VICKSBURG Chapter Thirty - One

 

As sunlight first touched Chancellorsville, Virginia on Monday, 4 May, 1863, both armies were staggering back from a disaster. The 133,000 man Federal Army of the Potomac under Joe Hooker had literally been worse than decimated, losing some 17,000 men - 1,600 dead, 9,800 wounded and almost 6,000 captured or missing. - almost 13% of their total strength.   But the 60,000 man rebel Army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee had suffered some 13,000 causalities - 1,700 dead, 9,000 wounded and over 2,000 captured or missing – or over 20% of their strength. 

General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker,  although still in command,  rightly bore most of the blame for the Federal failure.  He was mocked in the press both south (above) and north.  However, although few could see it at the time, the tragedy was a tactical victory for the Confederates, but a strategic defeat.

Two advantages helped disguise the scale of the disaster for General Lee's army.  First and foremost, General Longstreet's corps had not been present at Chancellorsville.  Lee (above) had been forced to disperse one third of his army,  some  30,000 men , to southern tidewater Virginia, so they could be fed.  They would now be rejoining Lee -  combat veterans, fresh and not blunted by a wasting battle.   And secondly, Lee had won a clear psychological victory over Hooker.  Lee, it seemed,  always won his battles with the Army of the Potomac. But Lee knew better.

The only shadow which seemed to darken this victory was that Lee's right hand man,  the  religiously fanatical General “Stonewall” Jackson,  had lost his left arm at Chancellorsville.  He was bedridden now, and would not be available to General Lee on his invasion of Pennsylvania. And Lee must invade. His army would never be stronger.  And only in the north would the Confederacy find the surpluses to feed, clothe and arm their soldiers.

Meanwhile, in Mississippi, most of the 42,000 men under Lieutenant General John Pemberton were

marching to realign after Grant's attack around the rebel right flank. There were now about 33,000 men in and around Vicksburg, another 6,000 in and around Jackson, with perhaps 2,000 men in Port Hudson on the Mississippi, just above Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  Pemberton's first impulse had been to abandon Port Hudson and call the garrison back to Vicksburg,  but Confederate President Jefferson Davis had countermanded that order.  In fact, over the next few weeks Davis would feed another 10,000 reinforcements into the isolated post, while commanders elsewhere in the state would be starved for men.

One of the most powerful Confederate regiments was on a forced march to Grand Gulf that morning - the 400 plus men of the 26^th Mississippi Infantry.   In April they had repelled the Federals at Fort Pemberton.  Now, they were ordered to Grand Gulf. They might have used the Southern Railroad to save time and energy, but after the raid on Newton Station, that line was no longer available.  The only way to get from the Yazoo delta to Grand Gulf was on foot.  And for two and a half days they had been marching under their colonel, A.E. Reynolds.  But they only got as far as Bayou Pierre before running into the Federals, who were marching north to meet them.

Their commander, the acquisitive Arthur Exum Reynolds,  was a big man in Tishomingo County - he was rich, he was politically powerful and he was fat. The 300 pound lawyer (above, evidently holding in his gut)  had moved to the north eastern corner of Mississippi in the early 1840's, once the Chickasaw native peoples had been forced out.  After the Presidential election of 1860, as a wealthy state representative "A.E." was a natural choice to represent his county at the secession convention. He agreed with the majority that "Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery",  but like 16 others he voted to wait until other states had joined the rebellion before taking the ultimate step.

When they did, "A.E." raised his own 400 man regiment. He was unanimously elected Colonel of the 26^th.  They arrived at Fort Donaldson, Tennessee in February of 1862 (above) - just in time to suffer 12 dead and 69 wounded in their and General Grant's first major battle.  During that engagement, "A.E."'s horse was killed, and the substantial Colonel, while uninjured, lacked the wind to keep up with his unit under his own power. So he led from the rear. The entire regiment, including A.E., were forced to surrender. They were paroled and reformed in September at Jackson, Mississippi. The 46 year old A.E. was again in command as they skirmished with Grant's army during his December 1862 advance to and January 1863 retreat from Grenada, Mississippi.  And now under orders from the profane General Loring, A.E. wisely offered only token resistance to the advancing Yankees.

