SUNDAY MAY 17, 1863

As Pemberton’s battered men march through the night, they number less than 10,000: exhausted, defeated and mishandled. By now Pemberton is aware that he cannot stop at the Big Black, but must reach the safety of the Vicksburg entrenchments. He leaves three brigades from General Bowen’s division behind to slow the Union advance, perhaps 2,000 men, and drives the rest of his weary men on to Vicksburg some 20 miles away.

*
Bowen’s men occupy positions prepared a week earlier, across the neck of a bend in the Big Black. The river at this point is so narrow that a riverboat has been jammed between the banks and is being used by the Confederates as a footbridge. The Vicksburg & Jackson railroad also bridges the river here, but it can not be used by horses or wagons. Grant describes the rebel position across the bend as covering an old bayou. “The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. All this time there was a foot or two of water in it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou, by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river.” Now General John McClernand’s Corps is in the lead again, and as Grant watches, his artillery begins firing on the rebel trenches while General Michael K. Carr’s division prepares to assault the Confederate works.

*

It is at this moment that (according to Grant) a messenger arrives with instructions from General Halleck in Washington, via General Banks - who is still struggling in the hinterlands of Louisiana in order (allegedly) to eventually, somehow, proceed against Port Hudson on the Mississippi River. The message is dated May 11 and orders Grant to immediately return to Grand Gulf and proceed against Port Hudson. And only after its fall will Grant be allowed to return to his actions against Vicksburg. After reading the message Grant tells the messenger that if Halleck knew the present situation he would not insist on the order. The messenger insists that Grant must obey his instructions. *
Just at that moment, with a bold charge, Irishman General Michael K, Lawler puts his military philosophy into practice (“If you see a head, hit it.”) by storming the Confederate breastworks in the face of a withering fire. Union Secretary of War Charles Dana would later describe Lawler as “…brave as a lion,…and has as much brains”, but with this one fell swoop the battle is won. Allegedly Grant now turns to the messenger and says, “It may be too early to end this campaign.” Whatever Grant said (if anything) he later wrote, “I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch, I think not even to this day.”
*
As the Confederate troops began to flee from the battle line the Confederate engineers set fire to the bridge and boat, to deny their use by the Union. The Union could claim 1,751 Confederate killed, wounded and captured, and an unknown number drowned when their bridges burned beneath their feet. Union losses are 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. Pemberton will return the next day to his original position inside the Vicksburg fortifications but with less than half the 17,000 men he had on the morning of Saturday, May 16.
*
On this morning General Sherman rouses his men before daylight and spends the entire day marching up the Vicksburg/Jackson road. He finally calls a halt after 2AM having reached Bolton. It is now May 18, the last day of Grant’s Vicksburg campaign.

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SATURDAY, MAY 16, 1863

At 6:30 in the morning cavalryman Wirt Adams reports to Pemberton that his pickets are already skirmishing with Federal troops near Raymond. During his report a telegram arrives from Johnston: “Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impractical. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing me, that we may move directly to that point. I have no means of estimating the enemy’s force at Jackson.”

*
It is a damning message. Johnston is hinting that it is possible Grant is shifting his weight from Jackson towards Vicksburg, but he offers Pemberton no evidence. Pemberton is already too far out on the limb, and he now has no choice but to support Johnston. He orders an immediate countermarch, back toward Edwards, so he can shift his axis of attack toward Clinton. Thus, at the very moment of contact with Grant, Pemberton is like a boxer, caught while shifting his weight from one foot to the other.

*
On the Confederate left flank General Stevenson has just reversed his march when, at about 7 am he receives word of enemy skirmishers just beyond the Raymond road junction. Immediately he throws his own skirmish line across the Jackson/Clinton road, and hurries (as best he can) the supply wagons back across the still flooded Baker’s Creek. He also throws his men to work building a defensive position 3 miles long across the hilltop farm of Matilda and Sid Champion. At about 9:30 that morning McClernand’s cavalry captures the tiny village of Bolton, and continues to press forward.

