.

General Pemberton had chosen the most direct route. But this proved to be a most unfortunate choice, because, as the head of Pemberton's column approached Baker's Creek ford the rebels found the stream swollen with Friday's downpour. The flood had washed out the bridge. 

A little scouting would have warned Pemberton of this problem But no one had checked the route in daylight, even with the hours of delay in getting started....

...not even though the vanguard of this sad sack march was being led by the man who had suggested it - the one armed General Loring (above).   So now, Pemberton's little army had to turn about and slowly counter march a mile back to Edward's Depot.  It took another hour or more. The inability to execute a simple march sapped the energy and spirit of the troops. But the man most offended was Major General Loring., and guess who old Give 'Em Blizzards" blamed for this screwup; not himself certainly, but his boss, General Pemberton.

Then Pemberton made things even worse by deciding to take the Jackson Road. After climbing Champion Hill, Pemberton, now  decided to leave the Jackson Road and follow the narrow and badly maintained “Ratcliff Plantation Road”, which ran a mile south across the top of Champion's Hill before dropping and reconnecting with the road he had originally intended upon using. This final choice slowed their progress even more, and the effect of all this waiting, marching and counter-marching was exemplified by Private Wesley Connor, a member of the Cherokee Artillery near the rear of the column. His unit had set out promptly at 7:00am, and then “... marched two hundred yards, halted an hour or two, and then marched back...” They had then then waited another 11 hours, until 6:00pm,  when they “...marched eastward several miles and then southward", before they, "...bivouacked five or six miles..." from their starting point.

Lorings men pitched their tents around the widow Champion's house, while Lieutenant General Pemberton slept comfortably inside. Two miles up the road, centered around the junction of the Raymond and Ratcliff roads was the division of Major General Bowen. And behind them, the troops commanded by Major General Stevenson,  camped along the northern crest of the hill.  And behind them was the supply train, which had delayed the army for half a day, and then advanced less than four miles.  It seemed to the participants as a disastrous day's march. In fact, the wreckage of Pemberton's first bold decision would save his army, because it failed.

Awakening before 5:00 the next morning, Saturday, 16 May, 1863, Pemberton learned that the cavalry scouts sent ahead to locate Grant's supply trains had found the roads between Port Gibson and Raymond, completely empty. Suddenly Pemberton was adrift. Where were Grant's supply trains? Where was Grant's army? Then about 6:30 the commander of his cavalry brigade, Colonel Wirt Adams (above) came galloping up to report that his men were already skirmishing with Yankee infantry on the Bolton Road, at the very rear of Pemberton's army.  And behind those skirmishers there appeared to be a lot of Yankee soldiers on the road to Edward's Depot, in the perfect position to cut Pemberton's men off from their supply line back to Vicksburg.

Almost immediately a new rider appeared, bearing a message from General Johnston, dated the afternoon of Thursday, 14 May. It informed Pemberton that Johnston was surrendering Jackson, and added, this “,,,makes your plan (to attack Grant's supply line) impractical. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton...".

But the problem with that suggestion was that the road to Clinton was filled with Yankee soldiers heading right at the rear of Pemberton's disjointed army. 

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VICKSBURG Chapter Forty - Six

 

Beginning bright and early on the morning of Friday, 15 May, 1863, the 16, 000 men of William Tecumseh Sherman's XVth Corp began destroying everything in Jackson, Mississippi which contributed to the military power of the Confederacy. 

This included, Sherman explained , burning “ the arsenal buildings, the Government foundry, the gun carriage establishment, including the carriages for two complete six-gun batteries”. Also a horse stable was burned down – not the horses, they were too valuable - dozens of captured wagons, with saddles, bridles and traces were also destroyed, as were the carpenter and paint shops. Seventeen cannon, captured in taking the city, were spiked, and then packed with powder and then set off, blowing out their breeches.

But the Yankees spent most of their energy, and seemed to most enjoy, dismantling the railroads. This meant tearing the iron rails from their cross ties.

Piling the ties four or five feet high , the soldiers then setting them on fire - which was easily done as they were soaked in lubricating oil constantly dripping from the locomotives. 

Once the ties were burning fiercely, the iron rails were piled on top and heated until they softened. These were then bent around an unlucky tree or post and twisted into what would later be nicknamed “Sherman's Neckties”.  If done right, such neckties would have be returned to a foundry, to be recast.

According to Sherman this treatment was applied to the rail lines crossing in the city for a distance of “4 miles east of Jackson, 3 south, 3 north, and 10 west.” 

In addition the Yankees burned the bridge over the Pearl River along with 3,000 feet of high trestle work connecting it to level ground. They also burned every other bridge they could reach. Sherman estimated the cost of rebuilding the rail lines alone would be $204,000.00 – over $4 million today.