Captain Patterson's  engineers worked all night to repair the bridge over the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, and at 5:30 the morning of Monday, 4 May, 1863, General Smith's division crossed the bridge and continued up the Port Gibson road toward Willow Springs. As they approached the tiny community a battery of rebel artillery from the Mississippi 26th made a show of firing a few rounds, but retreated before Federal artillery could return the favor. And with that the valuable fresh water of Willow Springs fell into Union hands.

While the Yankees were refilling their canteens a civilian plantation owner appeared riding a mule and demanding to speak with the officer in charge. The General's soldiers, the outraged plantation owner complained, had stolen everything in his larder - pigs and cows and horses. 

The man demanded his property be returned and the thieves punished. The craggy General Smith calmly ask the planter who owned the mule he had arrived upon. It was his mule, responded the planter. Well, said General Smith, the thieves could not have been his men, because his men would not have left the mule behind. And with that the planter was sent on his way, on foot.

Clearly, the troops were already working to stretch their rations beyond the ten days they had been told to make them last. And they were having no trouble doing that.  However General Smith did not allow his men to tarry at the springs or forage too much along their route. That very afternoon Smith pushed his men forward through Rock Springs,  5 miles to Harkinson's Ferry -  the main crossing of the Big Black River by the Port Gibson Road.  They arrived there just as the day was ending, and after a brief exchange of cannon fire the 20th Ohio Infantry stormed across the bridge, forcing the rebels to assume that Grant was going to make a drive directly for Vicksburg, just 20 miles further north.  The Yankees did little more than raid up the road, but if an immediate  assault in Vicksburg was not Grant's intention, what was next for the Army of the Tennessee?

Before he had even crossed the Mississippi  River, Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant (above) understood what he was risking by passing below the still active guns at Vicksburg. He would write later, “To have no communications - to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole army without a rear link was a tremendous gamble!" Once over the river he could not retreat, there would be no rescue and no resupply. He could not merely stay where he was.  He had to fight and he had to win, every fight and every skirmish. A single reversal could force him to pause and any pause would spell doom.  But fight who, and fight where?

There was still the possibility of joining with Nathaniel Banks( above)  and his 30,000 man Army of the Gulf,  and together crushing Port Hudson and then marching north to Vicksburg with 70,000 men.   But Banks had been tempted to follow a will-o-wisp of easy victories up Bayou Teeche, moving farther away from the key battleground of the Mississippi River.  The Massachusetts political general would not meet his promised return date of 10 May in front of Port Hudson.  And Grant could not wait until Banks returned. Grant had the initiative, and he could not surrender it,  else Pemberton would eventually gather strength against him. He most move forward. And after a bath in the newly liberated fortress of Grand Gulf, Grant rode north to keep a close eye on his most troublesome subordinate, Major General John McClernand.

Grant arrived at Rocky Springs after a daylong ride, "...by a strange and circuitous road." The next morning he might move directly on Vicksburg.  But he had only some 30,000 men in 2 corps drawing up to the Big Black River south of the city.  And Pemberton had about that same number in the new fortifications on the eastern side of Vicksburg.  Isolated as he was , Grant could not afford any battle which offered him less than favorable odds.   Deep in his enemies' rear,  he must keep the Confederates divided and not allow them to concentrate against him. Grant truly had the elephant by the tail.  He needed Sherman to join him, as quickly as possible.

- 30 -

VICKSBURG - Chapter Twenty - Eight

 

As sunlight first struck Virginia on Monday, 4 May, 1863, both armies were staggering back from the disaster of the battle of Chancellorsville. The 133,000 man Federal Army of the Potomac under Joe Hooker had literally been worse than decimated, losing some 17,000 men - 1,600 dead, 9,800 wounded and almost 6,000 captured or missing. - almost 13% of their total strength.   But the 60,000 man rebel Army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee had suffered some 13,000 causalities - 1,700 dead, 9,000 wounded and over 2,000 captured or missing – or over 20% of their strength. 