*
Pemberton also faces Federal troops on his right, in front of Loring’s division on the Raymond road. Still, most of the firing seems to be coming from his own left flank, at Champion Hill. And when Stevenson reports that he must be reinforced or lose the hill, Pemberton orders Bowen’s division to the left. But Bowen says he can not move unless Loring gets out of the way. And Loring says he cannot move because of the Federal troops to his front. Frustrated, Pemberton convinces Bowen to send at least one brigade to Stevenson’s assistance.
*
By 10 am Sherman’s men have finished their destruction in Jackson and are on the road to Clinton. Johnston’s troops do not follow the retreating Yankees, struggling instead to put out fires and resurrect the telegraph lines in Jackson. At about the same time Grant arrives on the field before Champion Hill and orders an immediate assault by McPherson’s men on the right and McClernand’s Corp on the left. By 1 pm McPherson’s men have carried the Confederate works and captured the hill.

*
Frustrated by the lack of co-operation on the parts of Loring and Bowen, General Pemberton has been reduced to feeding individual battalions into the fight for Champions Hill piecemeal. Now, in reaction to the Union success of 1 pm, Col. Cockrell, the same man who had so harassed McClernand on the Louisiana shore, now leads a charge that retakes the works for the Confederates. But Pemberton knows the hill cannot be held for long. He sends yet another order to Loring, instructing him to move to the left in support of Bowen and Stevenson. But Loring replies that the Federal troops to his front are moving to flank him. It is a reasonable argument. Except that Pemberton hears no firing coming from his left flank.

*
What Pemberton cannot know is that the Federal troops in front of Loring are commanded by General McClernand, who is showing no more inclination to force a fight than Loring. But Grant has chosen not to press McClernand, even though his inaction is in violation of direct orders from Grant. Instead the Union commander reaches for Sherman’s men coming up from Bolton. He throws these men into a counter attack on Champion Hill, retaking the crucial position by about 4 pm. At last Stevenson’s division, which had been driven back but not broken, now breaks.
*

Confederate General Loyd Tilghman’s brigade fights the rearguard action until he is killed. Then, the Confederate forces retreat across Bakers Creek. Luckily the stream has now fallen enough to make the ford useful again, but this means it will also be useful for the Yankees as well. Pemberton makes the decision to retreat at once back to the Big Black River. All the way, Pemberton continues to expect General Loring to act as the rear guard. But Loring has used the excuse of distant fire from Union cannon to retreat South along Bakers Creek, wandering for several hours, as if a petulant child resisting a call home for dinner. Eventually Loring turns north and rejoins the Confederacy at Jackson. Johnston thus acquired yet another temperamental general, something he did not need. But to all effects and purposes one third of Pemberton’s defeated army has simply vanished.

*
Champions Hill would prove to be the crucial battle of the entire campaign. The Union army (32,000 strong) have 410 dead, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing (total casualties 2,441), while the Confederates, weaker at the start of the battle (just 17,000), have suffered 3,840 dead, 1,018 wounded and 2,441 missing (total casualties, 7,299). Pemberton has lost 13% of his strength, (in addittion to the 1/3 under Loring who have declared independence), proving the point that in fulfilling his orders from Jefferson Davis while also trying to answer Johnston’s urgent requests, Pemberton has gambled more than he can afford to lose. But what choice did he have?

*

To have stayed behind the Vicksburg lines, as Davis wanted him to, would have simply made Grant’s job that much easier. If Pemberton had brought his entire force out to defeat Grant, that would have meant Vicksburg could have been captured by a U.S. Naval landing force, as Grand Gulf had been. Yes, if Grant had been defeated and forced to retreat, the city on the bluffs could have been recaptured at Pemberton’s leisure. But the problem was that Pemberton had direct orders to hold the city. And Johnston’s use of such tactics at Jackson, had not brought success either.
*
To quote Bruce Catton on the subject, “Vicksburg was one of the places which the Confederate nation had to possess if it was to win its independence…But if this bit of the river was lost…then the Confederacy would begin to die…(and) Unless help could be brought in from outside the department the game would be lost…But all the troops that could conceivably be brought in were urgently needed somewhere else…To accept this argument was in effect to admit that the Confederacy was being tried beyond its strength, an admission Mr. Davis would never make.”(Catton, “Never Call Retreat” pp 3-4.)
*
It reminds me of the quote attributed to Jefferson Davis, that the epitath of the Confederacy should read, "...Died of a theory."