The rail yards machine shops were dismantled and burned, all the machines for making machinery were pounded with sledge hammers until they were useless. Five locomotives were blown apart, and 22 freight cars were burned. Sherman estimated it would take six months to repair and replace all that was destroyed. But he was being conservative. Jackson was finished as railroad transfer center, as the confederacy lacked the material to replace any of it.

The Yankees also destroyed the state prison, known as “The Walls” (above). Since it's opening in 1840, Mississippi had used the labor of the 200 inmates to defray costs for their incarceration, even adding a 40 acre farm. But during the war most of the prisoners had either been shipped to adjoining states, or inducted into the Confederate Army. After the 1862 arsenal explosion, the prison factories had been used for making ammunition, as well continuing the manufacture of hemp rope, and bags for cotton harvesting. But Sherman's men now cleared that building and blew down its walls.

Not far from the state capital building, atop 'asylum heights', was the 7 year old state mental hospital (above). It had once sheltered 150 white patients, but war and 'natural' mortality had reduced that number by half.  However, Yankees under Brigadier General Joseph (Fighting Joe) Anthony Mower – in charge of the destructions in the center of Jackson - went on a shopping spree of the hospital's storehouse and garden, harvesting the crops and driving away many of the animals intended to feed the patients. 

Even worse, according to the Jackson Daily News, “...seven of the institution’s ten employees left their jobs and joined the Union Army.”  In other words, they had been slaves. It seems even the care of the most vulnerable in Mississippi had been done by the cheapest labor available. The remaining 50 or so patients survived as best they could, if they could, until the end of the war.

Since 1841 the Federal Government had been sitting on a fund to pay for the establishment of a state school for the blind. But the state of Mississippi refused to recognize the Federal right to seize and sell those lands, and for 13 years had refused to avail themselves of the money. Finally, in 1857, sanity demanded that the children came first and and in 1858 a dormitory and rude campus were constructed (above) a mile and a half west on the Clinton Road. Federal troops now investigated the property, but did little damage. However, the support staff were slaves and most chose personal freedom over caring for other people's children.   Meanwhile, the mostly young, indigent white patients were now just another cost of defending human slavery at all costs.

No Government buildings were purposely damaged – the state capital building (above) still stands a century later. The City Hall, the Masonic Hall, the Concert Hall and The Lyceum were all guarded by Federal troops to ensure their survival,  Even the Governor's mansion remained untouched. However a few Yankees had discovered a cache of rum and some pillaging of private property resulted. A minister admitted that while his church was undamaged, his home had suffered, “... wanton destruction...May God forgive them for all the evil they did...” But the war was still young, and compared to what Sherman would unleash upon Jackson just 5 months later, this was a benign occupation. 

In truth, Sherman had very little time to do much more. Before nightfall, “Cump” (above) had received orders that the last of his men were to be on the road to Clinton, by 10:00am, Saturday, 16 May, 1863. The Vicksburg campaign was rushing toward it's climax.

And Grant was ready. As the tail end of Sherman's Corps, General Blair 's division reached Raymond on 14 May, There they passed on the 200 wagon ammunition train to the protection of McClernand's Corps.  Most of what the army needed to eat and move was being taken from the Mississippi farmers and plantations. But shot and shell, sugar and coffee were all in short supply in the Confederacy. Those, the Army of the Tennessee  had brought with them from Grand Gulf, not in a continuous train of wagons, but in concentrated bundles, each protected by a full division. But this was to be the final bundle for Grant's army. After this train there would be no string of vulnerable wagons filling the roads between Grand Gulf and Jackson, Mississippi.

The vulnerable rear of the Federal army, which General Loring had convinced Pemberton to strike for, no longer existed. Had Pemberton struck on 12 May, or even 13 May, he might have hit Grant a serious blow. But by 15 May, it was too late. And had Pemberton followed Johnston's original order, he might have been striking toward Clinton on 15 May with 35,000 men, and the story of  Vicksburg might have been very different.

The story that was told later that a year and a half earlier an unnamed rebel civilian was suspected of union sympathies by authorities in the still Confederate city of Nashville, Tennessee (above). This rebel was then publicly accused and escorted out of the town in shame just before that city became the first rebel state capital to fall to Federals in February of 1862. 

That individual, now in Jackson, Mississippi, harbored his resentment until 13 May, 1863, when Captain James Yeager went looking for two volunteers to carry copies of General Joseph Johnston's orders through the Yankee armies to General Pemberton, in Bovina.  Knowing the vital nature of the message, the insulted rebel, volunteered. And at the first Yankee picket outside of Clinton,  he – or she – repaid the insult by handing over their copy of Johnston's message to Pemberton. Or so the story goes.