General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker,  although still in command,  rightly bore most of the blame for the Federal failure.  He was mocked in the press both south (above) and north.  However, although few could see it at the time, the tragedy was a tactical victory for the Confederates, but a strategic defeat.

Two advantages helped disguise the scale of the disaster for General Lee's army.  First and foremost, General Longstreet's corps had not been present at Chancellorsville.  Lee (above) had been forced to disperse one third of his army,  some  30,000 men , to southern tidewater Virginia, so they could be fed.  They would now be rejoining Lee -  combat veterans, fresh and not blunted by a wasting battle.   And secondly, Lee had won a clear psychological victory over Hooker.  Lee, it seemed,  always won his battles with the Army of the Potomac. But Lee knew better.

The only shadow which seemed to darken this victory was that Lee's right hand man,  the  religiously fanatical General “Stonewall” Jackson,  had lost his left arm at Chancellorsville.  He was bedridden now, and would not be available to General Lee on his invasion of Pennsylvania. And Lee must invade. His army would never be stronger.  And only in the north would the Confederacy find the surpluses to feed, clothe and arm their soldiers.

Meanwhile, in Mississippi, most of the 42,000 men under Lieutenant General John Pemberton were

marching to realign after Grant's attack around the rebel right flank. There were now about 33,000 men in and around Vicksburg, another 6,000 in and around Jackson, with perhaps 2,000 men in Port Hudson on the Mississippi, just above Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  Pemberton's first impulse had been to abandon Port Hudson and call the garrison back to Vicksburg,  but Confederate President Jefferson Davis had countermanded that order.  In fact, over the next few weeks Davis would feed another 10,000 reinforcements into the isolated post, while commanders elsewhere in the state would be starved for men.

One of the most powerful Confederate regiments was on a forced march to Grand Gulf that morning - the 400 plus men of the 26^th Mississippi Infantry.   In April they had repelled the Federals at Fort Pemberton.  Now, they were ordered to Grand Gulf. They might have used the Southern Railroad to save time and energy, but after the raid on Newton Station, that line was no longer available.  The only way to get from the Yazoo delta to Grand Gulf was on foot.  And for two and a half days they had been marching under their colonel, A.E. Reynolds.  But they only got as far as Bayou Pierre before running into the Federals, who were marching north to meet them.

Their commander, the acquisitive Arthur Exum Reynolds,  was a big man in Tishomingo County - he was rich, he was politically powerful and he was fat. The 300 pound lawyer (above, evidently holding in his gut)  had moved to the north eastern corner of Mississippi in the early 1840's, once the Chickasaw native peoples had been forced out.  After the Presidential election of 1860, as a wealthy state representative "A.E." was a natural choice to represent his county at the secession convention. He agreed with the majority that "Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery",  but like 16 others he voted to wait until other states had joined the rebellion before taking the ultimate step.

When they did, "A.E." raised his own 400 man regiment. He was unanimously elected Colonel of the 26^th.  They arrived at Fort Donaldson, Tennessee in February of 1862 (above) - just in time to suffer 12 dead and 69 wounded in their and General Grant's first major battle.  During that engagement, "A.E."'s horse was killed, and the substantial Colonel, while uninjured, lacked the wind to keep up with his unit under his own power. So he led from his rear. The entire regiment, including A.E., were forced to surrender. They were paroled and reformed in September at Jackson, Mississippi. The 46 year old A.E. was again in command as they skirmished with Grant's army during his December 1862 advance to and January 1863 retreat from Grenada, Mississippi.  And now under orders from the profane General Loring, A.E. wisely offered only token resistance to the advancing Yankees.

Captain Patterson's  engineers worked all night to repair the bridge over the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, and at 5:30 the morning of Monday, 4 May, 1863, General Smith's division crossed the bridge and continued up the Port Gibson road toward Willow Springs. As they approached the tiny community a battery of rebel artillery from the Mississippi 26th made a show of firing a few rounds, but retreated before Federal artillery could return the favor. And with that the valuable fresh water of Willow Springs fell into Union hands.

While the Yankees were refilling their canteens a civilian plantation owner appeared riding a mule and demanding to speak with the officer in charge. The General's soldiers, the outraged plantation owner complained, had stolen everything in his larder - pigs and cows and horses. 

