VICKSBURG Chapter Eighty - Eight

 

At about 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 3 July, 1863, a pair of rebel officers walked 100 yards to the Yankee trenches. Once safely below ground level they were introduced to the short and feisty commander of the 10^th division, XIII Corps, 48 year old regular army General Andrew Jackson Smith. (above). 

The junior Confederate officer, Colonel L.M. Montgomery, carried a letter from Lieutenant General John Crawford Pemberton, which read, “I have the honor to propose an armistice...with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour today as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period....”

The letter went from General Smith to Major General James McPherson, and was read by those officers and discussed with their staffs. By the time it had reached Grant, the contents were common knowledge among staff officers, as was the identity of the senior rebel officer, 32 year old Major General John Stevens Bowen (above). He had been promoted to Major General after the Federal noose had cut Vicksburg off from the outside world, so the Confederate Congress was unaware of Pemberton's largess toward the man who had forced the court martial of General Van Dorn – Pemberton's predecessor. Bad feelings in Richmond might delay approval of Bowen's promotion. Still, few would have questioned his qualifications as displayed at Shiloh and Cornith and Champion's Hill.

Like Grant, John Bowen (above, pre war) had graduated West Point. And like Grant, he had been posted to the Jefferson barracks in St. Louis. Both men had married into prominent Missouri families. Transferred to duty in the west, both men were so miserable they resigned from the army. But Grant had then been forced to try his hand at farming, while Bowen could fall back on a family fortune. Bowen became an architect, and returned to St. Louis in the 1850's to open a successful firm with Charles Miller. When Grant was reduced to selling firewood on the street, the firm of Bowen and Miller bought their firewood from Grant. It was not a relationship designed to encourage camaraderie.

Grant's (above) reply to Pemberton reversed the path of the appeal, and was just as widely known. “Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice...The useless effusion of blood you propose...can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison...I have no terms other than those...”

In retrospect Pemberton's note seemed to invite the repetition of Grant's terms from 16 February, 1862, at Fort Donaldson (above), “No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works”. Once again Ulysses  Grant would become “Unconditional Surrender Grant" in the press. But Bowen, reading the response while still in the Yankee trenches decided he could not wait for gentlemanly formalities.

Bowen appealed directly to General Smith, requesting that he ask Grant if he would not at least meet with Pemberton in person, today. After a few moments wait a runner returned with Grant's agreement to meet between the lines in front of General McPherson's Corps, at a time of Pemberton's choosing. And then the pair of Confederates carried their rejected truce flag back to the Confederate lines.

Grant's harsh terms set off an animated discussion in Pemberton's headquarters (above) . Honor insisted  the rebels chose to fight rather than accept humiliation. It was insane, of course. There were already 10,000 men on rebel sick lists - 1/3rd of the army too disabled by diarrhea, disease and wounds to participate in a march let alone an attack to reach Johnston's Army of Relief. Then Bowen announced, “General Grant would like to negotiate this afternoon with General Pemberton.”

Grant, of course, had suggested no such thing. Bowen had suggested the meeting. But other than a momentary wonder that Bowen had waited to mention this, the Confederates were greatly relieved. What else could they think except that Grant's written demand was a mere publicity stunt and there were to be the very negotiations which Pemberton had offered in his note. Pemberton (above) quickly sent word through the Yankee lines that he and his negotiators would meet with Grant and his, at 3:00 p.m.

But why had Bowen waited to announce Grant's acceptance of a  meeting? And why had he created the impression that Grant sought negotiations? Bowen knew that with Johnston's army at the Big Black River,  Grant was motivated to drop his demand for unconditional surrender - as he had at Fort Donaldson.   Bowen also knew that most rebels paroled from Vicksburg could re-enter the fight – and they would do that Atlanta in 1864.   But in trying to manipulate Grant and Pemberton into a quicker resolution, the risk was that when Bowen's ruse would be discovered, as it must be, both men would feel cheated, and their anger could result in a slaughter. Why was Bowen running such a risk?