We know as fact the captured message, however it was acquired, went directly to the headquarters of Major General James Birdseye McPherson (above), who passed the message on to General Grant's headquarters in the evening hours of 14 May. 

Even with parts of the order written in an as yet unbroken code, the essence was clear. Pemberton (above) was ordered to abandon Vicksburg, and march on Clinton, where he would be met by Johnston's gathering host. Johnston may have been pushed out of the game, but Grant now knew a rebel army was bearing down on his rear.

This explained Grant's orders to  McPherson on the evening of Thursday, 14 May. His XVII Corps wheeled about on their heels and during 15 May marched back through Clinton, to Bolton - 20 miles west of Jackson.  Also on that Friday, the  Major General John Alexander McClernand was ordered to "Turn all your forces toward Bolton Station, and make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." Grant was determined to block all of the roads Pemberton might use to combine with Johnston's growing force -  the Bridgeport to Clinton Road, the Edward's Depot to Clinton Road which ran through Bolton, and the Bolton to Raymond road.   Sherman's 2 available divisions were  ordered to finish their work in Jackson and be on the Clinton road by 10:00am on Saturday, 16 May.

Grant's staff had just shifted the direction of march of the Army of The Tennessee 180 degrees. McClernand's and McPherson's Corps were now in the lead.  Sherman's Corps was now the reserve.  It was a classic Napoleonic use of independent Corps to quickly concentrate their power in whatever direction their general chose.  Grant could not know that Pemberton's decision to strike toward Raymond was, in effect, moving toward Grant's left flank, while uncovering Grant's most direct route to Vicksburg and a re-establishment of the Federal supply line.   And neither side could know the outcome of the entire campaign would now be determined not by human egos or minds, but by the rains of 14 May.

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VICKSBURG Chapter Forty - Five

 

When 41 year old Major General Ulysses Grant (above) entered Jackson, Mississippi, there were warehouses full of Confederate supplies burning furiously. These fires had been set by Johnston's retreating men, to destroy military equipment they could not evacuate. But as yet Grant took little notice of the destruction. Instead, wrote Grant, “I rode immediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman.” 

About 4:00pm, Thursday, 14 May, 1863, Grant held a council of war with his 3 corps commanders. He ordered 43 year old Major General William Tecumseh Sherman (above) to destroy everything of value to the Confederacy in the state capital, before returning it's burned out shell to the Confederates and marching his XV Corps west, toward Clinton.

Grant ordered 34 yea old Major General James Birdseye McPherson  (above) to halt his XVII Corps  on Jackson's west side, and in the morning, march them 30 miles back to Clinton, and then another 8 miles further west to Bolton. 

Grant's ordered 49 year old Major General John Alexander McClernand, whose XIII Corps was now centered around Raymond, to march toward Bolton as well. Grant was concentrating his army. He had been inspired by the first message from Johnston to Pemberton, and intercepted by Yankee cavalry patrols,  ordering Pemberton to advance on Clinton.

His work done, Grant and Sherman then took a tour of a nearby factory. Remembered Grant, “Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager, or of the operatives (most of whom were girls). We looked on awhile to see the tent-cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with C. S. A. woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount of cotton in bales stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told they might leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze.”

Grant then checked into the Bowman House Hotel, across the street from the capital building. He received the room occupied the night before by his opponent, General Joseph Johnston. Scattered about the city in public and private houses were the 16,000 men of Sherman's corps. The 31^st Iowa was encamped in the state house chamber, and entertained themselves for an hour or so by holding a mock session to repeal Mississippi's 9 January 1861 Ordinance of Secession.

The 688 word long justification for Mississippi secession had referred to slavery either directly or indirectly 12 times. “Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery...a blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and civilization...” Complained the slave owners, northern hostility had deprived them, “...of more than half the vast territory acquired from France....dismembered Texas and seized upon all the territory acquired from Mexico...(and) denies the right of property in slaves, and refuses protection to that right on the high seas, (and) in the Territories...” (In fact the British Royal Navy had been choking off the transatlantic slave trade since 1807.) Further, said those who had built their wealth on the backs others, the Federal government, “...refuses the admission of new slave States....denying (slavery) the power of expansion...”

And what was Mississippi's justification for the lifelong bondage of 4 million human beings, the commonplace humiliation and rape of slave men, women and children, the beatings, the murders, the toil and early deaths demanded by a soul crushing life of servitude? It was because “...none but the black race can bear exposure to the tropical sun...”. Light skinned people got sunburned, and they sweated. That was the justification. It was a laughable rational for moral bankruptcy in the state of Mississippi, and had been recognized as absurd since at least 1807.