The man demanded his property be returned and the thieves punished. The craggy General Smith calmly ask the planter who owned the mule he had arrived upon. It was his mule, responded the planter. Well, said General Smith, the thieves could not have been his men, because his men would not have left the mule behind. And with that the planter was sent on his way, on foot.

Clearly, the troops were already working to stretch their rations beyond the ten days they had been told to make them last. And they were having no trouble doing that.  However General Smith did not allow his men to tarry at the springs or forage too much along their route. That very afternoon Smith pushed his men forward through Rock Springs,  5 miles to Harkinson's Ferry -  the main crossing of the Big Black River by the Port Gibson Road.  They arrived there just as the day was ending, and after a brief exchange of cannon fire the 20th Ohio Infantry stormed across the bridge, forcing the rebels to assume that Grant was going to make a drive directly for Vicksburg, just 20 miles further north.  The Yankees did little more than raid up the road, but if an immediate  assault in Vicksburg was not Grant's intention, what was next for the Army of the Tennessee?

Before he had even crossed the Mississippi  River, Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant (above) understood what he was risking by passing below the still active guns at Vicksburg. He would write later, “To have no communications - to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole army without a rear link was a tremendous gamble!" Once over the river he could not retreat, there would be no rescue and no resupply. He could not merely stay where he was.  He had to fight and he had to win, every fight and every skirmish. A single reversal could force him to pause and any pause would spell doom.  But fight who, and fight where?

There was still the possibility of joining with Nathaniel Banks( above)  and his 30,000 man Army of the Gulf,  together crushing Port Hudson and then marching north to Vicksburg with 70,000 men.   But Banks had been tempted to follow a will-o-wisp of easy victories up Bayou Teeche, moving farther away from the key battleground of the Mississippi River.  The Massachusetts political general would not meet his promised return date of 10 May in front of Port Hudson.  And Grant could not wait until Banks returned. Grant had the initiative, and he could not surrender it,  else Pemberton would eventually gather strength against him. He most move forward. And after a bath in the newly liberated fortress of Grand Gulf, Grant rode north to keep a close eye on his most troublesome subordinate, Major General John McClernand.

Grant arrived at Rocky Springs after a daylong ride, "...by a strange and circuitous road." The next morning he might move directly on Vicksburg.  But he had only some 30,000 men in 2 corps drawing up to the Big Black River south of the city.  And Pemberton had about that same number in the new fortifications on the eastern side of Vicksburg.  Isolated as he was , Grant could not afford any battle which offered him less than favorable odds.   Deep in his enemies' rear,  he must keep the Confederates divided and not allow them to concentrate against him. Grant truly had the elephant by the tail.  He needed Sherman to join him, as quickly as possible.

- 30 -

VICKSBURG Chapter Thirty-Two

As sunlight first struck Virginia on Monday, 4 May, 1863, both armies were staggering back from the disaster of the battle of Chancellorsville. The 133,000 man Federal Army of the Potomac under Joe Hooker had literally been worse than decimated, losing some 17,000 men - 1,600 dead, 9,800 wounded and almost 6,000 captured or missing. - almost 13% of their total strength.   But the 60,000 man rebel Army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee had suffered some 13,000 causalities - 1,700 dead, 9,000 wounded and over 2,000 captured or missing – or over 20% of their strength. 

General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker,  although still in command,  rightly bore most of the blame for the Federal failure.  He was mocked in the press both south (above) and north.  However, although few could see it at the time, the tragedy was a tactical victory for the Confederates, but a strategic defeat.

Two advantages helped disguise the scale of the disaster for General Lee's army.  First and foremost, General Longstreet's corps had not been present at Chancellorsville.  Lee (above) had been forced to disperse one third of his army,  some  30,000 men , to southern tidewater Virginia, so they could be fed.  They would now be rejoining Lee -  combat veterans, fresh and not blunted by a wasting battle.   And secondly, Lee had won a clear psychological victory over Hooker.  Lee, it seemed  always won his battles with the Army of the Potomac. But Lee knew better.