Like every one inside Vicksburg, Bowen was exhausted and near a physical and emotional collapse. Suffering already from the malady which would soon kill him, Bowen may have felt he had not the strength to wait for the slow witted Pemberton to face reality, or for Grant to accept the victory he was being offered, instead of the one he wanted. Bowen may have felt the situation had to be forced. Or he may just been a tired sick man, slowly losing control of his mind and body.

They met at 3:00 p.m under one of the few trees still standing near the rebel trenches (above). Pemberton, ever the gentleman, began by seeking to make Grant's come-down as easy as possible. He said he understood the Yankee had asked for this personal interview. Surprised, Grant honestly answered that he had not. Shaken, but determined, Pemberton then asked what other terms might Grant be willing to offer. Grant replied there were none. And for a moment Pemberton stood silent, feeling as if he had been slapped on the face. Ever the gentleman, he now said stiffly, “Then, sir, it is unnecessary that you and I should hold any further conversation; we will go to fighting again at once.”

And it was now, according to Grant, that John Bowen stepped forward. He began by saying he was anxious that the surrender be consummated right here, and now. He suggested that he and Yankee General Andrew Smith negotiate between themselves. In Pemberton's version, he was the one who made the suggestion. 

In any case, while Grant (above) and Pemberton small talked about the Mexican War, while Smith and Bowen agreed to a cease fire until final terms were decided. Then Bowen suggested Vicksburg would surrender while the Army of Mississippi would simply leave. Presumably Grant would believe they presented no threat because of their physical condition. Grant killed that idea out right. The General from Galena was now so frustrated he ended the meeting.  He accepted the cease fire, and said he would counter Bowen's offer by 10:00 p.m. that night.

It must have been an interesting evening meal in Pemberton's headquarters. The food, what there was of it, was at least warm.  Maybe John Pemberton was too ill to accuse Bowen of duplicity.  But the emotional roller coaster day of that had left them all exhausted. The Gentlemen from the south must have known, no matter what terms Grant offered, they had little choice but to accept them.

Grant must have been struggling with his temper. He'd been lied to. But once he got over that anger, as usual, he saw the situation with clarity. At 10:00 p.m. a white flag appeared over Smith's trench line, heralding a letter addressed to Pemberton – not Bowen. It was a not a negotiation, but a statement of intent. 

“ I will march in one division as a guard and take possession at 8 A.M. tomorrow. As soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, and Staff, Field and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property...any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have...You will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and privates as fast as they become able to travel...”

At dawn on Saturday, 4 July, 1863, Pemberton sent his reply. He sought 2 small face saving addendum. First, his men would stack their own arms and colors in front of their current positions, and second they would evacuate their trenches at 10:00 a.m. without turning them over to the Yankees.  Since Grant voiced no objections, that was the way it would be done.

The only thing left for Pemberton to do was to sign his parole and leave town.

Vicksburg had fallen.

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VICKSBURG Chapter Sixteen

 

I think the daguerreotype of John Clifford Pemberton (above) has influenced what historians think of the Vicksburg commander . To me, frankly, he looks a bit seedy. But in the flesh this 5 foot ten inch curly brown headed self made aristocrat was born with a silver stick up his butt and a marble chip on his shoulder. A few, a very few, were allowed to call him "Jack". With all others, he offered only cold reserve. To give our hero the most favorable interpretation, John Pemberton was the most famous American led to treason by his heart since Benedict Arnold. But there was a lot of that going around in 1860.

John Pemberton's family were wealthy Philadelphia Quakers, and the shallow youth inherited a brittle sense of entitlement. He was quick to take and deliver offense. He confessed to his mother, “I cannot always bear reproach though I deserve it,” and promised to do better. But he never did. While at West Point - from 1833 to 1837 - John became engaged to a Philadelphia girl. Then he met a more exciting paramour in New York City. The young lieutenant broke his engagement by mail. Shortly there after his new love buckled under family pressure and ended their affair. After that double fault John swore off serious women.

During John's antebellum West Point years, his best friend was William Whann Mackall (above), from a prominent Maryland slave owning family. Although trained as artillerymen, both cadets eventually became competent staff officers, dedicated to detail, minutia and the thousand little  things that have to happen before a more empathetic field officer could inspire soldiers to fight. When asked to risk his own life, neither John nor William ever flinched. But John often charged to a trumpet only he could hear.