*

In effect, the fall of Vicksburg was no more Pemberton’s fault because he could not find a solution to the problem of how he could defeat Grant while defending Vicksburg, than it was Johnston’s fault for not finding the same solution, or Jefferson Davis’s fault. You might as well blame Robert E. Lee for not giving up Lonstreet’s Corp to save Vicksburg. It could not be done, by anyone. And after Champion’s Hill, it was only a matter of playing out the cards that had already been dealt.
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FRIDAY MAY 15, 1863

In the pre-dawn darkness, Pemberton’s 17,000 men begin their march for Dillion. They set out from Edward’s Station, intending to follow the Raymond road South East, but the downpour from the 13/14 May has swollen Bakers Creek which they must cross about a mile and a half out of Edwards. The ford is so flooded as to be useless. So Pemberton is forced to backtrack 1 ½ miles on the Clinton Road to cross the stream by the bridge on the Jackson/Vicksburg Road, and then detour 4 miles South before rejoining the road to Raymond. Wirt Adam’s cavalry leads a mile in front of the infantry, followed by Loring’s and then Bowen’s Division, and finally Stevenson’s division, followed by the army’s wagon trains.
*

Also this morning another 4,000 Confederate troops arrive at General Johnston’s position on the Canton Road, six miles North of Jackson. He now has a force of 15,000 men. But the rebel troops are not a single cohesive unit yet and cannot be expected to fight a complicated engagement with Grant’s veterans. So Johnston holds back, waiting for word of Pemberton’s intentions. Meanwhile, in Jackson, two divisions of Sherman’s Corps begin their work destroying the industry and communications centers of the city.
*

This morning, at seven, McPherson’s Corps leaves Jackson, led by Logan’s division, and bound for Clinton and then Bolton, where the Vicksburg Road crosses the old Natchez Trace. Directly in front of McPherson's column on the Vicksburg Road is McClernard’s Corp, now with orders to about march and advance toward Edward’s station. Bit McClernard is also cautioned by Grant not to bring on a general engagement.

*

Grant rides as far as Clinton, where he is met by two captured engineers from the Vicksburg & Jackson Rail Road. They tell him that Pemberton is at Edward’s station with 3 divisions. Having earlier captured one of the couriers carrying a copy of Johnston’s message to Pemberton, Grant thus expects there to be contact with Pemberton’s army this day near Edwards. He urges Sherman to hurry the destruction of Jackson and bring up his full Corps to Bolton.

*
Meanwhile on the road to Raymond, Pemberton spends the night in a private home. But he is now growing ever more confused. Where are the Union supply trains? Wirt Adam’s cavalry report no traffic on the Grand Gulf/Raymond road. The troops of Stevenson and Loring are on the march past midnight, trying to close up the column. They all expect to make contact with the Federal cavalry guarding the wagon trains in the morning. But Pemberton goes to bed without issuing any orders for his troop on the next day. Clearly he is unsure of where Grant is and what he intends on doing next.

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THURSDAY, MAY 14, 1863

The rain pours down all night, letting up only in midmorning. The roads into and out of Jackson are reduced to quagmires. General McPherson’s corps begins the day by capturing Clinton, Mississippi, five miles East of Jackson. This is the first stop on the Vicksburg & Jackson Rail Road, and McPherson sets his men to work at once destroying the track. The instant that track is broken and twisted into what will later be called “Sherman’s neckties” Vicksburg becomes an albatross around Pemberton’s neck. Johnston knows this, and that is why he has ordered General Gregg to hold Jackson only long enough to allow for an orderly retreat.

*
Sherman also senses the rebels are not serious about fighting. So, despite facing water a foot deep across his path, despite facing a continuing downpour, and despite not being certain about the condition of his soldier’s powder, Sherman orders his men forward at the bayonet, looking for weak points. At about 10AM they cross the Plum Creek and the Lynch Creek Bridge and quickly drive the Confederates back into their fortifications. Meanwhile, to the North, on the Union right flank, General McPherson has pushed two divisions, commanded by Generals Logan and M.M. Crocker, forward to pin down the rebel troops.

