PEACE Part Two FAILURE OF SUCCESS

I was surprised to discover, after actually reading the famous "Potsdam Declaration", issued in July 29, 1945, that it says nothing about Japan. The public statement released concerning Japan was the "Potsdam Statement", which was issued on July 26th.The confusion is an easy mistake to make. The tone of the "Declaration" and the "Statement" are similar, as they were both issued in triumphant from amidst the rubble of a vanquished and occupied Nazi Germany. But where the "Decrlaration" is also a working blueprint for the shape of Europe's future, the "Statement" is pure American politics: part boastful victory display, and part pure posturing for the voters back home. It was signed by the U.S., Great Britain and China, but it had been written by and for the Americans.

The Pacific was America's war, beginning on December 7, 1941, the "date which will live in infamy...".  And the Potsdam Statement began with a blunt warning, “The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry…of the whole German people…”   The statement was blunt and it was accurate.

In the 44 months since Pearl Harbor the United States had largely supplied the allied victory in Europe, and at the same time the nation had built eight new battleships, 13 heavy cruisers, 2 large cruisers, 33 light cruisers, 18 heavy aircraft carriers, 76 light or jeep carriers, more than 600 destroyers and destroyer escorts, plus 4,000 large landing craft and 79,000 small landing craft, all of this almost solely for use against Japan.

The U.S. Marine Corp had grown to over half a million men and the U.S. Army to one million men in actual fighting divisions in the Pacific. And it was this force, supplied in abundance and seeking revenge, which was descending upon Japan in the summer of 1945. Americans could be forgiven if they had come to believe that they were the single greatest military machine on the planet.

It was that supreme confidence and a sense of moral outrage and the thurst for revenge which explained the haughtily tone in which the U.S. informed Japan that the “Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed …Japanese territory…shall be occupied…Japanese sovereignty shall be limited….as we determine…(and) stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals…We call…(for the) unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces,…The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.” It could almost have been written by an American political speechwriter; In fact, it was.

But the Japanese, reading this statement, noted two things; first, the Russians had not signed it; and two, there was no direct mention of the Emperor. They had of course already noticed that American propaganda often included hateful images of the Emperor. And the section about removing “...those who have deceived and misled” seemed to the Japanese, and to most Americans, to refer directly to the Emperor. In 1945 the Japanese leadership was prepared to destroy the entire nation to prevent Hirohito, and the army leadership,  from standing trial like mere mortals.

From the 1890’s on, all Japanese children were indoctrinated in the belief that the nation and the Emperor were synonymous, that Japan began and ended with the Chrysanthemum Throne. According to the Imperial Cult, the Emperor was a spiritual leader, closer to a pope than a king. His subjects fought “for the Emperor” even as they took orders from mortal men who ran the government, men like Tojo.

Hirohito certainly approved of the wars against China, England and America, but they were not "his" wars. He had not ordered them and was often a mere prop for the war makers. He was not expected to speak at meetings of his "Big Six" cabinet. Besides, Japan had a long and ancient history of ignoring or “working around” in-convienent imperial wishes; which was the problem the Emperor now faced in ending the war.

Like all Kings and Presidents, he was a prisoner of his office, but the Edo Palace was especially confining. Without a free press Hirohito only knew what his staff and advisors told him. And they rarely knew everything going on what was nominally his kingdom.  Worse, the Emperor could only act through his staff.  He, like everyone else in Japan, believed the nation could not survive without the Emperor. And he had come, finally, to believe his throne could not survive unless the war was ended quickly. Now he had to convince the Americans that without his moral impinture, there would be no Japan which could surrender to the Americans. 

- 30 -

PEACE Part One THEORY

I have begun to wonder just how we can end will the war in Afghanistan. In this endeavor we are haunted by

the old dictum from American Civil War General,  U.S. Grant; "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender." But the reality was that when Grant demanded those terms at Fort Donaldson in 1862, they immediately were rejected by the Confederate commander, General Buckner. And Grant immediately modified his offer.  Despite this President Roosevelt issued the same demand in World War Two of Germany and Japan. And because Germany was crushed and occupied, the “Greatest Generation” and their children, still expects all American wars to end like World War Two in Europe did. But the truth is that even WWII did not end in "absolute and total victory".   Let me try to show the reality of how we ended World War Two in the Pacific, the most heartless bloodbath America has ever been caught up in.