While stationed on the isolated Minnesota frontier, John's abrasive, self centered nature worsened, and he became a martinet, sparking conflicts with his fellow officers and inspiring one insulted corporal to take a shot at him. In 1842, while stationed at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the 34 year old Pemberton met his "Peggy Shippen". She was the 22 year old, 5 foot 2 inch tall Martha "Pattie" Thompson (above) . His wooing of the young lady was interrupted by the Mexican American War of 1846 - 1847.

His current enemy at Vicksburg, Federal General Ulysses Grant, described the Pemberton he served with under Major General Zachary Taylor. in northern Mexico this way;  "A more conscientious, honorable man never lived," Grant generously wrote. "I remember when a (written) order was issued that none of the junior officers should be allowed horses during the marches...Young officers not accustomed to it soon...were found lagging behind." After a verbal order rescinded the restriction, all the other officers remounted, "Pemberton alone said, 'No,' he would walk," remembered Grant. And, "...he did walk, though suffering intensely... he was scrupulously particular in matters of honor and integrity."

When he returned to Virginia, brevet Major John C. Pemberton proposed to Martha.  Her Episcopalian father, William Henry Thompson,  was skeptical of the Quaker from Pennsylvania. He was a wealthy shipping magnate, dispatching vessels from Norfolk and Charleston to and from French ports in the Caribbean. 

And like most prosperous Virginians, the Thompsons defined their wealth in part by the number of their slaves. John's passion for Martha beguiled him into writing his own mother, "The more I see of slavery the better I think of it, " and he dismissed the victims as "lazy plantation Negroes". This disturbed John's anti-slavery Quaker family. But despite misgivings all around, the couple were married on 18 January, 1848 in Norfolk, Virginia and then moved to Philadelphia.

Marriage and fatherhood - 3 children over the next decade - did not mellow John. He argued with at lest one superior so often he was arrested for insubordination. When cooler heads prevailed, the charges were dropped. But it seems that Captain John Clifford Pemberton's career was saved only when slavery split the nation. John's parents pleaded with him to stay in the union. His older and younger brother both put on Union Blue. But Martha was drawn home to Virginia, and John followed her. Delaying his announcement until she and the children had reached Norfolk, John Clifford Pemberton then resigned his commission, and enlisted as a colonel in the Confederate Army.

Because of his father-in-law's prominence, in June of 1861 Confederate President Jefferson Davis made the Colonel a General, and put him in command of a brigade at Norfolk (above). His ruthless discipline produced immediate complaints, which did not stop until January of 1862 when he was promoted to Major General and assigned to defend Charleston, South Carolina.  Which got him out of Norfolk. 

Upon examining his new fiefdom, John dared to point out that Fort Sumter (above), the raison d'etre for the entire war, was obsolete and not worth repairing. The political outrage this produced was so fierce, that Pemberton's boss, General Robert Edward Lee, reprimanded him. Still, when Lee was transferred to Virginia, John was given command of all of South Carolina and Georgia.  He was failing his way up the promotion lists.

This latest promotion didn't work, either. John offended too many people, too often. The complaints poured in. Eventually President Davis came up with what he thought was the perfect solution to his touchy, irritable argumentative northern southern officer. He promoted John again and put him in charge of defending Vicksburg. And that is why, after having failed at every job given him, John C. Pemberton rose from Colonel to Lieutenant General in 18 short months, without ever winning a battle or even hearing a shot fired in anger.

John's new command consisted of 54,000 men, but they were spread all across the state of Mississippi, as well as parts of Louisiana. There were now, in late March 1863, 3 divisions - 21,000 men - on his left flank, at Vicksburg. There were about 19,000 men to defend his center, stretching from the state capital of Jackson,  west along the delta rivers of the Tallahatchie and the Yazoo.  There was also a token force of 1,400 men on the Alabama border at Columbus. And finally, protecting his vulnerable underbelly to the south were the 12,500 men digging in at Port Hudson, Louisiana. Importantly, Pemberton's headquarters were in the state capital of Jackson, Mississippi , not at Vicksburg. John did not look at the Mississippi River every morning, judging its level, as Grant now did.