In orders received from General Johnston on 13 May, 49 year old Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton (above)  was to advance with his entire force from Bovina Station 40 miles east,  toward Clinton, Mississippi – the last reported position of Grant's army – and meet up with Johnston's gathering force.  

So on Thursday, 14 May the division of 45 year old Major General Carter Littlepage Stevenson...

...and that of 32 year old Major General John Stevens Bowen  crossed the Big Black River and marched 20 miles to Edward's Depot. 

That evening Pemberton was joined by 44 year old Major General Willing Wing Loring (above), whose infantry division...

...and The Mississippi Cavalry regiment under 44 year old Colonel William Wirt Adams were added to his command - some 17,000 men in total. And that evening Pemberton also held a council of war.

Pemberton began by explaining his orders from Johnston. He had left 2 division in Vicksburg, because protecting the riverfront town was his primary duty, per his instructions from President Jefferson Davis.  But moving all his remaining men to Clinton might give Grant a chance to slip south and capture Vicksburg behind him. Pemberton was also concerned that marching on Clinton might leave his flank vulnerable to an attack by McClernand's XIII Corps, which Adams accurately reported was near Raymond. So the paper pusher, struggling with his first field command, asked his 4 subordinates for their opinions. Should he advance on Clinton? Or should the army stay were it was?

It seems obvious that none of the officers in that room had much respect for Pemberton. But was the fault actually Pemberton's or his disorderly officers? Perhaps the most objective estimation of Pemberton we have, comes from a man not in that room - Captain G. Campbell Brown (above).

The Captain was the son of Lizinka Campbell Brown. She was first cousin and the great love of Virginia born Army officer Richard Stoddard Ewell (above). Broken hearted when Lizinka was forced to marry Tennessee Lawyer and player, James Percy Brown in 1839, Ewell exiled himself on the western frontier. Then James Brown committed suicide in 1844, leaving Lizinka a widow with 2 children. But “the widow Brown” as Ewell ever after referred to her, proved a smart business woman, and increased her inheritance and property holdings. The outbreak of war brought Richard back east, where he renewed his love affair with Lizinka, and making her eldest son, G. Campbell Brown, his personal aide.

In that position, Captain Brown met most of the famous and infamous Confederate officers and politicians in the first two years of the war, and formed concise, vivid and accurate opinions of them. In August of 1862, at the Second Battle of Mannanass, a minie ball shattered Richard Ewell's right knee, and his leg had to be removed. While Ewell recovered, Captain Brown was transferred to Joe Johnston's staff in Tennessee, and came with him to Vicksburg. Now he found himself reading the telegrams and letters of John Clifford Pemberton. And it was Brown's firm belief that Pemberton was an idiot. The Captain wrote, “I never knew, in all my life, so provoking a stupidity as Pemberton’s.”

So the officers facing General Pemberton that 14 May evening were on the spot. What was this fool asking of them? Permission to disobey orders? And if the campaign led to disaster, lost the war and lost their men's lives. they would be blamed right along with the stupid fool Pemberton. Major General Stevenson and Major General Bowen did the equivalent of saying nothing. They advised Pemberton he should follow his orders from General Johnston. But the one armed Major General Loring was made of more aggressive metal.

Since 30,000 men were tied down in the Vicksburg trenches, explained Loring , an advance on Clinton would place 17,000 Confederate soldiers up against 45,000 Yankees. That was a battle they could not win. Johnston might be besieged in Jackson with 20 or 30,000 men. Or he could have only 10,000.  He had never told Pemberton exactly how many men he had. 

Advancing on Clinton was too risky. Staying in Edward's Depot meant waiting for Grant to destroy Johnston's force, before turning on them. Again, that was a battle they could not win. But, advised Major General Loring, there was third option.

Grant's army must still be drawing supplies from Grand Gulf. So, suggested Loring, put 17,000 rebels astride the roads between Grand Gulf and Raymond (above), and the Yankees would be forced to withdraw from Jackson to defend their supply line. That would give Johnston time to advance his new army to combine with theirs, giving them, perhaps 50,000 men total.

It was an aggressive approach, the kind of bold attack typical of Loring. When asked to comment, both Stevenson and Bowen agreed that it was bold move, and not something Grant would be expecting. General Pemberton took their non-committal statements for advocacy. And when Wirt Adams suggested they aim their attacks at Raymond, and the Natchez Trace, just south of 14 Mile Creek, because that was the last reported position of General Grant, Pemberton decided to follow Loring's advice.

Come the dawn, of 15 May, 1863, Pemberton's army of 17,000 men, would be advancing south, to cut Grant's supply line.  The only problem was, there was no supply line for Pemberton to cut.

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