Logically, America and Japan's war in the Pacific should have ended on Sunday, July 9th, 1944. On that day, at 16:15 hours (4:15pm local time), the American commander Admiral Richmond J. Turner declared the island of Saipan secured. The everyone agreed at the time the victory had been decisive. In the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, three Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk and 600 aircraft and pilots were destroyed. The United States lost just 123 planes, and 80 of those experienced air crews were rescued. On the ground, on Saipan  30,000 Japanese soldiers and 22,000 civilians had died for the emperor. The United States lost about 2,949 dead, and 10,364 wounded. That ratio of 10 Japanese dead for every one American dead, had been fairly constant through the war in the Pacific.  And even before Admiral Turner’s pronouncement, U.S. Navy Construction Battalions (the amazing C.B.’s) had begun turning the island into the world’s largest airport, from which, eventually, 2,000 B-29’s heavy bombers would turn Japanese factories and cities into torches.

The Japanese recognized it. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, the architect of the war with America, and his entire cabinet resigned, nine days after Admiral Turner's pronouncement. This was unambiguous proof that every Japanese senior commander knew that the Japan had lost the war. But Japanese leadership now held onto the dream that if they could bleed America enough, if the Japanese could kill enough Americans in just one more big battle, they would win a more favorable peace from the Americans. In conquering Iwo Jima the United States suffered 8,621 dead and 19,189 wounded, and at Okinawa, on the threshold of Japan itself, America suffered 12,513 dead and 38,513 wounded But in those two invasions, Japan would lose 21,000 dead and 130,000 dead. The Americans still gave no hint of bending on terms. The Japanese strategy was not working..

But even after those bloodbaths, no Japanese leader even hinted in public that they might be willing to negotiate a peace with the Americans. In part this was because the Japanese saw no evidence that America was having any second thoughts about "Unconditional Surrender", and in part because the Japanese military was driven by its most radical leadership. Japan's public silence on the issue of a negotiations, amounted to the mass murder of their own citizens and soldiers,  of the U.S. forces closing in on them, and the hundreds of thousands of civilians from occupied nations (mostly China) caught between the avenging Americans and the silent fatalistic fanatics of Japan.

It takes only one nation  to start a war, but it takes two nations to make was peace. And there were a few,  mostly in Washington, D.C. and at Pearl Harbor, who realized it was no longer in either America or Japan's best interests, to continue this slaughter. How could these few find a way to convince the majority on both sides  to stop the killing?.

- 30-

HOW TO END A WAR: PART FIVE

I believe the long argument about just what would have been the human cost for an invasion of Japan in 1945 can be settled by knowing that the United States has not had to order a single new Purple Heart decoration to be manufactured for a wounded United States soldier, sailor or airman since 1945; the tolls from Korea, Vietnam and Iraq have not emptied the stockpiles intended for presentation to causalities suffered during an invasion of Japan in 1945-46.

General Douglas MacArthur, eager for glory after having been chosen to lead the invasion of Japan, tried to convince President Truman that it would cost "only" 500,000 causalities. But Truman had his own estimate, produced by former President Herbert Hoover. Hoover, using his old skills as an economist, and backed up by an independent study group estimated the real cost would be closer to a million dead and wounded. And with the example of the death toll from Okinawa as supporting evidence, Truman became a believer in Hoover’s numbers. (In my opinion, that deceptive reduction in causality estimates justified Dugout Dug’s immediate recall. Only his political clout with Republicans in Washington saved his command until another day.)

So the horrific casuality estimates for an invasion of Japan, plus the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which was gobbling up Asian real estate, were both factors encouraging Truman’s decesion to get out of this war as quickly as possible. This was what was driving the half hidden compromise offered over the emperor. And oddly enough they were the same factors driving the Japanese decision to accept the compromise and the occupation. The U.S. then issued the prompt instruction to the Japanese Government to “…Send emissaries at once…fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander….” And, as a sop for MacArthur’s deflated ego over the glorious armageddon he would not get to lead on the beaches of Kyushu, “…General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers…” The universe had finally recognized Doug as a supreme being, and that was all that he really wanted – that and some mass genuflection. His mother must have been very pleased.Contact was quickly made with the Japanese government via radio. First. General MacArthur ordered the immediate cessation of hostilities and then asked the Japanese what time convienent time they chosen for the ceasefire to begin. MacArthur's staff did designate the radio frequencies to be used in all future communications by the Japanese (13705 and 15965 kilocycles). And when they got to the emissaries journey they were very specific: They should leave Sata Misaki, on the southern tip of Kyushu, “between the hours of 0800 and 1100 Tokyo time” on the morning of August 17th in two Douglas DC-3 type transport planes, painted white with large green crosses on the wings and fuselage. In communications regarding this flight, the code designation "Bataan" will be employed.” It was anticipated the Japanese would get the irony. They did not. But American voters certainly would, and Doug was always thinking about what the American voters would think.