As a staff officer, John had solid rationalizations for remaining where he was. Jackson was centrally located. It had more secure road, rail and telegraph communications with the national capital in Richmond, Virginia.  And when John and his staff first arrived, in October 1862, Grant's first advance into Mississippi was aimed ultimately at Jackson. But after Major General Earl van Dorn's December victory at Holly Springs, and the unwelcome appearance of General McClernand on the Mississippi, Grant was forced to shift his attack to the west. However Pemberton remained in Jackson.

Even after the attack at Chickashaw Bluffs. Even after the Desoto Canal. Even after the Lake Providence canal. Even after the Yazoo Pass was breached. Even after the battle of Fort Pemberton. Even after the threat of Steele's Bayou. Even after the Duckport Canal, which I have yet to recount. From October, November and December 1862 though January, February, March and April of 1863, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton remained rooted in Jackson, mentally and physically, while the vital high ground, the the raison d'etre for his entire command, Vicksburg, was being wedged out of his control.

As proof, in mid April of 1863,  when several Federal gunboats and transports ran past the guns at Vicksburg,  John Pemberton, took far too long to realize the event had changed everything about the coming battle.

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VICKSBURG Chapter Eighty-Six

 

At about 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 3 July, 1863, a pair of rebel officers walked 100 yards to the Yankee trenches. Once safely below ground level they were introduced to the short and feisty commander of the 10^th division, XIII Corps, 48 year old regular army General Andrew Jackson Smith. (above). 

The junior Confederate officer, Colonel L.M. Montgomery, carried a letter from Lieutenant General John Crawford Pemberton, which read, “I have the honor to propose an armistice...with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour today as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period....”

The letter went from General Smith to Major General James McPherson, and was read by those officers and discussed with their staffs. By the time it had reached Grant, the contents were common knowledge among staff officers, as was the identity of the senior rebel officer, 32 year old Major General John Stevens Bowen (above). He had been promoted to Major General after the Federal noose had cut Vicksburg off from the outside world, so the Confederate Congress was unaware of Pemberton's largess toward the man who had forced the court martial of General Van Dorn – Pemberton's predecessor. Bad feelings in Richmond might delay approval of Bowen's promotion. Still, few would have questioned his qualifications as displayed at Shiloh and Cornith and Champion's Hill.

Like Grant, John Bowen (above, pre war) had graduated West Point. And like Grant, he had been posted to the Jefferson barracks in St. Louis. Both men had married into prominent Missouri families. Transferred to duty in the west, both men were so miserable they resigned from the army. But Grant had then been forced to try his hand at farming, while Bowen could fall back on a family fortune. Bowen became an architect, and returned to St. Louis in the 1850's to open a successful firm with Charles Miller. When Grant was reduced to selling firewood on the street, the firm of Bowen and Miller bought their firewood from Grant. It was not a relationship designed to encourage camaraderie.

Grant's (above) reply to Pemberton reversed the path of the appeal, and was just as widely known. “Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice...The useless effusion of blood you propose...can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison...I have no terms other than those...”

In retrospect Pemberton's note seemed to invite the repetition of Grant's terms from 16 February, 1862, at Fort Donaldson (above), “No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works”. Once again Ulysses  Grant would become “Unconditional Surrender Grant" in the press. But Bowen, reading the response while still in the Yankee trenches decided he could not wait for gentlemanly formalities.

Bowen appealed directly to General Smith, requesting that he ask Grant if he would not at least meet with Pemberton in person, today. After a few moments wait a runner returned with Grant's agreement to meet between the lines in front of General McPherson's Corps, at a time of Pemberton's choosing. And then the pair of Confederates carried their rejected truce flag back to the Confederate lines.

Grant's harsh terms set off an animated discussion in Pemberton's headquarters (above) . Honor insisted  the rebels chose to fight rather than accept humiliation. It was insane, of course. There were already 10,000 men on rebel sick lists - 1/3rd of the army too disabled by diarrhea, disease and wounds to participate in a march let alone an attack to reach Johnston's Army of Relief. Then Bowen announced, “General Grant would like to negotiate this afternoon with General Pemberton.”