*

General Marcellus M. Crocker is an example of the way the war has reshaped men’s lives. He had been enrolled in West Point when his father’s death required him to return home to Illinois in the fall of 1849. Marcellus then moved to Iowa and passed the bar in 1852. When the war broke he immediately raised a company of volunteers. Over the winter of 1861-62 Marcellus was promoted to Brigadier General and commanded troops at the battles of Shiloh and Corinth. In the Vicksburg campaign Crocker commands the 17th division. Later in the war Crocker will be offered the Republican nomination for Iowa governor, but replys “If a soldier is worth anything he cannot be spared from the field; if he is worthless, he will not make a good Governor.”
*
By noon Crocker and Logan’s men have driven the Confederates back into their fortifications, and McPherson calls a halt to feel out the rebel lines. At the same time, to the South and West of Jackson, Sherman’s Corp is tapping the Confederate lines at the bridge over Plum Creek, and sends General Tuttles’s division Eastward to outflank the rebel line. There, just after 2pm, General Tuttle finds the fortifications empty. The Confederate General Gregg has received orders to withdraw North along the Central Mississippi Railroad and the Canton Road.

*
The “Battle of Jackson” has cost Grant’s army 42 dead, 25 wounded and 7 missing. Gregg lost about 845 dead, wounded and captured, affirming Johnston’s decision not to stand and fight with a mix of militia and regulars against a far stronger Union force. Sherman’s men enter Jackson at about 4pm, and almost immediately Grant begins issuing orders to abandon the newly won prize.
*
The goal of the campaign is Vicksburg, and Grant has never lost sight of that. The capture of Vicksburg opens the Mississippi River and it cuts the Confederacy in-two. The capture of Jackson is merely a step on the road to that goal. Grant does not have the men to hold the place and take Vicksburg. So, even while Grant’s commanders celebrate in the Bowman house he is ordering McPherson’s men on the road again, to rejoin McClernand’s Corps, now almost at Clinton. Sherman is to leave two divisions in Jackson, but only long enough to destroy track along the Central Mississippi Railroad, and any manufacturing in the city. By the time Jackson is returned to the Confederacy, Grant means it to be almost worthless.

*
That night, six miles North of Jackson, and with the telegraph lines cut at Clinton and, now, at Jackson too, General Johnston sends written dispatches to Pemberton in Vicksburg, telling him of the capture of Jackson. But he also see’s an opportunity in this calamity. He now commands 11,000 men, and in 24 hours he will have 15,000. He knows that Grant does not have enough men to hold Jackson and take Vicksburg. So he tries, once more, to prod Pemberton, into action against Grant, asking, “Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him? As soon as the re-enforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy." But what Johnston and Pemberton do not yet realize is that Grant is two steps ahead of them. There is no supply line for Pemberton to cut.

*

This night at Edward’s Station, General Pemberton holds a council of war with his four commanders: Wirt Adams, whose cavalry at Edward’s Station was Pemberton’s eyes and ears; Pembertons's most trusted subordinate, Major General Stevens Bowen, who graduated from West Point in 1853; Major General Carter Stevenson, who graduated from West Point in 1838; and the most colorful and the most argumentative of Pemberton's three divisional commanders, Major General William Wing "Old Blizzard" Loring.

*

In 1862 Loring was subordinate to Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley when winter closed in and Jackson took his troops into winter quarters. But Jackson ordered Loring to remain active to keep an eye on the Federals. Loring complained of Jackson’s “utter disregard for human suffering”, specifically he complained to Jackson’s boss, the Confederate Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin. Benjamin agreed with Loring and gave him permission to get his men out of the cold. But the insulted Jackson thereupon threatened to resign. And Loring was eventually shipped out to Vicksburg where he could henceforth torment Pemberton.
*

After the council Pemberton replys to General Johnston’s telegram. “I shall move as early tomorrow as practicable with a column of 17,000 men to Dillions, situated on the main road from Raymond to Port Gibson, 7 1/2 miles to Raymond and 9 1/2 miles from Edward’s Depot. The object is to cut the enemy’s communications and to force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson.”