The Japanese replied that the Emperor had ordered the ceasefire for all Japanese forces at 1600 hours on August 16, so the Americans did the same. There were, of course, sparks of flame that refused to die. Sixteen suicide bombers attacked U.S. warships off Japan hours after the ceasefire had been ordered. All were shot down. I wonder if their commander even told the pilots of the ceasefire order. In fact, Tokyo shamefacedly informed MacArthur that members of the royal family were being dispatched to deliver the cease fire order in person. That admission told the Americans volumes about the volatility of the situation in Japan, and probably accounted for the leeway granted to the Japanese in timing the whole thing.

In fact this incident also highlights how important it was that the two sides were now talking, even by radio, and could thus explain events that previously could only have been interpreted in the most antagonistic way. If they had simply started talking earlier, even while the fighting continued, thousands of lives might have been saved.Finally, on August 19th, the Japanese were able to notify the Americans that, “The planes carrying the party of representatives have left Kisarazu Airdrome (in Tokyo) on 0718”. Again, there was fear on the Japanese side that a diehard might attempt to disrupt this mission for peace. So the planes took off secretly, with sealed orders. Only after becoming airborne was the flight plan revealed. Following the American instructions as closely as possible, the two aircraft, one a Mitsubishi G4M1-L2 (Betty) transport aircraft, and the other a Mitsubishi G4M1 (Betty) bomber (complete with a few bullet holes) which had been hastily modified for seating the 8 emissaries that flew in each plane. Each aircraft had been painted white with large green crosses on the wings and fuselage. They were known hereafter in Japanese history as the Green Cross Flights. They reached Sata Misaki on the southern tip of Kyushu at about 11 A.M. They then flew a course of 180 degrees to a point 36 miles North of le Shima Island, and began to circle at about 6,000 feet.Almost immediately the two aircraft were intercepted by twelve Lockheed P-38 twin tailed fighters, from the 49th fighter group under Majors Jack McClure and Wendal Decker. The two Bettys called out to the Americans in English on the prearranged frequency of 6970 kilohertz, repeating the password “Bataan”. Jack McClure responded, “We are Bataan’s watchdog. Follow us.” As the 14 aircraft continued on toward le Shima, the P-38’s began doing acrobatics to thumb their noses at the defeated enemy. On the way they were joined by two 2 B-25’s from the 345th . The Americans were not going to let any die hard kamikazes or hot headed Americans, interfere with this operation. Jack McClure landed first at Birch Airstrip on la Shima, followed by the two Betty’s. The first Betty landed safely but the second made a rough landing on the crushed corral strip and ran off the end of the runway by several feet, damaging the plane's landing gear. Still the strange white machines with large green crosses were down safe, and immediately surrounded by armed guards.

On this island, where the gentle genius Ernie Pyle had been killed by a Japanese sniper just a few weeks earlier, heavily armed men from both sides who had spent three long years bathed in violence and fear, who by training and experience despised their enemy, murdered him on sight and viewed him as less than human, would for the first time since Pearl Harbor physically touch each other in peace. One witness remembered the first man out of the Betty wore shorts.

Formalities were quickly performed and 20 minutes later the 8 commissioners were guided up a ladder into the four engine C-54 transport, a luxurious accommodation compared to the war worn Betty’s. The C-54 climbed off the coral and headed for Manila while the Betty’s crewmembers were guided to a holding area.On the flight to Manila the Japanese delegation was served box lunches with pineapple juice and coffee, with sugar. It was a lunch the front line soldiers rarely if ever saw, but it was common travel meal for senior American officers, and it had the intended effect upon the emissaries. They were impressed with the American determination to transfer their lifestyles even to a war zone. And like the Japanese visitors to my fourth grade class some fifteen years later, the emissaries offered to tip the Americans. They were politely refused. After arriving in Tokyo the delegation was driven through the streets of a still devastated Manila to the Rosario Manor hotel, where they were provided with a Turkey dinner; again an unexpected treat. Meat had been unavailable in Japan for over a year. And, wonder of wonders, the Japanese were each given a can of hard candies.What followed was a further surprise. Taken next to the Manila city hall, the Japanese sat at a conference table opposite the Americans, and found that all the Americans were interested in was in solving problems; where were minefields in Tokyo Bay, could they be quickly cleared, could we help? Where were the American POW camps in Japan, could we drop supplies to them, and where and when could the occupation troops arrive? There were problems, but most were rectified. Nineteen hours later the emissaries left Manila, each with a can of hard candies. It had all be easier than they had worried. The Americans were firm but not gloating. And the emissaries returned with the message that, by and large, a defeated Japan was going to be treated fairly by the Americans. And the war was going to end as quickly as possible, because of it.But it was after they returned to le Shima, that their mission of peace was almost derailed, right at the very edge of success.

- 30 -