The only shadow which seemed to darken this victory was that Lee's right hand man,  the  religiously fanatical General “Stonewall” Jackson,  had lost his left arm at Chancellorsville.  He was bedridden now, and would not be available to General Lee on his invasion of Pennsylvania. And Lee must invade. His army would never be stronger.  And only in the north would the Confederacy find the surpluses to feed, clothe and arm their soldiers.

Meanwhile, in Mississippi, most of the 42,000 men under Lieutenant General John Pemberton were

marching to realign after Grant's attack around the rebel right flank. There were now about 33,000 men in and around Vicksburg, another 6,000 in and around Jackson, with perhaps 2,000 men in Port Hudson on the Mississippi, just above Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  Pemberton's first impulse had been to abandon Port Hudson and call the garrison back to Vicksburg,  but Confederate President Jefferson Davis had countermanded that order.  In fact, over the next few weeks Davis would feed another 10,000 reinforcements into the isolated post, while commanders elsewhere in the state would be starved for men.

One of the most powerful Confederate regiments was on a forced march to Grand Gulf that morning - the 400 plus men of the 26^th Mississippi Infantry.   In April they had repelled the Federals at Fort Pemberton.  They might have used the Southern Railroad to save some time, but after the raid on Newton Station, that line was no longer available.  The only way to get from the Yazoo delta to Grand Gulf was on foot.  And for 2 and a half days they had been marching under their colonel, A.E. Reynolds.  But they only got as far as Bayou Pierre before running into the Federals, who were marching north to meet them.

Their commander, the acquisitive Arthur Exum Reynolds,  was a big man in Tishomingo County - he was rich, he was politically powerful and he was fat. The 300 pound lawyer (above, evidently holding in his gut)  had moved to the north eastern corner of Mississippi in the early 1840's, once the Chickasaw native peoples had been forced out.  After the Presidential election of 1860, as a wealthy state representative "A.E." was a natural choice to represent his county at the secession convention. He agreed with the majority that "Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery",  but like 16 others he voted to wait until other states had joined the rebellion before taking the ultimate step.

When they did, "A.E." raised his own 400 man regiment. He was unanimously elected Colonel of the 26^th.  They arrived at Fort Donaldson, Tennessee in February of 1862 (above) - just in time to suffer 12 dead and 69 wounded in their and General Grant's first major battle.  During that engagement, "A.E."'s horse was killed, and the substantial Colonel, while uninjured, lacked the wind to keep up with his unit under his own power. So he led from his rear. The entire regiment, including A.E., were forced to surrender. They were paroled and reformed in September at Jackson, Mississippi. The 46 year old A.E. was again in command as they skirmished with Grant's army during his December 1862 advance to and January 1863 retreat from Grenada, Mississippi.  And now under orders from the profane General Loring, A.E. offered only token resistance to the advancing Yankees.

Captain Patterson's Kentucky Federal engineers worked all night to repair the bridge over the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, and at 5:30 the morning of Monday, 4 May, 1863, General Smith's division crossed the bridge and continued up the Port Gibson road toward Willow Springs. As they approached the tiny community a battery of rebel artillery from the Mississippi 26th made a show of firing a few rounds, but retreated before Federal artillery could return the favor. And with that the valuable water supply of Willow Springs fell into Union hands.

While the Yankees were refilling their canteens a civilian plantation owner appeared riding a mule and demanding to speak with the officer in charge. The General's soldiers, the outraged plantation owner complained, had stolen everything in his larder - pigs and cows and horses. 

The man demanded his property be returned and the thieves punished. The craggy General Smith calmly ask the planter who owned the mule he had arrived upon. It was his mule, responded the planter. Well, said General Smith, the thieves could not have been his men, because his men would not have left the mule behind. And with that the planter was sent on his way.

Clearly, the troops were already working to stretch their rations beyond the ten days they had been told to make them last. And they were having no trouble doing that.  However General Smith did not allow his men to tarry at the springs or forage too much along their route. That very afternoon Smith pushed his men forward through Rock Springs,  5 miles to Harkinson's Ferry -  the main crossing of the Big Black River by the Port Gibson Road from Vicksburg.  They arrived there just as the day was ending, and after a brief exchange of cannon fire the 20th Ohio Infantry stormed across the bridge, forcing the rebels to assume that Grant was going to make a drive directly for Vicksburg, just 20 miles further north.  The Yankees did little more than raid up the road, but if an immediate  assault in Vicksburg was that was not Grant's intention, what was next for the Army of the Tennessee?