Grant, of course, had suggested no such thing. Bowen had suggested the meeting. But other than a momentary wonder that Bowen had waited to mention this, the Confederates were greatly relieved. What else could they think except that Grant's written demand was a mere publicity stunt and there were to be the very negotiations which Pemberton had offered in his note. Pemberton (above) quickly sent word through the Yankee lines that he and his negotiators would meet with Grant and his, at 3:00 p.m.

But why had Bowen waited to announce Grant's acceptance of a  meeting? And why had he created the impression that Grant sought negotiations? Bowen knew that with Johnston's army at the Big Black River,  Grant was motivated to drop his demand for unconditional surrender - as he had at Fort Donaldson.   Bowen also knew that most rebels paroled from Vicksburg could re-enter the fight – and they would do that Atlanta in 1864.   But in trying to manipulate Grant and Pemberton into a quicker resolution, the risk was that when Bowen's ruse would be discovered, as it must be, both men would feel cheated, and their anger could result in a slaughter. Why was Bowen running such a risk?

Like every one inside Vicksburg, Bowen was exhausted and near a physical and emotional collapse. Suffering already from the malady which would soon kill him, Bowen may have felt he had not the strength to wait for the slow witted Pemberton to face reality, or for Grant to accept the victory he was being offered, instead of the one he wanted. Bowen may have felt the situation had to be forced. Or he may just been a tired sick man, slowly losing control of his mind and body.

They met at 3:00 p.m under one of the few trees still standing near the rebel trenches (above). Pemberton, ever the gentleman, began by seeking to make Grant's come-down as easy as possible. He said he understood the Yankee had asked for this personal interview. Surprised, Grant honestly answered that he had not. Shaken, but determined, Pemberton then asked what other terms might Grant be willing to offer. Grant replied there were none. And for a moment Pemberton stood silent, feeling as if he had been slapped on the face. Ever the gentleman, he now said stiffly, “Then, sir, it is unnecessary that you and I should hold any further conversation; we will go to fighting again at once.”

And it was now, according to Grant, that John Bowen stepped forward. He began by saying he was anxious that the surrender be consummated right here, and now. He suggested that he and Yankee General Andrew Smith negotiate between themselves. In Pemberton's version, he was the one who made the suggestion. 

In any case, while Grant (above) and Pemberton small talked about the Mexican War, while Smith and Bowen agreed to a cease fire until final terms were decided. Then Bowen suggested Vicksburg would surrender while the Army of Mississippi would simply leave. Presumably Grant would believe they presented no threat because of their physical condition. Grant killed that idea out right. The General from Galena was now so frustrated he ended the meeting.  He accepted the cease fire, and said he would counter Bowen's offer by 10:00 p.m. that night.

It must have been an interesting evening meal in Pemberton's headquarters. The food, what there was of it, was at least warm.  Maybe John Pemberton was too ill to accuse Bowen of duplicity.  But the emotional roller coaster day of that had left them all exhausted. The Gentlemen from the south must have known, no matter what terms Grant offered, they had little choice but to accept them.

Grant must have been struggling with his temper. He'd been lied to. But once he got over that anger, as usual, he saw the situation with clarity. At 10:00 p.m. a white flag appeared over Smith's trench line, heralding a letter addressed to Pemberton – not Bowen. It was a not a negotiation, but a statement of intent. 

“ I will march in one division as a guard and take possession at 8 A.M. tomorrow. As soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, and Staff, Field and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property...any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have...You will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and privates as fast as they become able to travel...”

At dawn on Saturday, 4 July, 1863, Pemberton sent his reply. He sought 2 small face saving addendum. First, his men would stack their own arms and colors in front of their current positions, and second they would evacuate their trenches at 10:00 a.m. without turning them over to the Yankees.  Since Grant voiced no objections, that was the way it would be done.

The only thing left for Pemberton to do was to sign his parole and leave town.

Vicksburg had fallen.

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