*

Pemberton has thus rejected Johnston’s recommendation that they jointly fall on Grant’s rear, at Clinton. Instead Pemberton has chosen to attack the Union supply trains that must be filling the roads between Grand Gulf and Jackson. The most logical focus for such an attack is Dillion, midway between the two. Dillion will be Pemberton’s objective.

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1863

This morning General U.S. Grant orders General McClernand to pulls back to a line to the East of Raymond, Mississippi, to protect the rear of his operations against Jackson. Having thus neutralized any threat of McClernand getting into trouble (at least for 24 hours) Grant now feels free to join Sherman’s Corp as it advances toward Jackson through Raymond, via Mississippi Springs. In the lead is McPherson's Corps, marching through Clinton before turning East toward Jackson. At Clinton, McPherson's men will cross the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad line, and they will pause here long enough to destroy a couple of miles of track and cut the telegraph line to Vicksburg. The jugular of the "Gilbraltor of the South" will then be severed.

*
Late in the afternoon General Joe Johnston’s train finally arrives in Jackson. Here Johnston discovers that half of the 6,000 troops he expected to command have already been defeated at Raymond the day before, while bearing down on him are two Federal army corps: about 24,000 men. Still there are Confederate reinforcements on their way. Another five thousand men will arrive within 24 hours, and six thousand more 24 hours beyond that. But Johnston is convinced Grant will not give him time for those reinforcements to arrive. And he is right. After consulting with the General Gregg, Johnston telegraphs Richmond, “I am too late”. He then orders Gregg to defend the Jackson only long enough to evacuate as many supplies as possible. To meet this requirement Gregg throws his first line of defence out two miles beyond the Jackson fortifications to the South and West. Johnston is certain that, if he can get Pemberton to come out of Vicksburg, together they will finally have enough men to crush Grant's army between them.

*

General Joseph Eggleston Johnston always contended that the shrapnel wounds he suffered at the Battle of Seven Pines in May of 1862, was the best shot “…ever fired for the Confederacy”. Severely wounded in the shoulder and leg, Johnston was replaced as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia by General Robert E. Lee. But the truth is that Confederate President Jefferson Davis, convinced of his own military genius, had already grown frustrated with Johnston’s cautious formality in command. A hunting companion describs Johnston as man reluctant to shoot because he was “…afraid to…risk his fine reputation.” Johnston is elegant and well mannered to a fault. His feud with Davis really began because he was listed fourth on the Confederate promotion list of new Generals, ahead only of General Bragg, and Johnston felt he should have been listed first.
*

Johnston had graduated from West Point in 1829 and had been the first in his class to be promoted to General in the ante bellum U.S. Army. In person Johnston exudes elegance, education and culture, and a 19th Century "Star Quality" largely lost on us today. He was described by Stephen Vincent Benet as the "...the little precise Scotch-dominie of a general, stubborn as flint, in advance not always so lucky, in retreat more dangerous than a running wolf". But whether it was circumstances (such as the timing of his arrival in Jackson) or his overly cautious nature, Johnston is always an excellent general… in retreat.

*

After recovering from his wounds Johnston is sent to the Western Theatre in early 1863 - seemingly to keep him out of Lee’s way and Davis' hair. This time Johnston is given no troops to command. Rather he is limited to advising the dyspeptic and argumentative General Braxton Bragg in Chattanooga, and the indecisive Pemberton in far off Vicksburg. Johnston complains to Davis that “I cannot direct both parts of my command at once”. Still, Davis does not have enough faith in Johnston to allow him to command a theatre reserve, nor enough troops to form one - at least not until the situation is so desperate as to be too late. This is what has happened at Jackson. Still, after the war, Grant will observe that, “I have had nearly all of the Southern generals in high command in front of me and Joe Johnston gave me more anxiety than any of the others. I was never half so anxious about Lee.”

*

Late that afternoon, before the telegraph lines to Vicksburg are cut, Johnston sends the following message to Pemberton; "I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us…It is important to establish communication, that you may be re-enforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once...All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important."

*

That night the heavens open and the spring drought is briefly quenched with a massive downpour. For awhile, nobody is going anywhere in Mississippi very quickly.

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