Before he had even crossed the Mississippi  River, Lieutenant General Ulysses Simpson Grant (above) understood what he was risking by passing below the still active guns at Vicksburg. He would write later, “To have no communications - to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole army without a rear link was a tremendous gamble!" It meant there could be no retreat,  no rescue and no resupply. He could not merely stay where he was.  He had to fight and he had to win, every fight and every skirmish. A single reversal could force him to pause and spell doom.  But fight who, and fight where?

There was still the possibility of joining with Nathaniel Banks( above)  and his 30,000 man Army of the Gulf,  together  crushing Port Hudson and then marching north to Vicksburg with 70,000 men.   But Banks had been tempted to follow a will-o-wisp of easy victories up Bayou Teeche, moving farther away from the key battleground of the Mississippi River.  The Massachusetts political general would not meet his promised return date of 10 May in front of Port Hudson.  And Grant could not surrender all he had won to turn south and wait until Banks returned. Grant had the initiative, and he could not surrender it,  else Pemberton would eventually gather strength against him. He most move forward. And after a bath in the newly liberated fortress of Grand Gulf, Grant rode north to keep a close eye on his most troublesome subordinate, Major General John McClernand.

Grant arrived at Rocky Springs after a daylong ride, "...by a strange and circuitous road." The next morning he might move directly on Vicksburg.  But he had only some 30,000 men in 2 corps drawing up to the Big Black River south of the city.  And Pemberton had about that same number in the new fortifications on the eastern side of Vicksburg.  Isolated as he was , Grant could not afford any battle which offered him less than favorable odds, as an attack against trenches and forts did.  Deep in his enemies' rear,  he must keep the Confederates divided and not allow them to concentrate against him. Grant truly had the elephant by the tail.  He needed Sherman to join him, as quickly as possible.

- 30 -

FIRST BLOOD Part Six

I think it was William Tecumseh Sherman who best described Bull Run as, “one of the best-planned battles, but one of the worst fought.” And Sherman knew, since he was a Colonel in General Tyler's division, a spectator on the north side of the stone bridge while the battle raged south of the muddy meandering Bull Run. The fighting began about 9:30 that Sunday morning, 21 July, 1861, as the first federal soldiers wadded across Sudley Springs ford. They were the Second Rhode Island regiment, commanded by the tall, pleasant and amiable 38 year old Ambrose Burnside (above), an example of the Peter Principle a century before its enumeration. Brave, jovial, bright and easy going, he seemed a natural choice for command, but doubted his own competence, and proved it by becoming “obstinate and unimaginative” when given responsibility His men scrambled up the high southern bank of Bull Run in exactly the right place and moment to make Colonel Burnside a general.

Thirty minutes earlier the 1,000 men of General “Shanks” Evans battalion had been guarding the Warenton Turnpike where it crossed over that stone bridge at the northern base of Henry House hill.   Now they were over a mile to the northwest, trying to throw out a skirmish line on the forested northern slope of Mathews' House hill.

Unable to see more than a few yards in any direction, the zouaves of the First Louisiana Volunteers regiment, under Major Chatham Wheat, took a volley of friendly fire from another rebel unit, killing 3 men. Many of these “Tigers” had been “filibusters” in William Walkers' 1857-58 attempt to establish a slave state in Nicaragua. Armies from Costa Rica, Salvador and Honduras had eventually crushed the slavers, and Walker had been hanged in Honduras in September of 1860. But even now the filibusters remained true believers in slavery, and were reforming behind a split rail fence just as Burnside's men moved out of the trees at the top of the embankment.

The first volley fired by Evan's brigade was “A perfect hail storm of bullets, round shot and shell “, according to Rhode Island Private Sam English. But Burnside's men held (above), and after a five minute fire fight, they drove the rebels fell back. Twice more, Evens led his men forward, using the brush and a corn field to disguise his meager force.

After about fifteen minutes, Colonel John Slocum led a New Hampshire and a New York regiment in a general assault. The 5,000 federal troops pushed Even's 1,000 man brigade off the hill top. The retreat was stopped at the bottom  by the shallow creek called Young's branch, or the Chinn Branch.

From atop Henry House Hill, and seeing Major Evans preparing his men for a fourth assault, General Bernard Bee sent a note urging Evans to fall back. Instead Evans asked for help. General Bee gave into the impulse, and ordered his 2,000 man brigade forward, across the Warrenton Pike, splashing through the shallow Young's Branch, and alongside Even's brigade, up Mathew's House hill yet again. “Here is the battlefield,” he told his men, “and we are for it.”

The two sides stood within yards of each other, firing, reloading and firing again, the rebel assault blunted by more of McDowell's left hook climbing up from Sudley Springs ford. There were now close to 10,000 men battling on the Mathews' House Hill, the majority federal. And then, without warning, the rebels found themselves caught in a crossfire as federal troops suddenly appeared at their backs.

During the morning, Colonel William T. Sherman, a spectator on the north side of Bull Run, had seen a Confederate officer easily crossing Bull Run at a spot he noted. It was the hidden Farm ford. Just before noon, when General McDowell authorized Tyler's division to make an assault over the stone bridge (above), Sherman used his initiative to launch his regiment unresisted over his newly discovered ford. When Sherman's men fired into their backs, the rebel line crumpled, the survivors falling back to the crest of Henry House hill. General McDowell now arrived on Mathews' House hill, and ordered his artillery units to begin shelling the rebel positions, while his two divisions reformed for an assault on Henry House hill.

It was at this moment that Generals Beauregard and Johnston arrived on Henry House hill. The “Little Napoleon” began rallying Evan's exhausted soldiers at the crest, while Johnston rode toward the rear, to speed up the arrival of the rest of his Shenandoah battalions. At the same time, Thomas Jackson's 5 Virginia regiments arrived. But instead of forming on the crest of the hill with the others,  Jackson formed his men just behind the crest and ordered them to lay down. Using the hill to protect his men from the federal cannon fire, was a trick the Duke of Wellington had used to defeat the real Napoleon at Waterloo.

Seeing McDowell pushing forward almost 9,000 men toward Henry House hill, a desperate General Bee urged Jackson to advance his brigade forward. But unlike Bee, Jackson stayed right where he was.

Bee complained to his staff, “Look, there stands Jackson.  Like a stone wall”. Without Jackson's support the rest of the rebel flank began to give in the face of the advancing federal infantry. 

Then, just before stepping into effective musket range, McDowell ordered his men to halt, and brought forward two batteries of cannon, the 5^th U.S. artillery under Major Charles Griffin and the 1^st U.S. artillery under James Ricketts, to blast the rebel line, point blank.

The gunners positioned themselves with blue coated infantry to guard their flanks. As the 11 federal guns began firing across 300 yards at the 13 cannon supporting Jackson's brigade, the blue coated troops on one of the federal gunner's flank suddenly let loose a murderous volley on the gunners. (above) They were in fact 250 blue coated men of Arthur Cumming's 33^rd Virginia regiment, part of Jackson's brigade. At Cumming's command, his troops then charged the federal guns. Almost 50 of the rebels died in the assault, and almost half were wounded. But the federal battery was captured and turned on the federal line when Jackson's entire brigade stood and began returning the federal volleys. The federals charged, retook the guns, then lost them again, then retook them a third time. But the rebel battle line had stabilized alongside Jackson.

Rushing back and forth across his weakening battle line, Beauregard kept his men shooting. Then he saw the end approaching – more federal troops coming in on his left. General Beauregard was about to order a general retreat.

But the advancing troops were in fact the final Shenandoah brigades, part of Kirby Smith's battalion, and Jubal Early's from over on the rebel left. Together they were able to outflank the federal troops, and Beauregard ordered a general advance.

Under pressure across the line, the federal left began to crumble, and with Tyler refusing or unable to feed any more troops over the narrow stone bridge, General McDowell ordered a withdrawal.

The federal retreat was brilliantly handled at first. There was some panic when a rebel artillery shell landed on the bridge over Chub Run, and among the Washington elite who had gone forward to watch the fight, but in truth the image of a panic (above) has been greatly exaggerated. The exhausted federal troops could not be stopped at Centerville, but that was because the reserves were too weak to protect the retreating men. But the federal army largely stayed in good order, covered by Colonel Sherman's regiment. And the rebels were in no condition themselves to make the bad federal position, any worse.

It had been the bloodiest day in American history to date. There were 460 federal soldiers dead on the field, and over 1,100 wounded, many of whom would later die. Worse, there were 1,300 missing or taken prisoner. Confederate losses were about 390 killed, 1,500 wounded and just 13 missing. In terms of blood, the battle had been pretty much a draw. And by later battles the cost had been low. But this was only the first blood, the first major battle of a war that was too soon dwarf  the effort this day. 

The hero of the battle was clearly Colonel Thomas Jackson (above),  hereafter known as “Stonewall Jackson”. The accusation became an honor in large part because General Bee, who uttered it, was dead on Henry House hill.

On the federal side the villain was equally clear – General Robert Patterson (above). He was supposed to have held Johnston's men in the Shenandoah Valley. He did not. It could have been he could not. But as early as 19 July, the day after the “battle” of Blackburn's ford, and two days before the battle of Bull Run, Winfield Scott had ordered Patterson back to Harpers Ferry, and relieved him of command. Scott already knew, and McDowell already knew on that date,  that Johnston's 10,000 men were heading for Manassas Junction. But the approaching loss of the 90 day militia made the battle of Bull Run mandatory. And the north had come very close to winning it despite Johnston's reinforcement of Beauregard

The “Little Napoleon”, General Gustave Toutant Beauregard (above), was hailed as the hero of the Battle of Manassas Junction – Confederates always named their battles after the nearest town, the union after the nearest river. But within a few weeks Beauregard had so insulted President Jefferson Davis and his fellow officers, the Little Napoleon would be transferred first to the west, and later out of the war entirely. The man who sent the warning of the federal flanking movement, Captain Edward Porter Alexander, would come to command all artillery in the rebel Army of Northern Virginia, and conduct the largest bombardment of the war, on the afternoon of the third day at Gettysburg, preparing the way for the doomed Picket's charge.

Of the union veterans of Bull Run – the federal fight – William T. Sherman (above) would end the war, having carved his name across the deep south, all the way from Atlanta, Georgia, to North Carolina. 

Ambrose Burnside would lend his name to the fuzz on his cheeks – sideburns- and had already designed the standard cavalry carbine used during the last 2 years of the war, although he would not profit from it. But promoted to the his level of incompetence, over all commander of the federal Army of the Potomac, he would be most remembered as man who pointlessly sacrificed thousands of federal lives at Fredricksburg. 

And Major Charles Griffin (above), the man who lost his battery at Bull Run, would rise to the rank of Major General, and be a witness at Appomattox Court House when Robert E. Lee would surrender the rebel army of Northern Virginia , and end the war.

Rose O'Neal Greenhow, the pro-slavery fanatic, would be arrested in Washington for betraying McDowell's plans. At the end of May 1862 she would be handed over to the Confederacy.  Jefferson Davis welcomed her in Richmond, and credited her with winning the battle, in part because it downplayed Beauregard's efforts. But then what to do with her? He shipped her to Europe, where she attempted to convince the Europeans that slavery was not evil. Much of the royalty, who did not think much of their own people, welcomed her. But the disapproval of the working classes prevented the blue bloods from doing more than inviting her to parties, and buying her book.

In September 1864, the lady was returning home. Outside of Wilmington, North Carolina, the last open harbor in the rebel south, her ship ran aground, and Rose insisted on setting out for shore in a row boat. The boat over turned and Rose Greenhow, the queen of antebellum Washington society, disappeared beneath the waves. Her body washed up on shore the next morning. She had been pulled under by the $2,000 in gold she had carried sewn into her dress, earned for her white-washed defense of the indefensible

- 30 -